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This dissertation develops a discrete choice equilibrium model to evaluate the 
benefits of the air quality improvements that occurred in the Los Angeles area following 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).  Large improvements in air quality will 
change the desirability of different neighborhoods, isrupting the equilibrium of the 
housing market.   The discrete choice equilibrium approach accounts for the fact that air 
quality improvements brought about by the 1990 CAAA will change housing choices and 
prices. The dissertation makes two empirical contribu ions to public economics. First, the 
study provides the first application of the discrete choice equilibrium framework (Anas, 
1982, Bayer et al., 2005) to the valuation of large environmental changes. Second, the 
study provides new evidence for the distributional benefits of the 1990 CAAA in the Los 
Angeles area.  
Households’ location choices are modeled according to the random utility framework 
of McFadden (1978) and the differentiated product specification of Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1995). The model is estimated with public-use household microdata from the 
1990 U.S. Census. Findings suggest that the air quality improvements that occurred in the 
Los Angeles area between 1990 and 2000 provided an average equilibrium welfare 
benefit of $1,800 to households. In contrast, averag  benefits are $1,400 when 
equilibrium price effects are not accounted, demonstrating that ignoring equilibrium 
effects will likely underestimate the benefits of large environmental changes. We find 
that the equilibrium welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA in the Los Angeles area varied 
significantly across income groups. Households in the highest income quartile 
experienced equilibrium benefits of approximately $3,600 as compared to only $400 for 
households in the lowest income quartile. We also find that ignoring equilibrium 
adjustments in housing prices can significantly alter the distribution of relative welfare 
gains (i.e. welfare gains as a proportion of household income) across households. Indeed, 
welfare impacts that do not account for equilibrium adjustments suggest that high-income 
households experience larger relative welfare gains compared to low-income households. 
However, when accounting for equilibrium adjustments, we find that the distribution of 
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Environmental regulations such as the Clean Air Act can lead to large air quality changes 
which cover wide areas and affect many residential communities. These types of 
widespread non-marginal improvements in air quality will have significant equilibrium 
welfare effects across local jurisdictions as households re-evaluate their residential 
location choices and equilibrium housing prices adjust. Traditional approaches to 
evaluating the impacts of air quality regulation have relied on direct welfare measures. 
These welfare measures are recovered directly from the estimated preference function of 
consumers using either the hedonic framework (Rosen, 1974) or the discrete choice 
framework (McFadden, 1973, 1978). However, these welfare measures do not explicitly 
account for the adjustments in housing prices which will occur when widespread non-
marginal changes lead households to re-sort in the housing market. As a result, they will 
generally underestimate the full, i.e. equilibrium, welfare gains from regulations that 
result in widespread non-marginal improvements1 in environmental amenities (Bartik, 
1988). 
Recent studies by Sieg et al. (2004) and Smith et al. (2004) have shown that 
incorporating equilibrium price effects can significantly alter the estimates of welfare 
benefits from large environmental improvements. Forinstance, Sieg et al. (2004) find 
that the reductions in ozone levels during the fiveyears following the implementation of 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments led to equilibrium price increases ranging from 
11% to 20% in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area. These price changes resulted in 
                                                      
1 These are changes that are large enough to alter the stock of environmental quality in the market. As an 
example, consider the cleanup of all toxic waste sites in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. 
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equilibrium welfare gains that were 13 percent higher than the direct benefits estimates 
that do not account for equilibrium adjustments. 
This dissertation develops a discrete choice locatin l equilibrium model to evaluate 
the benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) to Los Angeles area 
households. The study makes two empirical contributions to public economics. First, the 
study provides the first application of the discrete choice equilibrium framework (Anas, 
1980, 1982) to the valuation of large environmental changes. Households’ location 
choices are modeled according to the random utility framework of McFadden (1978). 
The equilibrium model is closely related to the model of Bayer et al. (2005). This, more 
recent, discrete choice equilibrium model follows the differentiated product specification 
of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), henceforth BLP, by incorporating unobserved 
attributes of residential locations in the household utility function. The discrete choice 
equilibrium framework provides an alternative to the framework proposed by Sieg et al. 
(2004) for evaluating the welfare impacts of large environmental improvements. It also 
allows for a richer characterization of households’ substitution patterns and preference 
heterogeneity.  
Second, the study provides new evidence for the distributional benefits of the CAAA 
in the Los Angeles area. Using the changes in ozone lev ls that occurred in the Los 
Angeles area between 1990 and 2000 we estimate average welfare benefits as well as the 
distribution of welfare gains across income groups. Recently, Sieg et al (2004) have 
provided estimates of the benefits of the CAAA based on the changes in ozone levels that 
took place between 1990 and 1995. With the availability of air quality monitoring data 
for the year 2000, we are able to evaluate the benefits of the CAAA from 1990 to 2000. 
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Little is known about the distribution of the benefits among households from the 1990 
CAAA regulations. The only attempts at such an analysis have focused on the spatial 
distribution of welfare gains.2 In other words, welfare gains in predominantly high-
income neighborhoods are compared with those in low-income neighborhoods. This 
approach, however, fails to capture the distribution of welfare gains and losses across 
household characteristics such as income and race. It only provides a comparison of the 
welfare gains across neighborhoods. 
The study also sheds new lights on the performance of the representative consumer 
approach to approximating expected compensating variation (ECV) welfare measures in 
discrete choice random utility models. A general closed form expression for ECV does 
not exist since the compensating variation (CV) measure can be a nonlinear function of 
the stochastic component of the utility. Two numerical approaches have been suggested 
for recovering ECV. Morey et al. (1993) suggested approximating ECV by simply 
computing the CV for a representative consumer. McFadden (1999) suggested a Markov 
chain Monte-Carlo simulation approach for recovering the ECV of each individual 
consumer. McFadden argues that the representative consumer approximation to ECV is 
biased when large changes are considered. However, in a study of fishing mode choices 
by California anglers, Herriges and Kling (1999) find that the two approaches lead to 
similar welfare results. We provide additional empirical evidence on the relative 
performance of these two approaches in the context of measuring equilibrium welfare 
impacts. 
                                                      
2 See for example Shadbegian et al. (2004). Smith et al. (2004) investigate the distributional impacts of the 
1990 CAAA using the projected air quality changes, in the Los Angeles Area for the year 2000, from the 
EPA’s 1999 prospective study. However, the actual air quality changes between 1990 and 2000 
significantly differ from the EPA projections. 
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Household preferences are estimated using a dataset which includes households and 
housing units from the 1990 Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), annual 
ozone summaries from the California Air Resource Board, school performance data from 
the California Department of Education, and crime indices from the California Criminal 
Justice Statistics Center. Households’ residential location choices are characterized by a 
discrete choice model in which equilibrium conditions are enforced. The model captures 
the heterogeneity of household preferences for location amenities by incorporating 
observed household characteristics in the utility function. Observed household 
characteristics include household income, household size, employment location and 
educational attainment of the household head. 
Estimation of the equilibrium welfare impacts incorp ates price adjustments that 
result from the fact that households alter their resid ntial location choice after the 
changes in air quality throughout the Los Angeles Area. Computation of the equilibrium 
price adjustments is obtained via simulation. Using 1990 as a benchmark we simulate 
market clearing prices for the counterfactual locational equilibrium that would have 
resulted in 1990 if air quality levels were identical to those observed in 2000, while all 
other housing attributes remained at their 1990 levels. The counterfactual equilibrium 
reflects the changes in air quality that occurred in the Los Angeles area between 1990 and 
2000. Other factors characterizing the Los Angeles area housing market, such as 
population, household income and housing supply, are assumed fixed in the simulation. 
The empirical analysis focuses on the four counties of the Los Angeles area which 
makeup the South Coast Air Quality Management District. This area experienced 
significant improvements in air quality during the decade that followed the 
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implementation of the 1990 CAAA. Figure 1 provides a regional map of the area. The 
neighborhood average ozone concentration fell by nearly 21 percent between 1990 and 
1995. By the year 2000, the average reduction in ozone levels was close to 40 percent. 
The changes in ozone levels also varied widely across the area. The largest ozone 
reductions occurred in the most polluted neighborhods located in the south-central and 
south-eastern portions of Los Angeles County, and the western portions of Riverside 
County and San Bernardino County. On the other hand, the costal neighborhoods of Los 
Angeles County and Orange County, which already had low levels of ozone 
concentrations, experienced minor ozone reductions.  
 
Figure 1.1: The South Coast Air Quality Management District 
 
 
The empirical analysis suggests that the reductions n ozone concentrations across 
Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino counties, provided an average 
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equilibrium benefit of $1,800 to households. In contrast, average benefits are $1,400 
when equilibrium price adjustments are not accounted, demonstrating that ignoring 
equilibrium effects will likely underestimate the bnefits of large environmental changes. 
We find that the equilibrium welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA, in the Los Angeles 
area, varied significantly across income groups. Households in the highest income 
quartile experienced equilibrium benefits of approximately $3,600 as compared to only 
$400 for households in the lowest income quartile. W  also find that ignoring equilibrium 
adjustments in housing prices can significantly alter the distribution of relative welfare 
gains (i.e. welfare gains as a proportion of household income). Indeed, welfare impacts 
that do not account for equilibrium effects suggest that high-income households have 
larger relative welfare gains compared to low-income households. However, when 
accounting for equilibrium adjustments, we find that the distribution of relative welfare 
gains from the 1990 CAAA is fairly even across income groups. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides some 
background information on the 1990 CAAA and the changes in air quality that occurred 
in the Los Angeles area. Chapter 3 reviews the current body of literature on the valuation 
of housing amenities. Chapter 4 characterizes the locational equilibrium model. Chapter 5 
describes the various datasets used to estimate the mpirical model. Chapter 6 estimates 
the parameters of households’ preferences. Chapter 7 discusses the measurement of 
welfare impacts and reports the welfare results. Chapter 8 concludes the analysis. 
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2 Background and Policy Setting 
This chapter discusses the main policy context for this study, the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (CAAA). The chapter also presents some background information on ozone 
air pollution, and provides an overview of the air quality changes that occurred in the Los 
Angeles area between 1990 and 2000. 
2.1 The 1990 Clean Act Amendments3 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 addressed three major environmental issues in 
the United States: acid rain, urban air pollution, a d toxic air emissions. The amendments 
are organized in seven titles. Title I established n w provisions for the attainment and 
maintenance of the National Ambient Air Quality Stand rds (NAAQS). Title II 
introduced new provisions regarding air pollution from mobile sources. Title III 
expanded the regulation of hazardous air pollutants, while Title IV set new requirements 
for power plant emissions to control for acid rain. Title V mandated the use of tradable 
pollution permits to reduce pollution from major sources and Title VI implemented new 
provisions for the protection of the ozone layer. Finally, Title VII introduced new 
provisions expanding the authority of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in the enforcement of air pollution regulations.  
Titles I and II of the amendments provide the main provisions relating to air quality 
regulation. Title I addresses the urban air pollution problems arising from ozone, carbon 
monoxide and particulate matter (PM-10). Areas for which ambient levels of these 
pollutants were above the target levels were designated as non-attainment areas by EPA. 
                                                      
3 Based on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006a). 
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Non-attainment areas for ozone were divided into five categories: marginal, moderate, 
serious, severe and extreme. These areas were then required to implement control 
measures that vary with the severity of the non-attainment status. For carbon monoxide 
and particulate matter, areas that did not meet the fed ral health standards were classified 
into either moderate or serious non-attainment statu . Areas exceeding carbon monoxide 
standards were required to introduce oxygenated fuels programs and/or implement 
enhanced emission inspections. Depending on the sevrity of their status, particulate 
matter non-attainment counties were either required to implement reasonably available 
control measures (RACM) or best available control measures (BACM). 
Title II tightened emission standards from automobiles and trucks, two of the major 
sources for ozone and carbon monoxide emissions in urbanized areas. The new standards 
intended to curb tailpipe emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen 
oxide on a phased-in basis starting with 1994 models. Additional provisions for 
improving fuel quality were also introduced. A new reformulated gasoline program was 
to be initiated in 1995 for the nine cities with the worst ozone problems. In addition, 
higher levels of alcohol-based oxygenated fuels were to be introduced during winter 
months in the 41 areas that exceeded the federal standards for carbon monoxide. The new 
regulation also introduced a clean fuel car pilot program in California, calling for the 
establishment of tighter emission controls for 15,000 vehicles in model year 1996 and 
300,000 by the model year 1999. 
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2.2 Ground-level Ozone Air Pollution 4 
Ozone (O3) is a gas which is found in the earth’s atmosphere. Its chemical configuration 
is made of three oxygen atoms. The chemical structue of ozone is the same regardless of 
whether it occurs miles above the earth surface or at g ound-level. However, the function 
of ozone will depend on where it occurs in the atmosphere. When it occurs in the in the 
stratosphere, approximately 10 to 30 miles above the earth’s surface, ozone forms the 
layer that protects all life forms from the sun’s ultraviolet (UV) rays. When ozone occurs 
in the troposphere, the lowest portion of the earth’s atmosphere, it is a major air pollutant 
that can have damaging effects on human respiratory health, as well as plants and 
ecosystems.  
While stratospheric ozone occurs naturally in the atmosphere, tropospheric or ground-
level ozone is generally the result of urban activity. Emissions from industrial facilities, 
motor vehicle exhaust, and chemical solvents produce nitrogen oxide (NOX) and volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs). The chemical reaction betwe n NOX and VOCs in the 
presence of sunlight produces ground-level ozone. Though ground-level ozone is 
primarily an urban air pollutant, it may also occur in less populated areas when NOX and 
VOCs are transported over long distances by prevailing winds.  
Ground-level ozone can irritate the human respiratory system, causing chest pain, 
throat irritation, and coughing. Repeated short-term exposure in children can lead to 
reduced lung function in adulthood. Ground-level ozone can also aggravate asthma and 
other chronic lung diseases, such as emphysema and bro chitis, and reduce the immune 
system’s response to bacterial infections in the respi atory system. 
                                                      
4 Based on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 
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In addition to its effect on respiratory health, ground-level ozone can damage plants 
and ecosystems. It can limit the ability of certain sensitive plants to produce and store 
food, making them more vulnerable to diseases, insects, competition, and harsh weather. 
Ground-level ozone can also damage the leaves of plants and trees, negatively impacting 
the appearance of urban vegetation, national parks, and recreation areas. High 
concentration of ground-level ozone can also reduce crop yields and forest growth, 
thereby impacting species diversity in ecosystems. 
2.3 Air Quality Standards for Ground-level Ozone 5 
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA is required to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) for pollutants that are considered to be harmful to public health and the 
environment. The Clean Air Act established primary nd secondary national air quality 
standards. Primary standards were designed to protect the health of the general 
population, as well as the health of sensitive groups such as asthmatics, children and the 
elderly. Secondary standards, on the other hand, were intended to preserve public 
welfare. They set limits to protect against decreased visibility and damage to animals, 
crops, vegetation, and buildings. 
Currently, two primary standards are used to regulate ozone levels in the U.S. The 
national 1-hour standard for ozone, set at 0.12 parts per million (ppm) by volume, was 
established in 1979. It is achieved when the expected number of days per calendar year 
with maximum hourly concentrations above 0.12 ppm does not exceed 1. In 1996, EPA 
established a new national 8-hour ozone standard which was set at 0.08 ppm by volume. 
                                                      
5 Based on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006b) 
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This standard is attained when the 3-year average of the fourth highest daily maximum 8-
hour ozone concentration measured at each monitor within an area is less than 0.08 ppm. 
On June 15, 2005 the 1-hour ozone standard was revoked in all areas and replaced by 
the 8-hour standard, except in the fourteen 8-hour ozone non-attainment areas that were 
part of EPA’s Early Action Compacts program. Early Action Compacts give local 
communities the flexibility to develop their own approach to meeting the 8-hour ozone 
standard, provided the communities control emissions from local sources earlier than the 
Clean Air Act would otherwise require. 
In addition to setting the NAAQS, EPA designates areas as either non-attainment, 
attainment or unclassified. The designation process plays an important part in the 
implementation of air pollution control measures bystates and local governments. 
Currently, an area is designated as non-attainment if it violates the national 8-hour ozone 
standard over a three-year period. An area will be designated as attainment if it has air 
quality monitoring data showing that the area has not violated the ozone standard over a 
period of three years.  Areas are designated as unclassified if there is not enough data to 
determine ozone levels.  
2.4 Air Quality Improvements in the Los Angeles Area 
The South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) is the main regulatory body 
for air pollution in the Los Angeles area. It encompasses Orange County and the urban 
areas of Los Angeles, Riverside and San Bernardino County. The area is the most densely 
populated urban center of the state of California ad is home to over 16 million people.  
The South Coast Air Quality Management District hasistorically exhibited some of the 
worst ambient levels of air quality in the nation and is currently designated by EPA as a 
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severe ozone non-attainment area (U.S. EPA, 2006c). Every three years AQMD develops 
an air quality management plan which identifies implementation measures designed to 
bring the area in compliance of state and federal ai  quality standards. Figure 2.1 provides 
maps of ozone concentrations in 1990 and 2000 for the four counties which makeup the 
South Coast AQMD. The 1990 map shows a wide variation in ozone levels across the 
area. Specifically, ozone concentrations were lowest in the coastal areas of Los Angeles 
and Orange County. Average 1-hour ground-level ozone concentrations, in those areas, 
were below the federal 1-hour standard (0.12 ppm). On the other hand, the areas east of 
the San Bernardino Mountains and south of the San Gbriel Mountains exhibited the 
highest ozone concentrations in 1990. Average 1-hour ground-level ozone concentrations 
in these areas ranged from 0.185 ppm to as high as 0.225 ppm. 
The South Coast AQMD counties experienced significant reductions in ozone 
concentrations between 1990 and 2000. Table 2.1 reports average ozone concentrations 
from monitoring stations across the area. The average 1-hour ground-level ozone reading 
in 2000 was roughly 0.10 ppm, compared to 0.14 ppm in 1990. In addition, the number of 
days exceeding the federal 1-hour standard significa tly decreased between 1990 and 
2000. The average number of recorded exceedences across the area was about 3.5 days in 
2000, compared to nearly 36 days in 1990. Figure 2.1 also shows that the ozone 
reductions were highest in areas with the worst ground-level ozone concentrations in 
1990. Average ozone concentrations fell by nearly 62 percent at monitoring stations with 
a recorded 1990 ozone level above the federal 1-hour standard (0.12 ppm). On the other 
hand, monitors with a recorded 1990 ozone level below the federal 1-hour standard 
experienced an average reduction of only 28 percent. 
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Figure 2.1: 1990 and 2000 Ozone6 Concentrations for the Greater Los Angeles Area 
 
                                                      
6 Ozone concentrations are obtained via interpolation. We generate a pollution surface for the entire sudy 
area using 100 meter-by-100 meter grid cells. We then assign to each grid cell a distance-weighted average 
of the readings from the 3 closest monitors. 
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Table 2.1: Average† Monitor Readings for Ground-Level Ozone 









1990 0.144 0.15 0.116 0.137 0.154 Ozone 
concentration* 2000 0.097 0.089 0.078 0.111 0.109 
1990 35.7 37.1 11.2 33.2 46.9 Ozone 
exceedences**  2000 3.5 2 0.3 5.4 6 
* Average top 30 1-hour daily maximum readings at monitors (parts per million). 
** Average number of days exceeding the federal 1-hour ozone standard at monitors. 
† 3-year centered average. 
Source: California Ambient Air Quality Data. 2004 Data CD 
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3 Valuing Amenities in Housing Markets: A Review  
The idea that urban amenities will be capitalized into property values has provided 
economists with a powerful tool for valuing local public goods. (Cropper, 1999) The 
empirical evidence on this approach goes back to Ridker and Henning (1967) who 
estimate the willingness to pay for sulphate air polluti n in St Louis, Missouri during the 
1960s using house values across Census tracts. Since then, a large number of studies have 
investigated the benefits of various types of amenity changes using observed household 
decisions in housing markets. This class of models is known as property value models.  
This chapter reviews the current empirical evidence on the property value approach to 
valuing changes in environmental quality. The chapter is organized in three parts. Section 
3.1 provides a review of the behavioral approaches t at are used in property value 
models. In Section 3.2 we discuss the various approaches to valuing changes in local 
housing amenities. This discussion will also highlit the types of datasets that are 
required to carry out these methods. Section 3.3 surveys a special class of models, 
referred as locational equilibrium models, which have been used to value large and 
spatially dispersed amenity changes. A more comprehensive exposition of the theory and 
methods presented in this chapter can be found in Palmquist (2006) (see also Freeman, 
2003 and Bockstael and McConnell, 2007). 
3.1 Behavioral Approaches to Modeling Housing Choice 
Property value models are generally concerned with characterizing the behavior of 
households in a residential housing market. In these models the housing good or 
residential location is treated as a differentiated product, i.e. a bundle of characteristics. 
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Two behavioral frameworks have been used to characterize households’ residential 
location choice. The hedonic framework (Rosen, 1974) characterizes the household’s 
decision in terms of choosing the optimal levels for c ntinuous characteristics of the 
housing location. On the other hand, the discrete choice or random utility framework 
(McFadden, 1978) characterizes the household location decision as a choice among 
discrete housing bundles. 
The Hedonic Framework 
The hedonic framework postulates that a household’s ptimal housing choice will reveal 
their demand for environmental quality as well as other location amenities. In 
equilibrium, the price of each housing bundle is a function of the levels of the 
characteristics which make up the bundle. The mathematical representation of this 
mapping is referred as the hedonic price function (HPF). The formal treatment of the 
theory behind the hedonic approach is due to Rosen (1974).  
Consider a consumer with income y and idiosyncratic taste α choosing a housing 
location with vector of continuous characteristics ),..,( 1 JxxX = . These characteristics 
will include housing attributes such as number of bedrooms, age, as well as neighborhood 
attributes such as air quality, school quality, and public safety. Let );,( αbXuu =  
represent the value that the consumer derives from the consumption of a non-housing 
good (b) and the housing characteristics (X). The consumer chooses the optimal 
combination of X and the consumption of the non-housing good (b) to maximize her 
utility, 
 
);,,...,( 1 αbxxuu J= ,         (3.1) 
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subject to the budget constraint 
bXPy += )( .          (3.2) 
 
Where, P(X) represents the equilibrium HPF for the housing market. The price of the 
non-housing good is normalized to $1. Letting λ represent the marginal utility of income, 
the first order necessary conditions for an interior solution are given by 
 
jj xPxu ∂∂⋅=∂∂ // λ ,  j=1,…, n,      (3.3) 
λ=∂∂ bu / ,          (3.4) 
0)( =−− bXPy .         (3.5) 
 












,  j=1,…, J.    (3.6) 
 
The left hand side of equation (3.6) is the marginal rate of substitution between the j th 
characteristic and the numeraire non-housing good. This marginal rate of substitution 
represents the implicit price or the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for characteristic 
j in the housing market equilibrium. Equation (3.6) implies that, in equilibrium, the 
implicit price of a characteristic j is given by the slope of the HPF. It also characterizes 
the marginal willingness to pay function for the amenity xj.  
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We can also characterize Rosen’s bid function which represents a household’s 
willingness to pay for a housing location with a set of characteristics ),..,( 1 JxxX = . This 
willingness to pay will be function of the characteristic vector, the household’s income, 
the household’s taste, and the level of utility provided by the housing location. It will 
later be used to characterize the household’s valuation of a non-marginal amenity change. 
The household’s bid function, );,,( αθθ yuX= , is implicitly defined as: 
 
uyXu =− );,( αθ .         (3.7) 
 
Implicit differentiation of equation (3.7) provides additional insights on the shape of the 
household bid function. Differentiating the bid function with respect to amenity j, holding 













.          (3.8) 
 























,        (3.9) 
022 <−+ jbjbjbbbjj uuuuuuu .        (3.10) 
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Equation (3.9) holds from the first order conditions. It implies that the household bid 
function has a positive slope in the bid-amenity space. Holding income constant, an 
increase in the quantity of one characteristic will result in a higher bid. Equation (3.9) 
also implies that the household bid function is tangent to the HPF at the chosen amenity 
level, *jx . Equation (3.10) says that the household’s bid functio  is quasi-concave in the 
bid-amenity space, suggesting that the marginal bid for an amenity decreases as the 
quantity of the amenity increases.  
From equation (3.7) we can also obtain additional iformation on the functional form 
of the bid function. Differentiating the bid function with respect to income we obtain that 













.         (3.11) 
 
This suggests that the household’s bid function is additively separable in the income level 
y. A direct implication of this result is that the bid function can be redefined in the 
following form: 
 
yuXyuX += );,();,,( * αθαθ ,       (3.12) 
 
Where );,(* αθ uX  is simply the indifference surface which yields the level of utility u . 
*θ  can also be interpreted as the household’s expenditure on the numeraire non-housing 
good b, holding the level of utility constant. The specification of the bid function in 
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equation (3.12) implies that the marginal bid function jx∂∂ /θ  will be independent of the 
household’s income. 
Structural parameters for the household’s utility function can be recovered by 
estimating the marginal willingness to pay function, jxXP ∂∂ /)( , in (3.6). Rosen (1974) 
suggested a two-stage approach for estimating the MWTP function. In the first stage one 
estimates the HPF via a regression of housing prices on housing characteristics and 
neighborhood amenities, and obtains the implicit price for each amenity as the gradient of 
the estimated HPF. The MWTP function for a housing amenity is then estimated by 
regressing its implicit price on housing attributes and a set of household characteristics. 
The majority of applications of the hedonic property value approach have used the 
first stage estimation of the HPF. Estimation of the HPF requires data on the prices, 
characteristics and neighborhood amenities of occupied housing units. These data are 
generally easy to obtain. This estimation does not require information on the households 
residing in the housing units. However, estimation of the marginal willingness to pay 
function via the second stage does require the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
household choosing each housing unit. These data are not typically available, and are not 
contained in housing transactions data.  
Two types of datasets are generally available for the estimation of property value 
models. These are Census public-use microdata and housing transactions microdata. 
Census public-use microdata are generally aggregated to large spatial units to protect the 
confidentiality of households. The main advantage of Census public-use microdata is that 
they are free and they also provide a detailed set of characteristics of the household 
choosing each occupied housing unit, which is essential for estimating the marginal 
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willingness to pay functions in the second stage of R sen’s (1974) approach. The main 
limitation of these data is that the value of an owner-occupied housing unit is given by 
the owner’s assessment instead of the actual transaction price. In addition, they only 
provide a limited set of characteristics for the housing unit.  
Most property value applications of the hedonic first stage estimation have used 
housing transactions microdata. These data are spatially disaggregated and provide actual 
sale prices of housing units. Housing transactions data also provide a comprehensive set 
of characteristics for the housing units. However, these data typically do not include 
household socioeconomic characteristics which are necessary for the estimation of 
marginal willingness to pay functions. Transactions data are generally obtainable by 
purchase from private companies which specialize in r al estate data.  
The implementation of the two-stage hedonic estimation is complicated by a number 
of econometric issues which arise in the second stage. The first issue has to do with the 
identification of the parameters of the marginal willingness to pay function. In general, 
identification of the amenity demands can be achieved either via a priori restrictions on 
the functional forms of the hedonic price function a d demand equations, or data from 
multiple distinct housing markets. Palmquist (2006) provides an extended discussion of 
identification strategies that have been used in the empirical literature. Additional 
identification strategies are proposed by Eckland et al. (2004) and Bajari and Benkard 
(2002). An endogeneity problem also arises from the fact that implicit prices and 
quantities of amenities are simultaneously determined in the hedonic equilibrium. As a 
result amenity prices and quantities will be correlat d with the structural errors in the 
amenity demand functions. The correlation occurs because the structural errors contain 
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omitted characteristics which, by virtue of the hedonic equilibrium, are correlated with 
the observed prices and quantities. This means that ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
estimation of the amenity demand functions will produce bias estimates. A number of 
strategies for valid instruments have been proposed in the literature and are summarized 
by Palmquist (2006). 
The Discrete Choice Framework 
An alternative to the hedonic property value approach is the discrete choice random 
utility (RUM) framework (McFadden, 1978). Unlike the hedonic approach, where 
households choose continuous characteristics of housing units, this framework assumes 
that households make discrete housing location choices and their preferences for 
amenities are known up to an error term. Following the notation introduced in the 
hedonic approach, the consumer’s utility for choosing a house k is given by: 
 
);,,( αε kkkk bXuu = ,         (3.13) 
 
where the error term εk characterizes the fact the true specification of the utility is 
unknown. Since the choice of the house is a binary decision, the budget constraint is 
reduced to: 
 
kk bPy += .          (3.14) 
 
The consumer then chooses the house which provides her with the highest value. The 
indirect utility for the chosen house is given by 
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{ });,,(),...,;,,(max);,,( 111 αεαεαε KKK PyXuPyXupyXV −−=− .   (3.15) 
 
The probability that the household chooses a given house k can also be obtained as 
 
)];,,();,,(Pr[)Pr( αεαε lllkkk PyXuPyXuk −>−=   lk ≠∀  .  (3.16) 
 
Pr(k) can be viewed as the household’s expected demand for the housing location k. The 
final expression of the choice probability will depend on the functional assumption about 
the error term ε. For a given expression of the choice probability one can estimate the set 
of structural parameters characterizing the household’s random utility function. The 
expected population demand for housing location k is obtained by summing the choice 
probabilities across the household population. 
Estimation of the random utility model is not without econometric issues. In order to 
estimate household preference parameters, one needsto as ume a functional form for the 
error term which enters the indirect utility function. The estimation is greatly simplified 
when the errors are assumed independently and identically distributed as Type I Extreme 
Value (EV).  This error structure however gives rise to the multinomial logit model, 
which assumes Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). More general error 
structures can be used but with a greater computational cost. The nested logit model 
provides a partial relaxation of the IIA assumption by assuming a Generalized Extreme 
Value (GEV) distribution for the error term. A full relaxation of the IIA assumption can 
be achieved with the random parameter or mixed logit model. In this model, the error 
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term is assumed EV but the parameters of the utility are allowed to vary randomly across 
individuals. 
Identification of the parameters of the household’s random utility function requires 
housing prices as well as housing characteristics and neighborhood amenities. These can 
be obtained either from housing transactions microdata or Census public-use microdata. 
When the random utility function includes household interaction parameters, 
identification will also require household socioeconomic characteristics. Currently the 
most spatially disaggregated microdata which can accommodate this requirement are the 
Census long form files. Unfortunately, these data are confidential and generally difficult 
to obtain. An alternative is to use the Census Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 
which contain the same information as the long form files but are spatially aggregated to 
protect the confidentiality of the households. 
3.2 Valuing Amenity Changes Using Property Value Models 
The goal of most property value studies is to value housing amenities. However, there are 
a number of ways that this goal may be achieved. First, the researcher might be interested 
in estimating the marginal value from an amenity change. Second, the researcher may 
want to estimate the willingness to pay of households for a non-marginal amenity change 
at their residential location. Finally, the researcher might be interested in measuring the 
welfare impact from a policy or exogenous event which results in a non-marginal 
amenity change. Each of these questions requires a different empirical approach. We 
discuss these approaches and their applications to the valuation of environmental 
amenities. 
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3.2.1 Estimating the Marginal Value for an Amenity Change 
Given equation (3.4) the valuation of a marginal change in an amenity j is a simple task. 
It amounts to estimating the first stage of Rosen’s (1974) two-stage estimation. The 
MWTP an for amenity j is given by the gradient the estimated HPF, jxXP ∂∂ /)(ˆ . The 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a marginal change ∆xj is then obtained by multiplying the 
MWTP, jxXP ∂∂ /)(ˆ , by ∆xj.  
Applications of Rosen’s first-stage hedonic approach overwhelmingly dominate the 
empirical evidence on the valuation of environmental improvements. The majority of the 
applications to air quality valuation were summarized in the meta-analysis of Smith and 
Huang (1995). Empirical estimates of the MWTP for air quality vary widely across 
studies. The MWTP for a one percent change in air quality ranges from $18 to $181. 
More recent applications of Rosen’s first stage estimation to environmental valuation 
include Beron et al. (2001) and Banzhaf (2005). Theformer study evaluates the benefits 
of visibility improvements in the Los Angeles metropolitan area using residential housing 
sales between 1980 and 1995. Banzhaf (2005) estimates cost-of-living indices for air 
quality and other local public goods in the Los Angeles area using estimates of implicit 
prices from a hedonic price function. 
A potential limitation of the hedonic price estimation in the context of air quality 
valuation is due to an omitted variables bias. Certain relevant neighborhood attributes can 
be omitted from the hedonic price regression as a result of insufficient data. In 
equilibrium, the provision of such attributes is likely to be correlated with air quality and 
other observed public goods. As a result the estimated implicit price of air quality will 
generally be biased and highly sensitive to the choice f functional form for the HPF.  
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Recently, Chay and Greenstone (2005) have estimated the WTP for total suspended 
particulates (TSP) from a hedonic price regression that makes use of the non attainment 
status of counties as an instrumental variable (IV). The study finds that IV estimates of 
the WTP for air quality are more robust to various specifications of the HPF. 
3.2.2 Estimating the WTP for a Non-Marginal Change 
Valuing Non-Marginal Changes 
Though the valuation of marginal changes is generally a simple task, most environmental 
policies lead to non-marginal amenity changes. Unlike marginal changes, non-marginal 
changes do alter the distribution of an amenity in the housing market. As a result 
households may adjust their residential location choice which may cause the equilibrium 
HPF to shift. Following Bockstael and McConnell (2007), two non-marginal welfare 
measures can be defined. The first welfare measure characterizes the household’s 
willingness to pay for the change in amenity at their r sidential location. This welfare 
measure, termed “pure” WTP by Bockstael and McConnell, captures the direct welfare 
impact of a non-marginal change on households while ignoring the fact that the 
equilibrium HPF may shift. The full, i.e. equilibrium, welfare impact from a non-
marginal amenity change must account for the shifting of the HPF. This welfare measure 
can be used to characterize the welfare gains and losses from a policy or exogenous event 
which leads to a non-marginal change in environmental quality. 
Estimating the “Pure” WTP via the Hedonic Approach 
Measuring the household’s willingness to pay for a non-marginal change requires 
estimating the parameters of the household’s bid function. Knowledge of the gradient of 
the HPF is no longer sufficient as the non-marginal change would lead to a movement 
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along the household bid curve. The household’s willingness to pay for a non-marginal 
improvement in an amenity j at its current housing location can be defined as the change 
in income which allows the household to consume the same level of the numeraire non-
housing good b as before the improvement. Because the bid functio is separable in 
income, the WTP can be directly obtained as the change in the household’s expenditures 
on the numeraire (see equation 3.12): 
 
);,,();,,( 000*001* αθαθ uxxuxxWTP jjjj −− −= .      (3.17) 
 
The willingness to pay in equation (3.17) can also be defined in terms of the household’s 


















.       (3.18) 
 
The “pure” willingness to pay can be empirically recovered by estimating the marginal 
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The marginal willingness to pay function is recovered via the two-stage estimation 
procedure suggested by Rosen (1974), which is describ d in the previous section.  
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Applications of the hedonic demand estimation to the valuation of environmental 
amenities are limited. Cropper et al. (1993) estimate WTP for non-marginal changes in 
housing amenities using data from a simulated housing market. The welfare estimates are 
then compared to those from a discrete choice model. Th  amenity demand functions are 
identified via a linear box-cox hedonic price function. Chattopadyay (1999) uses data 
from the Chicago area housing market to estimate the WTP for clean air in terms of 
particulate matter (PM-10) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The identification of the second 
stage is achieved via functional form restrictions on the hedonic price equation and 
consumer preferences. A multi-market hedonic estimation is used by Palmquist and 
Israngkura (1999). The study uses housing data fromthirteen metropolitan areas in the 
United States to value particulates (TSP), nitrogen oxide (NO2) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
air pollution. 
Estimating the “Pure” WTP via the Random Utility Approach 
The random utility framework can also be used to characterize households’ willingness to 
pay for a non-marginal amenity change at their residential location. The willingness to 
pay defined in equation (3.17) can be equivalently s ated in terms of the change in 
income necessary to bring the household to their original utility level after an exogenous 
change in an amenity j. (Bockstael and McConnell, 2005) Noting that that θ* is merely 
the indifference surface ubxxu jj =− );,,( α  solved for the numeraire b = y - θ, and 
inverting equation (3.17) yields:  
 
);,,();,,( 001000 αα WTPpyxxupyxxu jjjjjj −−=− −− .     (3.19) 
 
 29 
The willingness to pay in equation (3.19) is commonly referred as the compensating 
variation (CV). Given estimated parameters of the household’s random utility function in 
equation (3.15) the WTP in (3.19) can be estimated.  
Like the hedonic demand approach, the discrete choice approach to valuing non-
marginal changes has seen few applications to the valuation of environmental amenities. 
One of the earliest applications was by Cropper et al. (1993), who estimate preferences 
for housing attributes using a multinomial logit model and compare the WTP for non-
marginal changes with the hedonic demand approach. Palmquist and Israngkura (1999) 
also compare benefit estimates, for air pollution reduction, from a multinomial logit with 
hedonic demand estimates. However, the comparison was unsuccessful as they could not 
obtain reliable welfare estimates from the multinomial logit model. Chattopadyay (2000) 
uses a nested logit model to value PM-10 air polluti n in the Chicago area. He finds that 
benefit estimates from the discrete choice model where consistently lower than the 
estimates from the two-stage hedonic approach. More rec ntly, Bayer, Keohane and 
Timmins (2007) use a discrete choice model, which incorporates unobserved housing 
attributes and household mobility constraints, to pr vide an estimate of the WTP for 
reductions in PM-10 concentrations. 
3.2.3 Measuring the Welfare Impact from a Policy or Exogenous Event 
The “pure” willingness to pay measure will reveal how much households are willing to 
pay for a non-marginal amenity change at their residence, all other things held constant. 
While this is an important question, it does not provide an answer to the broader welfare 
question that is the welfare impact on households from a policy or exogenous event 
which results in a non-marginal amenity change across housing locations. The welfare 
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impact from such a change may not coincide with the “pure” WTP measure. This is 
because households are likely to re-evaluate their location choice, which may lead to a 
shifting of the equilibrium HPF. Household choices may change because the underlying 
distribution of the amenity across housing locations will change when large changes 
occur. As a result, the “pure” WTP measure, which uses the ex-ante equilibrium HPF, 
will be misleading. The “pure” WTP measure from the random utility framework will 
also be incorrect as it still relies on ex-ante housing prices.  
Bartik (1988) shows that the “pure” WTP will underestimate the welfare impact from 
non-marginal policy changes. This is because the welfare measure restricts households to 
choose the same housing location in the ex-post equilibrium. The full, i.e. equilibrium, 
welfare impact of the improvement allows the household to re-optimizing their choice. In 
the absence of mobility constraints, households will be made at least better off as a result 
of this adjustment. This follows from the LeChatelier optimization principle (Bockstael 
and McConnell, 2007). Hence the “pure” WTP provides a lower bound to the full welfare 
impact. It will generally underestimate the welfare gains and overestimate the welfare 
losses from a non-marginal improvement.  
There is a special case when evaluation of the welfare impact from a non-marginal 
amenity change can be carried out in a simple way using the ex-ante equilibrium HPF. 
This occurs when the amenity change is localized, i.e. confined to a small set of 
neighboring houses. For such a change the equilibrim HPF will not change since only a 
small number of houses are affected. The implication is that the gains and losses to 
renters will be pecuniary. Assuming costless mobility, renters will move along the HPF 
until the marginal WTP for the change equals the increase in rent. Any welfare gains 
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(losses) resulting from the amenity change will be offset by an increase (decrease) in the 
housing price. As a result, the welfare impact from the localized amenity change will be 
confined to landowners and is given by sum of the canges in housing prices at each of 
the affected housing locations. A complete conceptual proof of this result appears in 
Bartik (1988). Bockstael and McConnell (2007) provide additional intuition on this 
result.  
To evaluate the welfare gains or losses from large m nity changes affecting many 
housing locations within a market, we need to explicitly account for the ex-post changes 
in equilibrium housing prices that would result from the re-sorting of households. The 
two-stage hedonic estimation and random utility models are only able to recover 
household preferences and characterize the ex-ante equilibrium in the housing market.  
Recently, models have been developed to explicitly incorporate equilibrium concepts 
with the estimation of household preferences. This cla s of models, referred as locational 
equilibrium models, is discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Locational Equilibrium Models 
In contrast to the standard hedonic and discrete choice models, locational equilibrium 
models are able to incorporate price adjustments that result from the re-sorting of 
households across housing locations in response to a p licy change. These models use 
estimated structural housing demands to simulate a counterfactual equilibrium outcome 
for a policy change. The concept of locational (or s ting) equilibrium can be traced back 
to the early work of Tiebout (1956). Tiebout was the first to postulate that households 
take account of the tax and expenditure policies of local jurisdictions when making their 
residential location choice. (Epple and Sieg, 1999) However, until recently, there have 
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been very few empirical attempts to estimate locatinal equilibrium models. (Ferreyra, 
2003) 
Currently two classes of locational equilibrium models appear in the empirical 
literature. One class of models is derived from the urban sorting equilibrium model of 
Epple and Sieg (1999). This class of equilibrium models has been recently applied to the 
evaluation of welfare impacts from non-marginal environmental changes by Sieg et al. 
(2004). The second class of locational equilibrium models is derived from stochastic 
discrete choice models of housing demand (McFadden, 1978 and Quigley, 1976). These 
models have been mostly applied to evaluate urban and tr nsportation policy problems. 
Anas (1982) developed the first locational equilibrium model based on the discrete choice 
theory of housing demand. 
3.3.1 The Epple-Sieg Equilibrium Approach 
Epple and Sieg (1999) provide a unified framework of theory and empirics for estimating 
urban equilibrium models that arise from the sorting of households in a system of local 
jurisdictions. The housing market is formed by a fixed set of communities, i.e. local 
jurisdictions, which constitute a metropolitan area. E ch community provides housing 
services and local public goods including school quality, public safety and environmental 
amenities. The price and quantity of housing in each community is determined by a 
competitive market equilibrium. Provision of the public goods is financed by a local tax 
on housing, and households are assumed to move freely across local jurisdictions.  
Households have preferences over a private good, b, a local housing good, h, and a 
local public good index g which is assumed to be a composite function capturing all 
locally provided public goods. In other words, for a given community j, gj = g(Xj) where 
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Xj is a vector of community-specific public goods. Households differ in their income 
endowment, y, and their taste α for the public good g. The Epple-Sieg framework 
incorporates aspects of the hedonic and the discrete hoice framework. Households make 
discrete choices among communities differentiated by their provision of the public good 
g. Conditional on their community choice, households select housing as a continuous, 
homogeneous good. Given the community-specific gross f tax housing price p, the 
household maximizes its utility 
 
),,,( bhguu α=          (3.10) 
subject to the budget constraint 
byph −= .          (3.11) 
 
The indirect utility derived from the household’s optimization problem is given by 
 
)));(,,(),);(,,(,,(),,,( αααα XgypphyXgyphguypgV −= .   (3.12) 
 
It is assumed that the slope of the household’s indifference curves in the (g, p) plane is 
globally monotonically increasing in α and y.7 As a result, indifference curves in the (g,
p) plane satisfy the single crossing property. It turns out that a sorting equilibrium 
emerging from preferences that satisfy the single crossing property will exhibit three 
properties which are: boundary indifference, stratification, and ascending bundles. These 
three properties will characterize the necessary conditi ns for the locational equilibrium. 
                                                      




The following proposition outlines the necessary conditions which characterize the 
locational equilibrium. Epple and Sieg (1999) provide a proof. 
 
Proposition 3.1 (Epple and Sieg, 1999): 
 
Consider an equilibrium allocation in which no two c mmunities have the same housing 
prices. For such an allocation to be a locational equilibrium there must be an ordering of 
community pairs, {(g1, p1), …, (gJ, pJ)}, such that the following conditions hold:  
(i) Boundary indifference: Individuals on the “borde ” between any two communities are 
indifferent between the two communities. The set of these individuals is characterized by 
the following expression: 
 
)},,,(),,,(|),{( 11 ypgVypgVyI jjjjj ++== ααα ,  j = 1,…, J-1.  (3.13) 
 
(ii) Stratification: Let yj (α) be the implicit function defined by equation (3.1). Then, for 
each α, the residents of community j consist of those with income y, given by: 
 
)()(1 αα jj yyy <<− .         (3.14) 
 
(iii) Increasing bundles: Consider two communities j and k such that pj > pk. Then gj > gk 
if and only if yj(α) > yk(α). 
 
The necessary conditions for the locational equilibrium are used to estimate a 
parameterized version of the household indirect utility function. Estimation of the 
preference parameters can be carried out using housing transactions microdata. The 
Epple-Sieg equilibrium model allows one to evaluate th  welfare impact of policies that 
lead to non-marginal changes in local public goods. This is because the estimated 
household indirect utility function can be used to simulate a new sorting equilibrium in 
which households adjust their locations and equilibrium housing prices change.  
The main advantage of the Epple-Sieg model is that t e estimation of preference 
parameters does not require household socioeconomic characteristics. In addition, the 
computational burden required by the estimation, simulation and welfare computation is 
 35 
relatively low. However, these advantages come at a cost. The necessary conditions for 
the locational equilibrium require a very tight parameterization of the indirect utility 
function. The main limitations of the framework result from the fact that housing 
amenities enter the utility via a single index g and preference heterogeneity for housing 
amenities is represented by the single parameter α. We discuss these limitations in the 
context of an application to environmental valuation. 
Valuing Non-Marginal Environmental Changes in the Epple-Sieg Framework 
Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf and Walsh (2004) apply Epple and Sieg’s (1999) locational 
equilibrium model to environmental valuation. The study provides the first empirical 
analysis of the equilibrium welfare impacts of non-marginal environmental 
improvements.8 The set of communities is characterized by 91 school districts. 
Communities differ in their provision of the public good index g, which is a function of 
community-specific amenities (including air quality), and housing. The properties of the 
locational equilibrium defined in proposition 3.1 are then used to estimate a 
parameterized version of the household indirect utility function, which is in turn used to 
simulate alternative equilibrium outcomes for changes in air quality at the school district 
level. 
The estimation of the model relies on a specific parameterization of the indirect utility 
function. The specification of the indirect utility uses a Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) functional form which is separable in the public good (g) and the market goods (h, 
b). In addition, the optimal housing consumption is assumed to be log-linear in income 
and housing price. The local public good index g is assumed to be a linear function of the 
                                                      
8 See also Smith et al. (2004) and Walsh (2003) for other environmental applications of the Epple-Sieg 
equilibrium approach. 
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community-specific amenities. The CES separable form allows the housing demand to 
have constant non-unitary income and price elasticities. Indifference curves from this 
indirect utility are monotonically increasing in α and y and hence satisfy the single 
crossing property. This allows the characterization of the three necessary conditions 
(boundary indifference, stratification and ascending bundles) for the locational 
equilibrium defined by proposition 3.1. 
Using the parameterized version of the household indirect utility, one can characterize 
the distribution of household income y, the provision of the public good index g and the 
demand for housing within each community j in the sorting equilibrium. The 
stratification property is used to define the set of households residing in each community 
j in the sorting equilibrium. The distribution of household income within community j is 
obtained by integrating the joint distribution of income and tastes over the set of 
households residing in j. By ordering the communities with respect to the housing price, 
the ascending bundle property can be used to define the public good index gj in 
community j as a function of the community size, its own housing price pj, and the 
housing price pj+1 and public good level gj+1 in community j+1 . By normalizing the 
public good index in the lowest community, the implied levels of the public good index 
in the remaining J-1 communities can be computed numerically via a recursive algorithm 
similar to the contraction mapping proposed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The 
consumption of housing by a household with income y located in community j is derived 
via Roy’s identity. The distribution of housing consumption within community j is 
obtained by integrating the individual household demands over the marginal distribution 
of income in community j. 
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Household preference parameters are estimated via a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) approach. The estimation makes use of housing transactions microdata 
from five counties in southern California: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San 
Bernardino and Ventura. The GMM estimation procedur entails searching for the values 
of the preference parameters that minimize the weight d distance between the between 
the moments predicted by the model and the corresponding sample moments observed in 
the data. Given the distribution of household income y, the provision of the public good 
index g, and the demand for housing within each community j, three sets of moment 
conditions are formed. The first set of moment conditions matches the 25th, 50th and 75th 
quantiles of the parameterized distribution of household income in each community, i.e. 
school district, j with those observed in the housing sample. Empirical quantiles of the 
income distribution for each school district are obtained from the 1990 U.S. Census. The 
second set of moments matches the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles of the parameterized 
distribution of housing expenditures in each school district with their empirical 
counterparts. The final set of moments matches the lev ls of the public good index, in 
each community, implied by the locational equilibrium with the value predicted by the 
parameterized functional form. The parameterized form f the public good index is given 
by a linear function of the air quality, school quality and crime level in each community.  
The estimated indirect utility function is used to evaluate the welfare impacts of the 
changes in air quality between 1990 and 1995. Changes in air quality are converted into 
changes in the public good index g via the estimated linear functional form for the 
community public good index. The new community public good indices are then used to 
simulate a counterfactual locational equilibrium for 1995. For a given exogenous change 
 38 
in the public good index g, Sieg et al. define the partial and general equilibrium 
willingness to pay of a household located in a community j. The partial equilibrium WTP 
is computed by holding prices and household location choices at their 1990 levels. This is 
the “pure” WTP measure defined in section 3.2. It will characterize the household’s WTP 
for the change in air quality in community j. The general equilibrium WTP makes use of 
the new housing prices and household locations from a simulated counterfactual 
equilibrium. This measure represents the welfare impact, on the household, of the 
changes in air quality across the communities. The community-level mean WTP 
measures are obtained by integrating the household-level WTP measures over the joint 
distribution of income and tastes for the set of households residing in each community. 
Sieg et al. (2004) apply this framework to investigate the welfare benefits of the 1990 
CAAA in the Los Angeles area. They find that equilibr um benefits that account for 
adjustments in housing prices differ substantially from direct benefit estimates. The 
average equilibrium welfare gain from the reductions i  ozone concentrations, which 
occurred between 1990 and 1995 in the Los Angeles area, was estimated at $1,371. This 
compares with the average direct benefit of $1,210. In addition, the study finds a 
significant amount of heterogeneity in welfare gains across counties. Equilibrium benefits 
were found to be highest in Los Angeles County ($1,556) and lowest in San Bernardino 
County ($367). The study also finds considerable variation in benefits across school 
districts, within each county. For example, the equilibrium benefits in Los Angeles 
County ranged from $486 in the Compton Unified school district to $9,000 in the Beverly 
Hills school district. 
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In a subsequent study, Smith et al. (2004) evaluated th  benefits of the 1990 CAAA 
in the Los Angeles area for 2000 and 2010. Using the EPA’s projected changes in ozone 
levels for 2000 and 2010 together with the estimated household preferences from Sieg et 
al. (2004), the study measures the equilibrium WTP for the policy scenarios developed 
for EPA’s prospective study (EPA, 1999) as they relate to the households of the Los 
Angeles area. The study also investigates the distribution of equilibrium benefits across 
income groups. They present the benefits associated with the 25th, 50th and 75th income 
percentile, for selected school districts in the Los Angeles Area. The estimated 
equilibrium welfare estimates vary significantly across the household income 
distribution. The distribution of the welfare estimates also varies across school districts. 
In the lowest income community, San Juacinto Unified school district, the welfare 
estimates are -$59 annually at the 25th income percentile as compared to -$28 at the 75th 
percentile. The welfare estimates in Beverly Hills school district, the highest income 
community, are $3899 at the 25th income percentile as compared to $7406 at the 75th 
percentile. 
Sieg et al. (2004) provide a major contribution to the valuation of large widespread 
changes in environmental amenities. The study provides the first explicit characterization 
of the equilibrium impact of non-marginal amenity changes on household choices and 
housing prices. Also, because it is based on the Epple-Sieg framework, the Sieg et al. 
model is quite simple to implement empirically. However the specification of household 
preferences, which is needed to ensure that the necssary conditions for the equilibrium 
are met, gives rise to a number of limitations. 
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First, the characterization of the public good index l ads to patterns of substitution 
across location amenities that are somewhat restrictive. This is because location amenities 
enter the household’s indirect utility function through the single index g. This can be 
shown by looking at the marginal rate of substitution between community characteristics. 
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that there are two community characteristics (i.e. 
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Equation (3.14) defines the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two 
amenities. It is clear from equation (3.14) that the MRS between the two community 
amenities does not depend on either household’s taste, α, or the household income, y. As 
a result, households are forced to have the same ranking of communities in the amenity 
space. This vertical differentiation of communities simplifies the estimation of preference 
parameters and the computation of the locational equilibrium. However, one would 
generally expect households to have different relative preferences for community-specific 
amenities such as air quality, education, and crime. For instance, other things equal, one 
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would expect that households with children enrolled in a secondary public school will 
have higher preferences for communities with good secondary public schools.  
A second limitation of the Sieg et al. model relates o the characterization of the 
heterogeneity in households’ preference for location amenities such as air quality, school 
quality and crime. Heterogeneity in households’ preference for the public good index is 
characterized by the single taste parameter, α, whose marginal distribution is assumed 
normal.  Hence a household’s marginal valuation for a given community amenity is only 
a function of the household’s income and does not depend on other household 
characteristics. Households’ preferences for community-specific attributes are, however, 
likely to vary across other household characteristics such as household size, the presence 
of children and educational attainment. For instance, highly educated household are 
likely to have a higher marginal valuation for school quality. As a result, a preference 
specification which incorporates an interaction between neighborhood school quality and 
household educational attainment would allow the model to better fit the data.  In 
addition, when investigating welfare gains from an amenity change, a researcher is able 
to provide an analysis of the distributional impacts across household characteristics other 
than income. For instance, one may investigate the diff rential impact of an improvement 
in air quality on senior households. 
3.3.2 The Discrete Choice Equilibrium Approach 
An alternative to the Epple-Sieg equilibrium framework is the discrete choice equilibrium 
framework. This is the equilibrium approach adopted in this dissertation. Anas (1980, 
1982) developed a theory of locational housing market equilibrium based on the discrete 
housing choice model of McFadden (1978). In recent years this framework has been 
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extended to incorporate advances in urban economics and empirical industrial 
organization. One such model was proposed by Bayer nd Timmins (2005). Their model 
incorporates endogeneous social interaction effects as well as unobserved location 
attributes.  
The discrete choice equilibrium approach provides for a richer characterization of 
preference heterogeneity and more general patterns of substitution. The discrete-choice 
modeling of the housing choice allows community-specific amenities to enter directly the 
utility function. This provides for more general sub titution patterns across communities. 
In addition, the researcher can provide a richer characterization of the observed 
heterogeneity in households’ tastes for location amenities by incorporating interactions of 
household characteristics and location amenities into the utility function. This would 
allow the researcher to evaluate the impact of a policy change on various socio-economic 
subgroups of the household population. 
To date, discrete choice equilibrium models have ben mostly used to analyze urban 
and transportation policy changes. Anas (1982) evaluates the impact of public 
transportation projects proposed for the Chicago area in the early 1980s. Bayer et al. 
(2005) use an equilibrium model similar to the Bayer and Timmins (2005) model to 
investigate the impacts of an increase in income inequality in the San Francisco bay area. 
Timmins (2007) applies the equilibrium concept from Bayer and Timmins (2005) to 
evaluate the welfare costs of rainfall changes in Brazil using labor market data. The 
equilibrium model in this dissertation is based on the specification of Bayer et al. (2005). 
Two main distinctions arise between our equilibrium model and the model used by 
Sieg et al. (2004). First, according to the Sieg et al. specification households value 
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community amenities through a single public good inex. As a result, households will 
have the same preference ordering of communities in the amenity space. This type of 
preference structure generates substitution patterns that can be restrictive since 
households are forced to have the same ranking of communities in the amenity space. In 
our specification, substitution patterns are determined by the interaction of household 
characteristics and location attributes. Hence, households will have different relative 
preferences for community-specific amenities such as air quality, education, and crime. 
Second, the interaction of household characteristics and location attributes also 
provide a richer characterization of the heterogeneity in household preferences for 
location amenities. The taste heterogeneity with respect to the community air quality 
level is captured by interaction with the household income. Heterogeneity in preferences 
for school quality is captured via interaction with the household’s educational attainment. 
This approach differs from the Sieg et al. (2004) model where heterogeneity in 
preferences for amenities is characterized by a single unobserved taste parameter, α.  
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4 A Locational Equilibrium Model for the Los Angeles Area 
This chapter develops the discrete choice equilibrium model used to evaluate the welfare 
impacts of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments in the Los Angeles area. We model 
households’ location decisions according to the framework of Bayer et al. (2005). The 
characterization of the locational equilibrium follows Anas (1982). Section 4.1 models 
the residential location choice of households. Section 4.2 defines the locational 
equilibrium.  
4.1  Modeling Households’ Location Choice 
The location model postulates that households choose their residential location h from a 
discrete set of housing types (H). A housing type is defined as a collection of houses with 
identical observed characteristics and located within t e same neighborhood. The utility 
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where yi represents household i’s monthly income and ph is the monthly rental price of 
house h. dih is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the residential location is within the 
household’s employment zone. It is intended to capture he household’s preference for 
housing locations that are closer to its workplace. The kth element of the vector of 
observed attributes for residential location h is given by xhk. These are the housing and 
neighborhood attributes that are present in the resarcher’s data. Housing characteristics 
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include bedrooms, age, dwelling type, and tenure statu . Neighborhood characteristics 
include ozone concentration, 8th grade math score, crime index, elevation, proximity to 
the pacific coastline, housing density and proportion of Hispanics. Other attributes of the 
residential location that are observed by the household but not observed in the data enter 
the household’s utility via the location-specific error term ξh. This term will capture the 
household’s average valuation of the unobserved attributes. The last term, εih, is a mean-
zero stochastic error which captures the unobserved taste heterogeneity among 
households.  
Each household chooses the residential location which provides it with the highest 
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where α, γ and βi are parameters of the household’s preference function. α characterizes 
the household’s marginal utility of the log of income9 while βik captures the household’s 
taste for location attribute k. The parameter γ characterizes the household’s disutility for 
commuting to work. We explicitly account for the heterogeneity in households’ 
preferences for location characteristics by allowing the taste parameters to vary 
systematically across households. The specification of the heterogeneous taste parameters 
uses interactions between location characteristics and observed characteristics of 
households. These observed household characteristics in lude household income, 
                                                      
9 So that the marginal utility of income is given by α / (yi - ph). 
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household size, the presence of children under the age of 18, and whether the household 
head is college educated. The functional form for the household’s taste (βik) for an 
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where zir represents the r
th characteristic of household i. The first term captures the mean 
component of the household’s taste for the attribute k, which is common across all 
households. The second term is intended to capture syst matic differences in tastes which 
can be attributed to the household’s observed charateristics.  
The final form of the indirect utility function is obtained by substituting equation 
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Equation (4.3) outlines the two main components of the household’s valuation of its 
chosen location. The first component, represented by the constant term (δh), captures 
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households’ common valuation of location attributes. This valuation is shared by 
households regardless of their characteristics. For instance, all else equal, households 
would prefer a house with more bedrooms, less polluti n, better schools, less crime, etc. 
This common valuation represents the average utility hat households derive from the 
residential location h. The second component captures the household’s individual 
valuation of the location attributes. These individual valuations are assumed to arise from 
differences in the observed characteristics of households. For instance, all other things 
equal, households of larger size are likely to choose houses with more bedrooms. 
As in Bayer et al. (2005) and Berry et al. (1995), the specification of the indirect 
utility in equation (4.3) assumes that households have the same valuation for the 
unobserved attributes. Hence, we are not able to identify heterogeneous preferences for 
unobserved location attributes. Bayer et al. (2005) suggest a two-stage approach to 
estimate the parameters of the household location ch ice model in equation (4.3). In the 
first stage, one would recover the household-specific taste parameters (α, γ, β1) and the 
location-specific constants (δh). This stage can be implemented by maximum likelihood 
estimation. Because of the large number of housing types the alternative constants are 
estimated using the contraction mapping proposed by Berry et al. (1995). The details of 
the estimation are provided in Chapter 6. The second stage then estimates the mean taste 
parameters (β0k) from the regression specification provided by equation (4.4) using the 
location constants estimated in the first stage. 
The household utility in equation (4.3) closely resembles the utility specification in 
Bayer et al. (2005). However, there are two differences between our specification and 
that of Bayer et al. (2005). One difference arises from the characterization of the non-
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housing good. We characterize the household’s consumption of the composite non-
housing good using the term log(yi - ph). This allows the model to capture income effects 
that are present in the household’s choice problem. It also allows us to derive Hicksian 
welfare measures that are consistent with the houseld’s utility maximization problem. 
In the Bayer et al. model the indirect utility does not incorporate the composite non-
housing good. The household income enters the utility as a linear interaction with 
location attributes, and the housing price enters the utility linearly as an attribute of the 
residential location.  
The second difference between our model and the model used by Bayer et al. (2005) 
is that we do not incorporate endogenous social interac ion effects. Social interaction 
effects emerge from the fact that households may care about the average socioeconomic 
characteristics of their neighborhoods. These social interaction effects are likely to be 
endogenously determined in the sorting equilibrium when households have 
heterogeneous preferences. This is because the average socioeconomic makeup of 
neighborhoods changes each time households resort. In our utility function the social 
interaction effect is a result of households’ homogeneous tastes for the proportion of 
Hispanics in their neighborhood. Hence the social interaction effect is exogenous since 
the neighborhood proportion of Hispanics will not change as households resort. This is 
due to the fact that households’ preferences, for the neighborhood proportion of 
Hispanics, are assumed homogeneous. 
Our specification of the household’s indirect utility differs fundamentally from Sieg 
et al. (2004). Sieg et al. specify the indirect utility of a household residing in a 
community j as: 
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where gj is the public good index for community j and h(•) is a non-linear function 
characterizing the household’s expenditures on housing. yi represents the household’s 
income while αi is a parameter characterizing the heterogeneity of the household’s 
valuation for the public good index. pj represents the housing price index for community 
j.  
Two main distinctions arise between our equilibrium model and the model used by 
Sieg et al. (2004). First, according to the Sieg et al. specification, households value 
community amenities through the single public good index g. As a result, households will 
have the same preference ordering of communities in the amenity space. This type of 
preference structure generates substitution patterns that can be restrictive since 
households are forced to have the same ranking of communities in the amenity space. In 
our specification, substitution patterns are determined by the interaction of household 
characteristics and location attributes. Hence, households will have different relative 
preferences for community-specific amenities such as air quality, education, and crime. 
Second, the interaction of household characteristics and location attributes also 
provide a richer characterization of the heterogeneity in household preferences for 
location amenities. The taste heterogeneity with respect to the community air quality 
level is captured by interaction with household income. Heterogeneity in preferences for 
school quality is captured via interaction with the ousehold’s educational attainment. 
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This approach differs from the Sieg et al. model where heterogeneity in preferences for 
amenities is characterized by the single unobserved taste parameter, α.
4.2  Characterizing the Locational Equilibrium 
We now turn to the characterization of the locational equilibrium for the housing market. 
We first derive the predicted demand for each housing type. The demand side of the 
market is made of N heterogeneous households. The supply side of the housing market 
comprises N occupied housing units classified into H housing types. The supply of each 
housing type h is defined as the measure of housing units of typeh in the study area and 
is assumed fixed. The locational equilibrium defines a set of market clearing prices {ph} 
and household choice probabilities {Pih}. 
Characterizing the Housing Demand 
We will assume that the idiosyncratic error component εih is identically and 
independently distributed and has a Type I Extreme Value (EV) distribution. Given this 

































The predicted aggregate demand for housing type h is obtained by summing the choice 
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where p is a vector of housing prices, zi is a vector of housing characteristics, and x is a 
matrix of location attributes whose columns are xh.  
Equation (4.6) characterizes a multinomial logit (MNL) choice structure. An 
implication of the MNL choice structure is the independence from irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property, which has been the subject of much criticism in the discrete choice 
literature. Using equation (4.6) the ratio of the choi e probabilities for two alternatives h 
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This implies that, for a given household, the ratio of the choice probabilities for any two 
alternatives is independent of the household’s systema ic valuation of the remaining other 
alternatives in the household’s choice set.
The IIA property gives rise to household choice patterns that are somewhat 
unrealistic. This can be seen from the following example. Suppose that a town has two 
restaurants, named Big-M and Big-K. Also, suppose that the two restaurants have 
identical characteristics except that Big-M only serves beef while Big-K only serves 
chicken. Furthermore, assume that the household choice probabilities are given by: 
Pr[choose Big-M]=Pr[choose Big-K]=1/2. Now suppose that a new restaurant, Big-J, also
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serving only chicken is built in the town. All other characteristics of the new restaurant 
are identical to the existing ones. Under the MNL choi e structure, the new choice 
probabilities would be: Pr[choose Big-M] = Pr[choose Big-K] = Pr[choose Big-J] = 1/3. 
But this is somewhat unrealistic as on would expect customers to treat the two chicken 
serving restaurants as the same choice. This implies that the new choice probabilities are 
likely to be: Pr[choose Big-M] = 1/2 and Pr[choose Big-K] = Pr[choose Big-J] = 1/4. 
It should be noted that while IIA is a property of the individual household choice 
probabilities in our model, it is not a property of the housing demands. This can be easily 
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It is clear that this ratio is not independent of the remaining housing alternatives in the 
choice set. The only instance when this ratio can be independent of the remaining 
alternatives is when households have identical characte istics. In this case the ratio equals 
one. Hence, the inclusion of household characteristics in the indirect utility function 
ensures that the housing demands derived from the model will exhibit realistic 
substitution patterns.  
Defining the Locational Equilibrium 
The supply of housing units of type h, sh, is assumed fixed and is given by the number of 
housing units of type h in the data. The locational equilibrium is such that the demand for 
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each housing type equals its supply. It is characteized by a vector of H housing prices p 
and a set of NH household location choice probabilities {Pih}. More specifically, the 
vector of market-clearing prices p is defined by: 
 
hh spd =)(  h = 1,..., H. (4.10) 
 
Equation (4.10) defines a system of H equations in H variables.  
Existence and Uniqueness of the Locational Equilibrum 
The existence of a unique vector of market-clearing prices follows under fairly general 
conditions. The following proposition establishes the uniqueness and stability of the 
equilibrium price vector. 
 
Proposition 4.1 (Anas, 1982). 
Let hhh spdped −= )()( define the excess demand for each residential location (i.e. 
housing type) h. The vector of housing prices (p*) which solves the system in (4.10) is 
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and 0ˆlim =+∞→ hp dh for each h = 1,…, H. In other words, all residential locations are strict 
gross substitutes in the allowable range of market rents. 
 
Proposition 4.1 is a well-known result in Walrasian equilibrium analysis. Mas-Colell 
et al. (1995, chapter 17) provide an extensive treatm nt of general equilibrium theory. It 
can be shown that the excess demand function )( pedh  satisfies the strict gross 
substitution property provided that the household lcation choice probabilities Pih are 
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strictly decreasing in the housing price ph. This will occur when the estimate for the 
parameter α is positive. 
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5 Data Sources 
This chapter describes the various datasets used in the estimation of household 
preferences. The focus of this study is on the fourcounties that make up the South Coast 
Air Quality Management District (AQMD): Los Angeles County, Orange County, 
Riverside County and San Bernardino County. The equilibri m model incorporates a 
discrete choice model of housing demand. Households choose their residential locations 
from a discrete set of housing alternatives. Households have heterogeneous preferences 
for the housing characteristics as well as the neighborhood amenities of residential 
locations. We estimate the parameters of households’ preferences from a cross-section of 
1990 microdata which includes household characteristics, housing characteristics, 
neighborhood air quality, neighborhood school quality, neighborhood crime rate, 
neighborhood racial composition, neighborhood housing density, neighborhood 
elevation, and proximity of the neighborhood to the Pacific coastline.  
The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 5.1 describes the household and 
housing microdata. In section 5.2 we describe the procedure used to compute the rental 
price of housing across owner-occupied and renter-occupied housing units. Section 5.3 
describes the neighborhood variables. In section 5.4 we characterize the housing 
alternatives. The STATA codes used to generate the data are provided in Appendix A. 
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5.1 Household and Housing Characteristics 
Households and housing characteristics are obtained from the 1990 Census Public Use 
Microdata 5-percent Sample (PUMS).10 These are records containing a 5-percent sample 
of all housing units in the United States. The recods provide an extensive description of 
the housing stock and the households in the occupied dwelling units. The PUMS are 
extracts from the actual decennial Census long form questionnaire, which are taken in a 
way that protects the confidentiality of households. Unlike the confidential long form 
files, which identify each household’s Census block (an area of approximately 100 
people), the 5% PUMS sample only identifies the locati n of households in a PUMA 
(Public Use Microdata Area), which is a Census geographic area containing 
approximately 100,000 people. The PUMS also identify the employment location of 
household members by their workplace PUMA.  
The 1990 PUMS 5-percent sample for the Los Angeles m tropolitan area comprises 
224,565 occupied housing units. The original household sample consists of the 224,565 
households that occupy those housing units. Our analysis focuses on the households 
occupying single and multi-family dwelling units.  Mobile homes and group quarters are 
excluded from the sample. In addition, we restrict our sample to households that have a 
monthly income of at least five hundred 1990 dollars. Finally, we dropped the 
observations where the household’s reported monthly income was less than the imputed11 
monthly rental value of the housing unit. The final s mple, which is used to represent the 
                                                      
10 These data are publicly available from the U.S. Census bureau (www.Census.gov), or at 
www.ipums.umn.edu/usa/vars.html. 
11 We describe the method for imputing the rental value of housing, as well the various issues with the 
housing prices provided in the Census data, in the next section. 
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population of households and housing units in this study, consists of approximately 
171,000 observations. 
Sieg et al. (2004) estimate household preference parameters using housing 
transactions microdata from 1989 to 1991 in Los Angeles, Riverside, Orange and Ventura 
County. These data identify the Census tract in which a housing unit is located. Sieg et al. 
characterize residential communities using 1990 school district boundaries. Housing 
transactions data provide a more comprehensive set of housing characteristics than the 
Census long form. However, these data do not provide information on the households 
occupying the houses. As a result they do not allow one to estimate richer preference 
specifications, such as those used Bayer et al. (2005), where preferences for location 
amenities vary across household characteristics.  
Table 5.1 provides mean values for selected household and housing characteristics in 
our 1990 PUMS sample. The microdata sample comprises 171,000 observations 
describing households and their occupied housing units. The vast majority (nearly 70 
percent) of the households in the sample reside in Los Angeles County. Orange County 
has the second most households in the sample (17%), followed by San Bernardino 
County (10%) and Riverside County (3%).  
The average number of bedrooms for houses in the sample is 2.25. We follow the 
approach of Bayer et al. (2005) to compute an imputed monthly rental housing price 
across tenure. A detailed description of the method is provided in the next section.12 The 
mean monthly rental housing price is $749. Monthly housing prices are highest in Orange 
                                                      
12 We construct a single price vector for owned and rental housing units by estimating a hedonic price 
regression for each of the 3 metropolitan statistical areas in the PUMS sample (Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
Orange County, and Riverside-San Bernardino). The regressions provide an estimate of the average ratio of 
housing values to monthly rents in each metropolitan st tistical area. The average ratio for the study area is 
316.1. The average ratios are then used to convert housing values to their corresponding rental rates. 
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County ($956) and lowest in San Bernardino County ($707). Half of the housing units in 
the sample are owner-occupied. Riverside and San Ber ardino County have the largest 
owner-occupied housing shares (0.63). Overall the housing stock is quite young. 
Nineteen percent of the houses in the sample were built after 1980; 37 percent were built 
in the 1960s and 70s. 
 












      
Number of observations 170,955 119,726 28,209 5,642 17,378 
Housing characteristics      
Monthly housing price ($) 749 709 956 725 707 
1 if unit owned 0.51 0.47 0.58 0.63 0.63 
Bedrooms 2.25 2.09 2.58 2.71 2.66 
1 if built in 80s or 90s 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.43 0.32 
1 if built in 60s or 70s 0.37 0.33 0.56 0.33 0.39 
1 if single family dwelling 0.62 0.58 0.66 0.77 0.76 
1 if unit is within householder’s 
employment zone 
0.505 0.529 0.444 0.447 0.466 
Household characteristics      
Monthly income ($) 4,098 3,943 4,945 3,860 3,926 
1 if Asian and non-Hispanic 0.082 0.089 0.075 0.041 0.055 
1 if Black and non-Hispanic 0.091 0.111 0.015 0.072 0.080 
1 if Hispanic 0.237 0.262 0.147 0.189 0.224 
1 if White and non-Hispanic 0.585 0.533 0.758 0.689 0.633 
1 if children under 18 0.417 0.405 0.396 0.505 0.502 
1 if married and has children under 18 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.017 
1 if householder is 65 or older 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.13 
1 if householder has college degree 0.35 0.33 0.44 0.29 0.32 
Household size 2.99 2.97 2.95 3.14 3.16 
 
A household’s preference for housing locations that are closer to its workplace is 
captured by a dummy variable which equals 1 if a residential location is within the 
household’s employment zone. The household’s employment zone is defined as the 
PUMA of the household head’s workplace. Other studies (see e.g. Bayer et. al, 2005 and 
Takeuchi et al., 2005) have instead used the distance to the householder’s employment 
location. However, in the PUMS data, the householder’s employment location is given by 
the workplace PUMA. Hence the distance to the household r’s employment location 
cannot be calculated. Because the workplace PUMA is a relatively large geographic area 
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we prefer using a dummy variable for whether the residential location is within the 
workplace PUMA, instead of the distance from the resid ntial location to the workplace 
PUMA. The later turns out to be a noisier measure. Roughly half of the households in the 
sample choose housing units which are located within their employment zone. 
The lower half of Table 5.1 provides a summary of means for selected household 
characteristics. The average monthly household income in the sample is $4,098. Orange 
County has the highest average monthly income ($4,945) while Riverside County has the 
lowest average ($3,860). The racial profile of the household is given by the race of the 
household head. The sample comprises 8 percent non-Hispanic Asian and 9 percent non-
Hispanic Black households. 58 percent of the households in the sample are non-Hispanic 
Whites. Households of Hispanic origin make up 23 percent of the sample. The share of 
Hispanic households is highest in Los Angeles County (26%) and lowest in Orange 
County (15%). Married couples with children under the age of 18 make up 1.5 percent of 
the households in the sample. In addition, 16 percent of the households in the sample are 
headed by a senior person, while 35 percent of households are headed by a college 
graduate.  
5.2 Computing the Rental Price of Housing across Units 
The housing price is a key characteristic which determines the sorting of households in 
our model. In the Census data the price of a house is reported as the owner’s assessment 
of the market value, in the case of an owner-occupied unit, or the monthly rent in the case 
of a renter-occupied unit. To arrive at one price variable which will characterize both 
owner and renter-occupied units we follow the approach of Bayer et al. (2005) by 
converting the market value of owner-occupied units to a monthly rental rate. Before 
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describing this procedure we address some potential issues with the reported market 
value and monthly rent. The procedures described in this section were performed in 
STATA. All the codes, as well as the regression results, are contained in the data 
appendix (Appendix A) provided at the end of the dissertation. 
5.2.1 Value of Owner-Occupied Housing 
A number of issues must be addressed when using the house value reported in the Census 
long form. The first issue relates to the fact that t e housing price reported in the Census 
long form is based on the owner’s own assessment of the market value. This assessment 
may not always reflect the true market value of the house, as most owners may either 
report the price of the house at the time of purchase or simply misrepresent the true 
market value of the house. The second issue regards the fact that the housing values 
reported in the 1990 Census are top-coded at $500,00 . Because housing prices in 
California are generally higher than the remainder of the United States, we would expect 
to see a higher occurrence of binding top-codes. According to the 2000 Census 11.4 
percent of houses in California where reported at a value of $500,000 or more compared 
to only 2 percent for the overall United States. In our 1990 sample approximately 8 
percent of the houses have top-coded values. 
To address these issues, we construct a predicted value for each house by making use 
of the property tax payment reported for each owner-occupied housing unit. The 
predicted value makes use of the fact that California law (Proposition 13) requires the 
property tax to equal either 1 percent of the transaction price of the house at the time the 
current owner bought the property or the value of the house in 1978. The predicted 
market value of each owner-occupied house is obtained by regressing the log of the 
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reported house value on the estimated transaction pr ce, i.e. 100 times the property tax, 
and a set of dummy variables for the year that the house was purchased. The regression 
specification is given by: 
 
hhhh yTp εαα ++= 21 )log()log( .  (5.1) 
 
Where ph represents the reported market value, Th represents the estimated transaction 
price and yh is a set of year dummies.  
If the reported values were true, and all houses were identical except for the year of 
sale, then α1 would equal 1 and α2 would represent how much the house has appreciated 
in value. If, on the other hand, long time owners tend to underreport the value of their 
house then α2 would underrepresent the appreciation of the house in the market. In this 
case, the predicted value of the house from equation (5.1) should be a conservative 
estimate of the true market value. We replace the reported value for each house with our 
computed estimate whenever the latter exceeds the former, which would represent a case 
of significant underreporting on the part of the owner. In the actual implementation we 
allow the parameters to vary across sub-regions of our study area by running the 
regression in (5.1) for each of the three metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) in the study 
area. These are, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Orange County and Riverside-San Bernardino. 
To correct for the bias in the house values, resulting from top coding, we use the 
following procedure. First, we estimate equation (5.1) using only the sample of houses 
whose values do not equal the top-code. We then use the stimated parameters to predict 
the market value for the houses with reported top-cded values. 
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5.2.2 Reported Housing Rents 
As in the case of reported owner-occupied house values one may expect that reported 
monthly rents of renter-occupied units may not represent a fair assessment of the true 
market rent. This is likely to be true when the resid nt has lived in the house for a long 
period of time. In this case, we may expect that the reported rent will be an 
understatement of the true market rent. This could be either a result of rent controls or 
implicit tenure discounts. To correct this issue we compute an adjusted market rent by 
regressing the log of the reported market rent on a set of dummies characterizing the 
tenure of the current owner as well as a vector of housing characteristics. The regression 
specification is given by: 
 
hhhh Xyp ωββ ++= 21)log( .  (5.2) 
 
Where yh is a dummy variable representing the year the current enter moved into the 
unit, and Xh is a set of housing and neighborhood characteristics for the house. As in the 
case of housing values we run this specification for each of the three MSAs in our 
sample. The parameter β1 in equation (5.2) represents the tenure discount in a given 




h ypp β−= . 
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5.2.3 Imputing the Rental Value of Housing across Units 
In order to arrive at a comparable measure of housing price for both owner and renter-
occupied units, we convert owner-occupied house values into monthly rents using the 
approach described in Bayer et al. (2005). Poterba (1992) provides the theoretical 
foundation for this approach. Sieg et al. (2004) also use this approach to develop a price 
index for each housing unit in their sample. To convert housing values into monthly 
rents, we regress the log of the housing price (house value or monthly rent) on a dummy 
variable (Oh), indicating whether the unit is owner occupied, and a set of structural 
housing characteristics (Xh). 
 
hhhh XOp υγγ ++= 21)log(  (5.3) 
 
We run this specification for each of the three MSAs (Los Angeles-Long Beach, Orange 
County and Riverside-San Bernardino) in our sample. The parameter γ1 represents the 
ratio of house values to rents for each MSA, controlling for structural characteristics of 
housing units. This is the user-cost of owner-occupied housing as defined by Poterba 
(1992). We use this ratio to convert owner-occupied house values to a corresponding 
monthly rent. 
To summarize, there are three sets of adjustments tha  are used to characterize the 
price of housing across owner-occupied and renter-occupied units. The first adjustment 
accounts for the fact that the house values contained i  the Census data are self reported 
and top coded. The second adjustment addresses the fac  that housing rents contained in 
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the Census data may misrepresent the true market rent. The final adjustment deals with 
converting owner-occupied housing values into monthly rents. 
5.3 Neighborhood Variables 
Table 5.2 reports average values for the neighborhood attributes used in the model. We 
use the 1990 Census PUMA boundaries to characterize neighborhood geography. This is 
because the PUMS identify the geographic location of a dwelling unit as the Census 
PUMA. A Census PUMA is a geographic area containing approximately 100,000 
individuals. Sieg et al. (2004) characterize residential communities using 1990 school 
district boundaries. They were able to do so because housing transactions microdata 
identify the census tract as well as the school district for each housing unit. Because they 
had access to the 1990 Census long form files, Bayer et al. (2005) were able to use 
Census block boundaries to characterize neighborhoods. The census block is a 
geographic area of approximately 100 individuals. 
 
Table 5.2: Mean Neighborhood (PUMA) Characteristics In 1990 









      
Number of observations 79 55 11 3 10 
      
8th grade math score† 34.0 31.6 45.1 34.3 34.8 
Crime (FBI index) 786.5 843.3 604.2 831.6 661.2 
      
Elevation (meters) 200.7 172.9 63.2 345.6 461.8 
PUMA is on pacific coastline 0.114 0.091 0.364 - - 
Housing density (sq. km) 1,061.7 1,116.2 1,056.9 2,02 .2 479.4 
      
Ozone‡ (ppm) 0.146 0.143 0.109 0.177 0.198 
Exceedences national 1hr ozone standard  32.94 29.58 12.11 51.46 68.80 
PM-10 annual average (µg/m3) 55.51 51.87 60.45 68.72 66.12 
† School district average for 1994 CLAS. Math test scores have been normalized so they fall between 0 and 100. 
‡ Annual average of top 30 daily 1hr maximum readings. PUMA is assigned the 3-year centered average from the closest monitor. 
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The study area comprised a total of 87 PUMAs in 1990. This compares with 
approximately 150 school districts and 2400 Census tracts. The average PUMA in 1990 
had approximately 3000 housing units. To reduce measur ment errors in characterizing 
neighborhood attributes, the estimation only uses PUMAs whose boundaries are mutually 
exclusive. PUMAs that are enveloped by other PUMAs are excluded from the sample. 
This reduces the number of PUMAs to 79. A map of the study area with the PUMA 
boundaries is shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
                              Figure 5.1: PUMA Boundaries with Ozone and PM10 Monitors 
 
 
PUMAs are relatively large geographic units compared to Census tracts or school 
districts.   However, for the main attributes used in the estimation, the variation within 
PUMAs is significantly small compared to the variation across PUMAs. Table 5.3 shows 
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within and between PUMA standard deviations for select d characteristics. For math 
score, ozone and PM-10 values, the variation across PUMAs is nearly five times larger 
than the within PUMA variation. The difference is smaller though still significant for the 
crime measure. The standard deviation of crime values across PUMAs is 20 percent 
higher than the mean standard deviation within PUMAs. We therefore conclude that the 
PUMA boundaries provide a good characterization of eighborhood school quality, crime 
and air quality. 
 
Table 5.3: Within and Between Variation for Selected PUMA Characteristics In 1990 
 
Mean of PUMA 
values 
Std. of PUMA 
Means 
Mean of within PUMA 
Std. 
    
8th grade math score 34.0 35.5 5.7 
Crime (FBI index) 786.5 770.1 631.9 
Ozone† 0.146 0.040 - 
Ozone‡ 0.148 0.031 0.006 
PM-10† 55.5 11.0 - 
PM-10‡ 53.2 7.4 1.4 
† Interpolation method: PUMA is assigned closest monitor reading. 
‡ Interpolation method: PUMA is assigned distance-weighted average of readings from 3 closest monitor. 
 
5.3.1 Air Quality Data 
The air quality data used in this study was obtained from the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB). CARB provides California ambient air quality data for criteria and toxic 
pollutants from 1980 through 2002. The data include hourly and daily values as well as 
annual summaries collected from a large network of m nitors dispersed throughout the 
state of California. Annual averages for 1990, 1995, and 2000, are obtained for two major 
primary criteria pollutants: ozone and particulate matter (PM-10). These pollutants have 
been shown to have a significant impact on housing prices (Sieg et al., 2004). Ozone is 
 67 
measured as the average of the top 30 daily maximum readings at a monitor, while 
particulate matter (PM-10) is measured by the annual geometric mean.  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 provide descriptive statistics of the monitor air quality data in the 
study area. Average ozone concentrations in 1990 were highest in Los Angeles County 
and lowest in Orange County. Ozone concentrations fell by nearly 40 percent between 
1990 and 2000, with the largest reductions recorded in the worst areas. Monitor readings 
tend to be strongly correlated across pollutants. Table 5.6 shows the correlation between 
ozone, PM-10, nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The correlation 
coefficient for ozone and PM-10 at monitor locations measuring both pollutants is 0.44. 
 
Table 5.4: Active Monitors Measuring Ozone and PM-10 in the Los Angeles Area 









1989-1991 50 20 6 11 13 Ozone 
1999-2001 43 18 6 6 13 
1989-1991 18 6 2 5 5 PM10 
1999-2001 19 6 3 5 5 
 
Table 5.5: Average Monitor Reading† for Ozone and PM-1013 









1990 0.144 0.150 0.116 0.137 0.154 Ozone* 
2000 0.097 0.089 0.078 0.111 0.109 
1990 36 37 11 33 47 Ozone 
Exceedances** 2000 3 2 0 5 6 
1990 55.4 51.5 42.3 61.1 59.5 PM-10 *** 
2000 44.1 41.6 34.5 44.8 52.2 
* Average top 30 1-hour daily maximum readings at a monitor during a year (parts per million). 
**  Number of days with a recorded violation the one-hour national standard for ozone. 
***  Annual geometric mean (ug/m3). 
† The yearly reading for each monitor is obtained by computing a 3-year centered average. For instance, the 1990 reading for monitor 
x is computed by averaging the readings for 1989, 19 0 and 1991 at monitor x.
 
                                                      
13 Source: California Ambient Air Quality Data. 2004 Data CD 
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Ozone and PM-10 levels are also strongly correlated with secondary pollutants such as 
nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide. The correlation coefficient between ozone and NOx is 
0.47; for ozone and SO2 it is -0.56. 
 
Table 5.6: Correlation between Primary and Secondary Pollutants In 1990 




Ozone - 0.44 0.47* -0.56** 
PM-10 0.44 - 0.52* -0.54 
Note: * Significant at 5 percent level. **  Significant at 1 percent level. 
 
The study area had a total of 50 active monitors measuring ozone between 1989 and 
1991 (See Table 5.4). This compared with 18 monitors measuring PM-10 concentrations. 
We use two interpolation approaches to determine neighborhood air pollution levels. The 
first approach assigns to each PUMA the centered 3-year average of readings from the 
closest monitor. If more than one monitor falls within a PUMA, the PUMA is assigned 
the average from these monitors. Sieg et al. (2004) used a similar approach to assign air 
quality levels to each house in their sample. They t n approximate the neighborhood air 
quality level using the averages for the houses sold in each school district. One potential 
issue with this approach is that it may assign the same monitor readings to a collection of 
neighborhoods, regardless of how far they are located from the monitor. Hence, it does 
not account for the fact that pollution concentrations are likely to dissipate with distance. 
The second interpolation approach uses a distance-weighted method. We generate a 
pollution surface for the entire study area using 100 meter-by-100 meter grid cells. We 
then assign to each grid cell a distance-weighted average of the readings from the 3 
closest monitors. The neighborhood air quality measure is then computed by averaging 
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the grid values within each PUMA. The two interpolation approaches lead to similar 
neighborhood ozone and PM-10 concentrations. We follow Sieg et al. (2004) and use the 
pollution levels from the closest monitor interpolation approach in the estimation of 
household preferences and the computation of welfare benefits. 
Figure 5.2 shows a map of the neighborhood air quality levels in 1990 across the 
study area. The coastal communities of Los Angeles and Orange counties had the highest 
air quality levels in the area. On the other hand, air quality was the worst in the inland 
areas of Los Angeles, Riverside and San Bernardino counties. It is interesting to note that 
the distribution of ozone levels does not appear at first glance to be correlated with the 
distribution of average household income across neighborhoods, shown in Figure 5.3. It 
is not clear that higher air quality areas are located in high income neighborhoods and 
vice versa. In fact, some of the lower income cities such as Inglewood and Long Beach 
are located in areas with very good air quality, while higher income cities such as 
Pasadena and Santa Clarita are in poor air quality areas.  
The relationship between air quality and income levels implied by the raw data is 
merely reflecting the fact that households in the Los Angeles area might care more about 
other public goods (such as school and crime) than ey do about air quality. It turns out 
that the distribution of income is highly correlated with the distribution of school quality. 
This also suggests that a more rigorous analysis is needed to disentangle the relationship 






Figure 5.2: 1990 Neighborhood Ozone Levels 
 
 




5.3.2 Other Neighborhood Data  
In addition to air quality, we collect data on other neighborhood amenities that 
households may value. These include school quality, crime and racial composition. The 
racial composition of the PUMA is characterized by the proportion of Hispanics. Finally, 
three variables are used to control for unobserved factors that may affect the level of air 
pollution in a neighborhood. These are, mean elevation of the neighborhood, the 
proximity of the neighborhood to the Pacific coastline, and the housing density of the 
neighborhood.  
School Quality 
Because California State law limits expenditures of local school districts, a more reliable 
measure of school quality would be one that is based on academic performance outcomes 
rather than expenditures (Sieg et al. 2004). The California Department of Education 
(CDE) administers standardized tests that are used to monitor the academic performance 
of public schools. In the early 1990s the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS) 
was administered to public schools throughout the State of California. The 1994 CLAS 
provides a measure of students’ academic performance in math, reading and writing. 
More recent academic performance test scores are the Academic Performance Index 
(API) and the STAR report.  
We use the school district average 8th grade math score from the 1994 CLAS as our 
measures of school quality in 1990.  Ideally one would want to use the 1989 CLAS data. 
Unfortunately this dataset is no longer available. The neighborhood school quality 
variable is computed by using a weighted average of the scores for all the school districts 
that intersect the PUMA. We use the area of the school district which intersects the 
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PUMA as weight. For instance, suppose PUMA j has total area A and overlaps area a(x) 
of school district x and area a(y) of school district y. Then the school quality level for 
PUMA j is computed as a(x)·score(x)/A + a(y) ·score(y)/A. 
Figure 5.4 provides a map of the neighborhood level school quality data. The large 
cluster of neighborhoods with the worst school quality levels is part of the Los Angeles 
unified school district (LAUSD). The LAUSD is one of the largest school districts in the 
United States and the largest in the State of California. 
 




Currently, the most disaggregated crime data for California is provided by the Criminal 
Justice Statistics Center (CJSC) from the Office of the California Attorney General. The 
CJSC compiles statewide, county and city crime statistics and publishes them every year 
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in the Criminal Justice Profiles. The crime variable used in this study is the FBI crime 
index for each jurisdiction in 1990. The FBI crime index reports the number of crime 
occurrences per 10,000 populations. The neighborhood crime rate is computed using the 
same weighting average method used to compute the neighborhood school quality. The 
crime data is not as reliable as the school quality data since it is only provided at the 
jurisdiction level and not all of the study area is incorporated. A map of the neighborhood 
crime levels in 1990 is shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5: 1990 Neighborhood Crime Levels 
 
 
Elevation, Proximity to Pacific Coastline, Housing Density 
A number of factors may determine the level of air pollution in a neighborhood. For 
example all other things equals, air pollution will generally be less in coastal 
communities because of the prevailing west winds.  In addition, local climate conditions 
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are likely to have a significant impact on the concentration of air pollutants. Also, densely 
populated urban areas generally tend to have more air pollution because of higher road 
congestion. To account for these factors we add three neighborhood variables to the 
household preference specification. These are, the mean elevation of the neighborhood, 
the neighborhood’s proximity to the Pacific coastline, and the housing density of the 
neighborhood.  
The National Elevation Dataset (NED) is a product of he US Geological Survey. It 
was developed by merging the highest resolution and best quality elevation data across 
the United States into a seamless raster format. The data is provided at a resolution of 1 
arc second with the unit of elevation in meters. We us  the NED to calculate the average 
elevation of each PUMA. The neighborhood’s proximity to the Pacific coastline is 
measured by a binary variable which equals one if a portion of the neighborhood’s 
boundary is on the Pacific coastline. The housing density of the PUMA is given by the 
number of housing units per square kilometer. 
5.4 Characterizing the Residential Location 
We characterize the household’s residential location choice alternatives in terms of 4037 
discrete housing types.  These are also referred as housing products. Each housing type is 
a collection of housing units that are located within the same neighborhood and have 
identical observed characteristics. Housing types ar  defined in terms of six variables: 
ownership status, number of bedrooms, dwelling type, built after 1980, built during the 
1960s or 70s, and PUMA. The first five variables represent the housing characteristics for 
each housing type. We characterize the rental price of a given housing type h as the 
average of the rental prices for all units of type h. This is similar to the approach used by 
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Berry et al. (1995) to obtain average prices of carproducts. The neighborhood 
characteristics for each housing type are given by the characteristics of the PUMA (see 
Table 5.2). 
The ownership status is defined as either renter-occupied or owner-occupied. The 
number of bedrooms ranges from 0 to 5, giving 6 types. The dwelling type is defined as 
either single-family or multi-family. The variables “built after 1980” and “built during 
1960s or 70s” are binary variables that equal one if true and zero otherwise. Lastly, the 
study area contains 79 neighborhoods. These six categories provide a total of 7584 (2 * 6 * 
2 * 2 * 2 * 79) possible housing types. The actual number of combinations that exist in the 
study area is much smaller. We obtain a total of 4037 distinct housing products. This is 
because some of the 7584 possible housing types do not exist in the data. For example, in 
a given neighborhood there are eight possible types of four-bedroom multi-family units. 
However, some neighborhoods contain no multi-family four-bedroom units. As a result 
these neighborhoods will have zero, instead of eight, types of four-bedroom multi-family 
units.   
Using housing types rather than housing units to characterize residential locations 
significantly reduces the number of alternatives in the housing market while still 
providing a complete span of the product space. This has a direct implication for the 
identification of preference parameters in the first stage of the estimation. Indeed, a 
necessary requirement for the identification14 of the first stage is that the number of 
observations be larger than the number of alternative-specific constants plus the number 
of interaction parameters. This requirement is not me when housing units are used to 
                                                      
14 A discussion of identification issues is provided in section 6.3. 
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characterize residential locations, as the number of observations (i.e. households) will 
equal the number housing alternatives. 
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6 Estimation Strategy 
This chapter describes the estimation of the parameters of the household’s indirect utility 
in equations (4.3) and (4.4). In section 6.1 we characterize the sampling framework used 
to generate the household sample and the choice set of ampled households. Section 6.2 
discusses the details of the estimation strategy. Section 6.3 discusses the properties of the 
estimated preference parameters. Section 6.4 presents the results of the estimation. The 
estimation is done in MATLAB. All the codes used in the estimation are contained in the 
estimation appendix (Appendix B) provided at the end of the dissertation. 
6.1  Sampling Framework 
Two issues arise in the empirical estimation of the household location choice model. The 
first issue regards how to draw the sample of households to be used in the estimation of 
the model. The sampling of households is necessary because it is not computationally 
feasible to estimate the model from the population of 171,000 households. The second 
issue pertains to the relevant choice set for the sampled households. This is a classical 
issue in the estimation of discrete choice models (See for example McFadden, 1978 and 
Quigley, 1985). 
6.1.1 Drawing the Household Sample 
We devise a sampling scheme that allows us to use a smaller yet representative sample of 
the households in the data. The sampling framework uses a stratified, choice-based15 
sampling design. In particular, we draw a 10 percent ra dom sample of the households 
                                                      
15 Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) provide a review of sampling theory and applications to the estimation of 
discrete choice models. 
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who choose each housing type. This produces the final sample of 17,894 households used 
to estimate the location choice model. 
The choice-based sampling design does not produce a fully random sample of the 
household population. Indeed, it is easy to show that the average household 
characteristics from this sample will be biased estimates of the mean household 
characteristics in the population. An alternative to the choice-based sampling design 
would be to use a simple random sampling scheme. While a simple random sampling 
design produces independent observations, it does nt guarantee that every housing type 
will be represented in the sample. This will likely be the case for housing alternatives that 
are chosen by very few households. In other words, the random sample may not produce 
households from those residential locations. In an ttempt to provide a full 
characterization of the housing market, we opted to preserve the product space at the 
expense of the independence of household observations. We correct for the bias in the 
first stage estimation, resulting from the choice-based sampling design, using the 
approach of Manski and McFadden (1981). This correction is explained below in the 
details of the estimation.  
6.1.2 Determining the Choice Set of Sampled Households 
The household’s relevant choice set or feasible set of alternatives is an essential 
component of the estimation. A sampling approach is also used to construct the choice 
set. Potentially, one could set the household’s choice set as the 4037 housing types in the 
sample. However, this would render the estimation cmputationally intractable. The 
reason is that the computational burden of the estimation grows linearly with the size of 
the household’s choice set (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). An alternative is to construct 
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the choice set by sampling a few alternatives from the full set of available alternatives. In 
particular, the household’s choice set includes (i) the household’s chosen residential 
location and (ii) a random sample of 20 residential locations from the remaining non-
chosen alternatives. McFadden (1978) has shown that such a scheme will yield consistent 
parameter estimates for the multinomial logit model. In section 6.4.2 we investigate the 
robustness of our estimates with respect to the size of the choice set. 
6.2 Estimation of Household Preference Parameters 
The parameters (α, γ, β0, β1) of the household indirect utility function defined by 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) are estimated from a multinomial logit model. The estimation 
follows the two-stage approach proposed by Bayer et al. (2005). In the first stage we 
estimate (H-1) alternative-specific constants16 (δh) and the household-specific taste 
parameters (α, γ, β1) in equation (4.3). The second stage estimates the vector of mean 
taste parameters (β0) using the estimated vector of alternative constant  s the dependent 
variable in the regression specification given by equation (4.4). 
6.2.1 Recovering the Household-Specific Taste Parameters (First Stage) 
The alternative-specific constants (δh) and the household-specific taste parameters (α, γ, 
β1) are obtain via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The indirect utility in equation 
(4.3) defines the household-specific multinomial choi e probabilities given by: 
 
                                                      



























βγαδ ,  (6.1) 
 
where Ci represents the choice set of household i. Given the household choice 
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where I ih is a dummy that equals 1 whenever household i chooses location h in the data. 
The estimates for the preference parameters (α, γ, β1) and the choice-specific constants 
(δ) are then obtained via maximization of the log-like hood L (δ, α, γ, β1). 
The closing conditions of the equilibrium model are implicitly enforced via 
maximization of the log-likelihood. As pointed out by Bayer et al (2005), this can be 
observed from the first order condition of the maximization problem. Differentiating the 
























where ihP̂  is the estimated choice probability, sh represents the sample housing supply for 
alternative h, and hi ∈  indicates that household i chooses housing type h. Notice that 
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equation (6.3) closely resembles the equilibrium condition in equation (4.10). It is indeed 
the sample equivalent of equation (4.10). Hence, th vector of alternative-specific 
constants which maximizes the log-likelihood also insures that the equilibrium condition 
in equation (4.8) holds for the sample. 
The maximization of the log-likelihood in equation (6.2) with respect to the full set of 
parameters (δ, α, γ, β1) is computationally demanding. This is because the dimension of δ 
(the vector of location-specific constants) is generally large. In this study, the housing 
market comprises a total of 4037 housing alternatives. This requires estimating 4036 
alternative-specific constants in the first stage. As a result, maximizing the log-likelihood 
using standard search algorithms (i.e. Newton-Raphson, quasi-Newton or direct search) 
can be extremely slow and inefficient. A contraction mapping proposed by Berry et al. 
(1995) allows one to circumvent this computational burden by solving for the alternative-
specific constants separately using the first order condition in equation (6.3).  
Equation (6.3) implicitly defines the vector of alternative-specific constants (δ) as a 
function of the household-specific taste parameters (α, γ, β1) and the vector of housing-
type supplies (s). This allows one to derive a concentrated version of the log-likelihood as 








PIL ),,),,,((log),,( 111 βγαβγαδβγα . (6.4) 
 
For given values of (α, γ, β1) that maximize the concentrated log-likelihood Lc, we can 
obtain estimates of the alternative constants by solving the system in equation (6.3). The 
contraction mapping of Berry et al. (1995) provides a quick numerical solution to this 
 82 















h sP ),,,(ˆlog 1
 1 βγαδδδ . (6.5) 
 
Berry et al. (1995) prove that the algorithm in equation (6.5) is a contraction mapping, 
which means that it is guaranteed to converge for any starting value of δ. Convergence 
generally occurs quickly. In our estimation, convergence of the contraction mapping 
usually occurs after 20 to 30 iterations. The computing time is usually between 5 and 10 
seconds on Pentium 4 2Ghz PC stations. 
The first stage estimation can be summarized as follows: 
 
i. Set an initial guess for δ. 
ii. Given δ, maximize the constrained log-likelihood in (6.4) with respect to (α, γ, β1). 
iii. Given the estimates of (α, γ, β1), solve for δ using the contraction mapping in (6.5). 
iv. Repeat (ii) and (iii) until the estimates converg . 
 
It is easy to see that the above steps solve the syst m of first order conditions for the 
unconstrained log-likelihood in equation (6.2). This implies that the estimates produced 
by this sequential estimation are indeed the MLE estimates of (δ, α, γ, β1), which are 
unique given the global concavity of the multinomial logit log-likelihood. 
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6.2.2 Correcting for the Sampling Design 
As discussed previously, the choice-based sampling approach does not produce a random 
sample from the household population. As a result, additional steps need to be taken to 
ensure that the first stage MLE estimates are consistent. It turns out that the log-
likelihood in equation (6.2) represents a special cse which requires only a minor 
correction to achieve consistency. In fact, it has been shown (McFadden and Manski, 
1981) that the MLE estimates of (α, γ, β1) are consistent as long as (i) the choice model is 
a multinomial logit and (ii) the model contains a full set of alternative-specific constants. 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) Both of these conditions are satisfied by the log-
likelihood in equation (6.2). In addition, a minor correction will ensure the consistency of 
the alternative constants when the sampling design i  such that each choice alternative is 
a stratum and the population share of each stratum is known. The consistent estimate of 











wlnˆˆ δδ , (6.6) 
 
where wh is the fraction of the sample drawn from stratum h, and Wh represents the 
population share of stratum h. For the sampling design described in the previous section, 
each housing type represents a stratum. wh is therefore the ratio of the number of 
households drawn from housing type h to the total number of households in the sample. 
Wh is the proportion of the household population choosing each housing type h.  
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6.2.3 Estimating the Mean Taste Parameters (Second Stage) 
In the second stage, the mean taste parameters (β0) are estimated via ordinary least-
squares (OLS). We regress the vector of alternative-specific constants estimated in the 





khkh x ξβδ +=∑ 0ˆ . (6.7) 
 
The underlying assumption of the second stage regression is that the housing and 
neighborhood attributes in xh are uncorrelated with the unobserved attributes of the 
residential location. That is, they must be exogenous r at least determined prior to the 
revelation of the household’s valuation for the unobserved attribute (Nevo, 2000). A 
potential endogeneity problem may be due to the fact that unobservable neighborhood 
attributes may be correlated with neighborhood air quality. Bayer, Keohane and Timmins 
(2007) address this issue by constructing an instrument for neighborhood PM-10 air 
pollution that uses panel data. In particular, they compute the PM-10 measure, for a 
location j, using changes in PM-10 levels originating from sources outside location j.
Though we recognize the potential endogeneity of the neighborhood ozone measure, the 
fact that we have a small number of neighborhoods (79) limits our ability to construct 
reliable instruments. However, robustness checks suggest that the endogeneity of the 
PUMA-level ozone measure is not a severe problem. We return to this issue below in the 
estimation results. 
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Differentiated product models (see e.g. Berry et al., 1995 and Bayer et al., 2005) have 
used an instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal with the potential endogeneity 
problem that arises when the housing price enters the second stage. This endogeneity is 
caused by the fact that housing prices are likely to be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics of residential locations. However, we do not instrument for housing prices 
as they do not enter the second stage regression. Our model does not treat housing prices 
as attributes of residential locations. Rather, housing prices enter the first stage estimation 
as part of the household’s budget constraint. The first stage maximum likelihood 
estimation does, however, assume that the household’s expenditure on non-housing 
goods, i.e. the term (y-p), is uncorrelated with the household-specific random error term 
(εih). 
6.3 Properties of Parameter Estimates 
6.3.1 Identification 
We briefly discuss the identification of the parameters of the household’s indirect utility 
function. Specifically, we ask what features of thedata allow for the identification of the 
estimated parameters. A separate, though not unrelated, identification argument can be 
given for the each of the stages of the estimation. 
A necessary data requirement for identification of the first stage parameters is that the 
number of observations be larger than the number of alternative-specific constants (H-1) 
plus the number of interaction parameters (k) to be estimated. In particular let N be the 
number of households in the sample. Then we must have that N ≥ H + k – 1. Note that 
this condition has a direct implication for the characterization of residential locations and 
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the household sample. First, it implies that the household sample used in the estimation 
must be at least of size H + k – 1. Second, characterizing the residential locations as 
individual housing units would imply that N < H + k – 1. As a result, the alternative 
constants may not be identified. Hence the need to characterize residential locations using 
housing products rather than individual houses. 
Given that the data satisfies the necessary requirement for identification, the 
heterogeneous taste (i.e. interaction) parameters will be identified, provided that there are 
sufficient differences in the attributes of households’ location choices across each 
dimension of the household characteristics. For instance, suppose we hypothesize that 
college educated households have a higher willingness to pay for school quality relative 
the remainder of the population. Then, for the interaction parameter between school 
quality and college education to be identified, we ne d to observe a sufficient difference 
(in this case positive) in the school quality levels of residential locations chosen by 
college educated households compared to the remainder of households.  
The alternative-specific constants, which will characterize the mean utility from each 
residential location, are identified by the variation in the market shares17 of residential 
locations. Simply put, if residential location A ison average preferred to residential 
location B (i.e. BA δδ > ) then, all other things equal, we should observe more households 
choosing A over B in the data. 
The mean taste parameters in the second stage regression are identified from the 
variation in the market shares of residential locations across housing and neighborhood 
attributes. Notice that a necessary condition is that e alternative-specific constants are 
                                                      
17 The market share of a housing product is defined as the proportion of households choosing the housing 
product in the 1990 PUMS data. 
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identified in the first stage estimation. This should obviously be the case, since the second 
stage regression cannot be defined without the altern tive-specific constants. We can 
illustrate the second stage identification argument as follows. Suppose, for example, that 
we hypothesize that households place, on average, a n gative value on air pollution. Then 
in order to identify the negative mean taste parameter for air pollution we must observe 
that, holding all other attributes equal, residential locations in highly polluted areas have 
a lower market share compared to residential locatin in the least polluted areas. 
6.3.2 Consistency and Asymptotic Normality 
Similar to the identification argument, the asymptotic properties of the estimates can be 
discussed in terms of the first and second stage estimation. An in-depth discussion of the 
asymptotic properties of the two-stage estimator can be found in Bayer et al. (2005). The 
consistency and asymptotic normality of the first stage estimates follow in the same spirit 
as in the traditional multinomial logit estimation. Given identification of the first stage, 
the estimated alternative-specific constants and heterogeneous taste parameters will be 
consistent and asymptotically normal as long as the number of households (N) in the 
sample grows large (Bayer et al., 2005). 
The argument for consistency of the second stage is, however, less straightforward. 
The complication arises because the dependent variable in the second stage regression is 
the estimated vector of alternative-specific constat  from the first stage. Hence a large 
number of housing products is not sufficient to guarantee consistency and asymptotic 
normality. A formal proof is given in Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004). They show that the 
second stage estimates will be consistent as long as (i) the number of housing 
alternatives, H, grows large and (ii) H log H/N goes to zero. That is, not only must H 
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grow large but the number of households in the sample ust also grow faster than H. In 
addition, asymptotic normality at a rate H requires that H2/N be bounded. In other 
words, N must grow at a rate faster than H2. 
6.4 Estimation Results 
We estimate the specification of the household’s indirect utility function in equations 
(4.3) and (4.4). The study area had a total of 50 active monitors measuring ozone between 
1989 and 1991 (see Table 5.4). This is compared with only 18 monitors measuring PM-
10 concentrations. We use ozone concentrations to chara terize air pollution in 1990. Due 
to the high correlation among the household characte istics we only estimate a limited set 
of interaction parameters in the first stage.  
6.4.1 Parameter Estimates 
Table 6.1 summarizes the results of the estimation. Model 1 estimates the benchmark 
specification which is used in the welfare estimation. The other models provide 
robustness checks which are described below. The house ld-specific taste parameters 
estimated in first stage are all significant. The interaction parameters also have the 
expected signs except for the interaction parameter between crime and household income. 
We find that households with higher income levels have a higher willingness to pay for 
air quality, which is in accordance with the hypothesis that air quality is a normal good. 
We also find that larger households are willing to pay more for additional bedrooms. 
Households with college educated heads tend to havea stronger preference for school 
quality. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that educated people place a higher 
value on the quality of their children’s education. Households also prefer residential 
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locations that are within their employment zone. This supports the hypothesis that 
households dislike commuting. 
 
Table 6.1: Estimation Results 
 Model 1‡ Model 1a Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
First Stage      
Log(y-p) 1.475**  - 1.499**  1.649**  2.052**  
Ozone * Log(y-p) -0.019**  - -0.020**  -0.028**  0.01**  
Bedrooms * Household size 0.066**  - 0.066**  0.066**  0.064**  
Single family * Children under 18 0.227**  - 0.227**  0.227**  0.165**  
Math * college 0.309**  - 0.31**  0.244**  0.337**  
Log crime * Log(y-p) 0.004**  - - -0.013**  0.026**  
Within household’s  employment zone 1.989**  - 1.989**  - 2.194**  
      
Log-Likelihood -37,072 - -37,072 -40,719 -47,733 
Likelihood Ratio  statistic (H0: δ =0) 25,996 - 26,009 26,857 5,541 
Likelihood Ratio p-value  (H0: δ =0) 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.999 
      
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.319 - 0.319 0.252 0.124 
Observations 17,894 - 17,894 17,894 17,894 
      
Second Stage OLS †      
Bedrooms 0.04* 0.041* 0.04* 0.044* 0.155**  
Built after 1980 -0.594**  -0.594**  -0.594**  -0.596**  0.267**  
Built in 60s or 70s -0.172* -0.171* -0.173**  -0.169**  0.131**  
Single family dwelling 0.352**  0.346**  0.353**  0.349**  0.185**  
Owned 0.054 0.057 0.053 0.04 0.044**  
Math test score 0.139**  0.172**  0.153**  0.086* 0.092**  
Log FBI crime index 0.0005 -0.0005 - 0.003**  -0.044**  
Log Elevation 0.016 0.035 0.007 -0.018 0.066**  
PUMA is on Pacific coastline 0.342**  0.378**  0.327**  0.315**  0.167**  
Log Density 0.079 0.075 0.068 0.001 0.188**  
Prop. of population Hispanic -0.380* - -0.32* -0.498**  -0.611**  
Ozone 0.161 0.120 0.17 0.211 -0.095**  
      
R2 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.302 
Observations 4,037 4,037 4,037 4,037 17,894 
Notes: 
**  Significant at 1% level. * Significant at 5% level. † Standard errors are computed using White’s robust covariance matrix. 
‡ Model 1  : Benchmark specification used in the simulation and welfare analysis. 
    Model 1a: Estimates the second stage OLS without  the variable “proportion of Hispanics”. This is inte ded to check the 
endogeneity of neighborhood ozone. 
   Model 2: Estimates the first and second stage without  the “crime” variable. 
   Model 3: Estimates the first stage without  the “employment” variable. 
   Model 4: Characterizes residential locations using individual houses instead of discrete housing types. 
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The positive and significant interaction between the log of crime and household 
income is contrary to our intuition. We would tend to expect that public safety is a 
normal good. This means that households with a higher income would want to have more 
public safety and hence be willing to pay more. This would imply a negative sign for the 
interaction of crime with income. As described in chapter 5, the crime variable is quite 
noisy as crime rates are only available at the city level. Also, as Table 5.3 shows, there is 
not enough variation in the crime variable across neighborhoods. These factors may 
contribute to the counterintuitive interaction effect between crime and income.  
The mean taste parameters estimated in the second stage also generally have the 
expected signs. On average, households are found to prefer more bedrooms, owner-
occupied dwellings, single family dwellings, better school quality and coastal 
communities. The second-stage ozone coefficient is ot statistically different from zero at 
either the one, five or ten percent level. The mean taste for ozone can be obtain by 
multiplying the ozone-income interaction coefficient, -0.02, by the mean of Log(y-p) in 
our sample, 8. The fact that the average taste for owner-occupied dwellings is not 
significant may be due to the positive correlation between single-family and owner-
occupied dwelling. The sample correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.68 
for the housing units in the study area. 
6.4.2 Robustness Checks 
Endogeneity of Neighborhood Air Pollution 
As discussed in the previous section, the estimate of ozone pollution in the second stage 
regression is likely to be endogenous as a neighborhood’s ozone level may be correlated 
with unobserved neighborhood socioeconomic variables that enter the error term (ξh). As 
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a result the estimated mean taste parameter for air pollution may be biased and 
inconsistent. The direction of this bias is to make th  coefficient less negative, as air 
pollution will generally be positively correlated with neighborhood characteristics, such 
share of low-income households and share of ethnic minorities, which are generally 
disliked by households. This could explain the positive estimate of ozone pollution in the 
second stage regression. 
As explained previously, the small number of neighbor oods in our data limits our 
ability to construct reliable instruments. However, we do a simple robustness check for 
the endogeneity problem that would result from the correlation between neighborhood 
ozone level and unobserved neighborhood characteristics. This involves estimating the 
second stage OLS regression without the proportion of Hispanics. The assumption is that 
the unobserved neighborhood socioeconomic variables are correlated with the proportion 
of Hispanics in the neighborhood. Hence, if the ozone level is correlated with unobserved 
socioeconomic characteristics, removing the neighborhood proportion of Hispanics from 
the second stage regression should significantly lessen the bias in the estimated ozone 
mean taste parameter. Model 1aof Table 6.1 reports the results from the alternate 
regression specification. We find that the estimated ozone coefficient remains positive 
and insignificant. The magnitude of the coefficient is also roughly the same in Model 1 
and Model 1a. We should again note that the mean taste for ozone remains negative, as 
the ozone-income interaction coefficient is the same across models 1 and 1a. 
Robustness Checks with Respect to the Crime and Employment Variables 
As mentioned previously, the crime variable is quite noisy as crime rates are only 
available at the city level. One may wonder whether t  noisiness in the crime variable 
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may significantly affect the estimates of the taste parameters for the other neighborhood 
variables. Model 2 of Table 6.1 runs the estimation without the crime variable in both 
first and second stages. The estimated parameters from this model are very similar to the 
estimates in Model 1. 
The estimated taste parameter for the household’s preference for locations that are 
within its employment zone is significantly large in absolute value compared to the other 
taste parameters.  It is possible that the employment dummy may also be capturing 
household-specific preferences for other neighborhod characteristics that are not 
observed in the data. To the extent that this is the case, one may wonder if the presence of 
the employment dummy significantly distorts the estima ed coefficient for ozone in both 
the first and second stages. As a robustness check, we run the estimation without the 
employment dummy in the first stage. The results are reported in Model 3 of Table 6.1. 
Except for the coefficients involving the crime variable, the remaining of the estimated 
parameters are similar to those in Model 1. 
Alternative Characterization of Residential Locations 
We explained in section 5.4 that the residential locati ns are characterized in terms of 
housing types, rather individual housing units. This not only reduces the computational 
burden of the estimation, but also plays a key rolein the identification and asymptotic 
properties of the estimates (see section 6.3). When residential locations are characterized 
in terms of individual housing units, the alternative constants may not be identified since 
N < H + k – 1.18 One would essentially be trying to recover more parameters than the 
number of observations in the first stage estimation.  
                                                      
18 Here H is the number of housing alternatives and k represents the number of interaction parameters to be
estimated in the first stage. 
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Model 4 of Table 6.1 estimates the household preference parameters by 
characterizing residential locations using housing u its. This is the approach used by 
Bayer et al. (2005). The sample of housing alternatives is formed by taking a random 
sub-sample of H (= 17,894) housing units from the 171,000 houses in the 1990 PUMS 
data for the study area. The household sample is given by the households choosing the H 
sampled housing units (i.e. N = H). This means that the first stage will involve estimating 
N-1 alternative-specific constants plus k interaction parameters from the location choices 
of N households. Hence there are not enough observations to explain all the parameters in 
the first stage estimation. This is reflected by the likelihood ratio test result for the first 
stage estimation. The joint null hypothesis that the estimated alternative constants are all 
zero cannot be rejected. 
Alternative Sampling Strategies 
We also check the robustness of the estimated preferenc  parameters with respect to the 
size of the household’s sampled choice set. In section 6.1.1 we explained that the 
household’s relevant choice set includes (i) the chosen alternative and (ii) a random 
sample of 20 non-chosen alternatives. Model 5a in Table 6.2 re-estimates the preference 
parameters using a choice set that includes (i) the chosen alternative and (ii) a random 
sample of 10 non-chosen alternatives. Model 5b usesa random sample of 50 non-chosen 
alternatives to form the household choice set. The estimated parameters from both 
specifications have the same signs with the coeffici nts in Model 1. The magnitudes of 





Table 6.2: Alternative Sampling Strategies 
 Model 1‡ Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b 
      
First Stage      
Log(y-p) 1.475**  1.394**  1.536**  1.6**  1.56**  
Ozone * Log(y-p) -0.019**  -0.023**  -0.019**  -0.022**  -0.021**  
Bedrooms * Household size 0.066**  0.07**  0.066**  0.062**  0.053**  
Single family * Children under 18 0.227**  0.271**  0.225**  0.21**  0.253**  
Math * college 0.309**  0.32**  0.3**  0.295**  0.297**  
Log crime * Log(y-p) 0.004**  0.001 0.006**  0.006**  0.009**  
Within household’s  employment zone 1.989**  1.986**  2.006**  1.971**  1.961**  
      
Log-Likelihood -37,072 -27,104 -51,690 -67,241 -130,056 
Likelihood Ratio p-value  (H0: δ =0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.319 0.368 0.265 0.353 0.365 
Observations 17,894 17,894 17,894 34,132 67,304 
      
Second Stage OLS †      
Bedrooms 0.04* 0.03 0.045* 0.048* 0.05**  
Built after 1980 -0.594**  -0.602**  -0.588**  -0.596**  -0.59**  
Built in 60s or 70s -0.172* -0.18**  -0.168* -0.18**  -0.175**  
Single family dwelling 0.352**  0.359**  0.356**  0.351**  0.355**  
Owned 0.054 0.06 0.041 0.045 0.047 
Math test score 0.139**  0.13**  0.143**  0.147**  0.138**  
Log FBI crime index 0.0005 0.001 0.0001 0.000 0.000 
Log Elevation 0.016 0.009 0.025 0.028 0.028 
PUMA is on pacific coastline 0.342**  0.341**  0.334**  0.341**  0.349**  
Log Density 0.079 0.07 0.089* 0.09* 0.094* 
Prop. of population Hispanic -0.38* -0.401* -0.387* -0.376* -0.41**  
Ozone 0.161 0.19 0.148 0.151 0.141 
      
R2 0.054 0.052 0.055 0.056 0.057 
Observations 4,037 4,037 4,037 4,037 4,037 
Notes: 
**  Significant at 1% level. * Significant at 5% level. † Standard errors are computed using White’s robust covariance matrix. 
‡ Model 1  : Benchmark specification used in the simulation and welfare analysis. 
    Model 2a: Characterizes the household’s relevant choice set using 10, instead of 20, randomly sampled non-chosen alternatives. 
   Model 2b: Characterizes the household’s relevant choice set using 50, instead of 20, randomly sampled non-chosen alternatives. 
   Model 3a: household sample is form by drawing 20, instead of 10, percent of the households choosing each alternative in the 
1990 PUMS. 
   Model 3b: household sample is form by drawing 40, instead of 10, percent of the households choosing each alternative in the 
1990 PUMS. 
 
We do a final robustness check of the estimated parameters with respect to the 
sampling of the households. In section 6.1 we explained that the household sample is 
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formed by drawing a 10 percent random sample of the households choosing each housing 
type. We re-estimate the household parameters using a different sample size for the 
random draws. The results are reported in Models 6a and 6b of Table 6.2. Model 5a 
reports the estimates from a household sample obtained by drawing 20 percent of the 
households choosing each housing type. Model 5b reports the estimates from a household 
sample obtained by drawing 40 percent of the households choosing each housing type. 
The estimated coefficients are very similar to those in Model 1. 
6.4.3 Implications of the Estimated Preference Parameters 
The predictive power of the model can be seen by mapping the neighborhood mean 
valuations. Figure 6.1 maps the neighborhood (PUMA) averages of the mean utilities (δh) 
estimated in the first stage. This provides a spatial representation of the model’s 
prediction of the relative rankings of neighborhoods in 1990. The predicted rankings 
generally concur with the distribution of other neighborhood attributes across the study 
area. The least preferred neighborhoods in 1990 are located in the south-central and 
south-eastern portions of Los Angeles County, and the western portions of Riverside and 
San Bernardino County. This encompasses areas such as East Los Angeles and 
Inglewood. Those are areas which also possess some of th highest neighborhood crime 
rates (see Figure 5.5) and lowest school performance results (see Figure 5.4). On the 
other hand, the most preferred places are generally found in Orange County, as well as 
the central and north western neighborhoods of Los Angeles. This includes cities such as 
Beverly Hills, Glendale, Pasadena, Anaheim and Irvine. These are also areas with the 




Figure 6.1: Neighborhood Average of Estimated Mean Utilities (1990) 
 
 
Table 6.3 summarizes the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) estimates, in annual 
dollar terms, for selected housing and neighborhood characteristics. The mean MWTP, in 









.       (6.8) 
 
Where, ihV̂ is the estimated household indirect utility function, and kih xV ∂∂ /ˆ  represents 
the marginal utility of xk evaluated at the mean of the household sample. The 
multiplication by 12 converts the MWTP to an annual rental rate. The term in the 
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denominator represents the marginal utility of income evaluated at the mean of the 
household sample. The mean MWTP for a specific group f the household population 
(i.e. college graduates, households with annual income below $19,000) is obtained by 
evaluating the marginal value and the marginal utility of income at the group mean. 
 










     
Bedrooms  
(+1 bedroom) 
1,143 - 150 2,426 
Single-family dwelling 
(vs. Multi-family) 
10,104 - 1,326 21,450 
Math test score*  
(+1 standard deviation) 
3,550 11,474 466 7,538 
PUMA is within household’s 
employment zone 
(vs. outside) 
57,119 - 7,494 121,262 
PUMA is on pacific coastline  
(vs. inland) 
9,821 - 1,289 20,850 
Share Hispanics  
(+0.01) 
-109 - -14 -232 
Ozone†  
(-1%) 
62 - 8 131 
Note: All values are in annual rental rates. For example, the average household is willing to pay $1,143 annually for an  
additional bedroom while households with income below 19,000 are only willing to $150. The annual mean rental housing  
price in the study area is $9,000. 
†MWTP for a one percent change in 1990 average. 
* Math test score: mean = 34, standard deviation = 8.9, range: 25 to 60. 
 
All things equal, we find that households are willing to pay an additional $1,100 in 
annual housing rent for an extra bedroom in their house. Households are willing to pay an 
additional $10,000 annually or nearly twice the aver g  annual rent to reside in a single-
family housing unit. Households are also willing to pay an additional $9,800 annually for 
a one standard deviation increase in neighborhood school quality. The model also 
predicts that households will pay nearly twice the average rent to live in coastal 
communities. The estimated mean MWTP for locations that are within the household’s 
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employment zone is very large. Households are on average willing to pay roughly seven 
times the average annual rent for locations that are within their employment zone. As 
explained earlier, this may be due to the fact thate employment zone dummy may be 
capturing unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are valued by households. 
MWTP estimates also vary across household characteristics. For instance, compared to 
the average household, college graduates will pay an extra $500 per year for a one-point 
increase in the neighborhood schools’ average math score. Math scores range from 25 to 
60 in the study area. 
The estimated ozone coefficient implies a mean MWTP of $62 for a one-percent 
reduction in the 1990 average ozone concentration. We follow Sieg et al. (2004) by 
reporting the MWTP for a one-percent reduction in the 1990 ozone levels. This allows 
comparing the MWTP estimates with estimates from previous studies. We also find a 
significant variation in MWTP across households. For example, the MWTP for a one-
percent reduction in ozone for households in the highest income quartile (top 25 percent) 
is $130 compared to only $8 for households in the lowest income quartile. 
Our estimate of the MWTP for a one-percent ozone reduction compares well with 
MWTP estimates for other air pollutants in the literature. Sieg et al. (2004) report a 
marginal willingness to pay of $61 for a one-percent r duction in the 1990 average ozone 
concentration. Sieg et al. also report that MWTP estimates for other air pollutants in the 
literature range from $18 to $181, for a one-percent r duction. The Estimates of the 
MWTP for bedrooms also vary in the literature. Bayer et al. (2005) find a mean MWTP 
of $1,312, in annual 1990 dollars, for an additional bedroom. Quigley (1985) estimates a 
nested logit model of household choice in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area, and finds that 
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households are on average willing to pay $618 in anu l 1990 dollars for an additional 
bedroom.19 Chattopadhyay (2000) estimates a similar model, as Quigley (1985), for the 
Chicago area using four alternative nesting structues. He finds that the willingness to pay 
for an additional bedroom ranges from $82 to $533, in 1990 annual dollars.  
Our estimate of the mean MWTP for a one standard deviation increase in school 
quality is very large compared to the estimate obtained by Bayer et al. (2005). Our mean 
MWTP estimate for a one standard deviation increase in the school quality level is 
$3,550 in annual terms. This compares with the Bayer et al.’s estimate of $21.5. It should 
be noted, however, that the two school quality measures are reported using different 
scales. The mean school quality in the Bayer et al sample is 527, while our school quality 
measure has a mean of 34. As a result it makes sense to also compare the mean MWTP 
for a one percent change in the annual 1990 mean school quality, as suggested by Sieg et 
al. (2004) in the case of air quality. Our estimate of the mean MWTP for a one percent 
increase in the mean school quality level is $136, which is closer to the Bayer et al. 
estimate of $18, but still quite high.  
We would expect our MWTP estimate of school quality to be relatively higher than 
the estimate from Bayer et al. (2005). This is because, in our model, school quality may 
be correlated with unobserved neighborhood characteristics captured by the error term ξh.
As result, the second stage OLS regression may tend to overestimate the mean taste for 
school quality. Bayer et al. control for this problem using school district boundary fixed 
effects. It is not possible to apply this approach to our data because the neighborhoods, ie. 
PUMAs, are too large compared to school districts. The neighborhoods in Bayer et al. are 
                                                      
19 The estimate reported in the paper is $13.18 per month in 1967 dollars. This estimate is converted into
annual 1990 dollars. 
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Census blocks, which are much smaller geographic units compared to school districts. 
This facilitates the use of school district boundary fixed effects because most census 




7 The Benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
This chapter evaluates the equilibrium welfare impacts of the air quality changes brought 
about by the implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act mendments (CAAA) in the Los 
Angeles area. Section 7.1 discusses the simulation of the equilibrium price changes that 
emerge from the re-sorting of households as a result of the large changes in air quality. 
Section 7.2 defines the welfare measures and Section 7.3 discusses their computation. We 
conclude with a discussion of the welfare results in Section 7.4. 
7.1 Simulation of the counterfactual locational equilibrium 
Induced price changes that result from the re-sorting of households are obtained by 
simulating the counterfactual equilibrium which would have emerged in 1990 if air 
quality levels were identical to those observed in 2000 while all other housing attributes 
and household characteristics remained at their 1990 levels. Our estimation of the 
household preference parameters ensures that the housing market is in equilibrium in 
1990 (see section 6.2.1).  The counterfactual equilibri m is given by the new set of 
housing prices and the resulting household location choice probabilities which solve the 
market equilibrium condition in equation (4.10). Residential location demands are 
calibrated using the estimates of the preference parameters entering the household 
indirect utility function. The counterfactual equilibrium only reflects the changes in the 
air quality that occurred in the Los Angeles area btween 1990 and 2000. Other factors 
characterizing the Los Angeles area housing market, such as population, household 
income and housing supply, are not allowed to change i  this simulation. 
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7.1.1 Calibrating the housing demand 
The economic agents in this model are households. We consider the housing choices of 
Ns (=17,894) households sampled from the overall population of Np (=171,000) 
households obtained from the 1990 Census PUMS. The sampling framework used to 
generate the household sample is described in section 6.1. The housing market is 
characterized by 4037 distinct housing types. The choice set of each sampled household 
is characterized by the sampling framework in section 6.1.  
We could have each household facing the full set of 4037 housing types. However, 
this would not be consistent with the estimation of h usehold preference parameters. 
Recall that the maximum likelihood estimation, which uses choice set sampling, ensures 
that the market is in equilibrium in the 1990 benchmark (see section 6.2.1). This 
benchmark equilibrium, which is enforced via the first order conditions of the maximum 
likelihood estimation (see equation 6.3), will no longer hold when households face the 
full set of alternatives.20 As a result significant errors arise in the computation of the 
predicted housing-type demands, and the counterfactual equilibrium housing-type prices 
may have undesirable21 properties. Hence we prefer to maintain the choice set sampling 
framework, used during the estimation, in the calibr tion of housing-type demands. We 
next discuss strategies for obtaining consistent estimates of housing-type demands under 
choice set sampling. 
Obtaining an Appropriate Forecast of the Demand for Housing Types 
The computation of the counterfactual equilibrium begins with forecasting the predicted 
demand for each housing type in the household population under the new air quality 
                                                      
20 In order for the benchmark equilibrium to hold we ill need to re-estimate the preference parameters 
using the full choice set, which is not computationally feasible. 
21 Notably, some housing types may have negative prices in the counterfactual equilibrium. 
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levels. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) provide a detail d overview of various techniques 
for obtaining appropriate forecasts of aggregate demands for choice alternatives in 
discrete choice models. Our prediction of the aggreat  demand for a residential location 
h uses the method of sample enumeration. This technique is especially appropriate in 
cases when (i) the household sample is drawn nonrandomly22 from the population and (ii) 
the choice set of the household is formed by taking a random subsample of the full set of 
alternatives. In both of these cases sample enumeration llows the researcher to obtain a 
consistent23 estimate of the share of the household population choosing a residential 
location h. For a stratified sample with g = 1,…, G strata, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) 
define the sample enumeration estimate of the share of the household population 





























ˆ βγαδσ ,      (7.1) 
 
where, Np is the household population, Ng is the population size of strata g, Nsg is the 
sample size of strata g, and ihP̂  is the estimated household choice probability. For the 
sampling design used in this study (see section 6.1.1), each housing type h represents a 
stratum. As a result Ng = Nh, Nsg = Nsh, the first summation term drops out and the 
expression for the estimated population share becom: 
 
                                                      
22 Our household sample is formed by drawing a 10 percent random sample of the households choosing 
each housing type. 
23 Consistency of the estimated population share holds as long as the estimated preference parameters are 























ˆ βγαδσ ,       (7.2) 
 
Where, Nh is the number of households choosing location h i  the population and Nsh the 
number of households choosing location h i  the household sample. The population share 
is then converted into the predicted population demand for a housing location h by 
multiplying the estimated share by the household population (Np). For a given housing 














1)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ(ˆ)(ˆ βγαδ .       (7.3) 
 
The main limitation of the sample enumeration estima e, of the predicted population 
demand, is that it is subject to sampling error. The sampling error is due to the sampling 
of households and the sampling of the household choice sets. However, in our 
application, the sampling error is relatively small given the large size of our sample. The 
sampling error in the predicted population share for h using type h can be computed 
using the weighted root mean square formula provided by Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985), which is due to Koppelman (1975). For our sampling framework, the sampling 
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where σh represents the actual share of the household population choosing housing type h, 
which in our sampling framework turns out to equal ph NN / . The weighted root mean 
square in our application is approximately 10-10 which is fairly small. An alternative way 
of assessing the sampling error is to compute the square root of the sum of squares of the 
excess demands across housing types in the benchmark. This is because, by virtue of the 
maximum likelihood estimation, the benchmark excess demands24 must equal zero if 
there is no sampling error in the predicted population demand. The sampling error in the 













hh sd . In our 
application the sampling error in the predicted population demand is roughly 10-6 which 
is also small. 
Computing the Predicted Population Demand under the N w Air Quality Levels 
Using equation (7.3) we can now characterize the predicted population demand for each 







































where, ihP̂  has been defined explicitly. Ci represents the choice set of household i. The 
superscript 1 is used to indicate market conditions after the air quality changes have 
occurred. 1khx  is the vector of attributes for housing type h which includes the new air 
                                                      
24 The excess demands are given by hh sd −ˆ , where sh is the supply of housing units of type h. 
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quality level. 1ĥδ  represents the predicted mean utility for housing type h under the new 




khkh x ξβδ ˆˆˆ 0
11 +=∑ , 
 
where hξ̂  is the vector of residuals obtained in the second stage OLS estimation 
(Equation 6.7). hξ̂  characterizes the estimate of the mean valuation from the unobserved 
location attributes. The vector of residuals must be added because the alternative 




khkh x ξβδ +=∑ 000 . 
 
The reader can note that this is the same equation characterizing the mean utility in 
equation (5.4). Hence hξ  is an key component of the functional form of hδ . 
7.1.2 Defining the Locational Equilibrium 
The 171,000 housing units occupied by the population of households in the 1990 Census 
PUMS are classified into 4037 residential locations. The housing supply sh is given by 
the number of housing units at each residential locati n h. We assume that the housing 
supply is exogenous with respect to the changes in air quality. Given the housing supply 
(sh) and the predicted housing demand (
1ˆ




0*)(ˆ*)( 1 =−= hhh spdped  h = 1,…, H.  (7.6) 
 
The counterfactual locational equilibrium defined by equation (7.6) is unique and locally 
stable. This follows from the fact that the parameter stimate α̂  is positive and hence the 
excess demand edh(p) satisfies the strict gross substitution property. (See Proposition 4.1) 
7.1.3 Implementation 
A numerical solution to the system of H equations in H variables, which defines the 
counterfactual locational equilibrium, is obtained via an efficiently convergent algorithm 
suggested by Anas (1982). The equilibrium price vector is found iteratively via a price 
adjustment process that starts with the benchmark 1990 price vector p0 and adjusts the 
location prices until the adjusted price vector is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium price 
vector p*. 
Let t = 1, …, T define a sequence of T iterations such that *ppT ≈ . The price vector 
at iteration t + 1  is given by the Newton step: 
 
)]([]/)([ 11 tttt pedppedpp −+ ∂∂−= .       (7.7) 
 
ed(p) represents the system of excess demands for all H residential locations, and 
]/)([ pped t ∂∂ is the Jacobian matrix of ed(p) evaluated at tp . Computation of the 
Newton step defined in (7.7) requires evaluating and inverting the Jacobian which has 
dimension H = 4037. The computational cost of this algorithm is considerably large. The 
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evaluation of the Jacobian alone takes approximately 30 minutes on a Pentium 4 2Ghz 
PC station.  
Anas (1982) suggests a less costly iteration step which is obtained by ignoring the off 
diagonal element of the Jacobian matrix. In this cae the iteration step t + 1 is defined 









+ ,   h = 1,…, H.    (7.7a) 
 
The computational cost of the iteration step in (7.7a) is significantly less than that of (7.7) 
since it only requires computing the diagonal vector of the Jacobian matrix and its 
element inverse. This alternate Newton step will converge to the equilibrium price vector 
p* as long as the off-diagonal elements of the Jacobin are significantly small in absolute 
value compared to the diagonal elements. Convergence is achieved when the price vector 
pT at iteration T is “sufficiently” close to p*. In our counterfactual simulation pT is 




h sped  h = 1,…, H.  (7.8) 
 
In other words, the absolute absolute value of the excess demand for each location is less 
than 0.001% of the housing supply. 
A computational issue arises from the fact that knowledge of H-1 housing-type excess 
demands is sufficient to characterize the system of H excess demands. This is because we 
assume that the housing market is a closed economy, which implies that no household 
 109 
relocates outside the study area. A direct implication of the closedness assumption is that 
the housing-type demands always sum to the total population (N) of households. This 
means that the system of H housing-type excess demands has only H-1 degrees of 
freedom. As a result, we fix one of the prices when solving for the numerical solution. 
This normalization guarantees that any starting value will lead to the same market 
clearing prices. The normalization also guarantees that the counterfactual equilibrium 
prices are within the same H-dimensional simplex as the benchmark price vector and
hence lies in the positive quadrant +ℜH . 
7.1.4 Simulation Results: Impact of Air Quality Changes on Housing Rents 
We discuss the extent of the equilibrium price effects that result from the air quality 
improvements brought about by the 1990 CAAA. These quilibrium price effects are the 
result of the re-sorting of households across housing locations. Figure 7.1 maps the 
changes in ozone levels for the neighborhoods in the study area. The lowest 
improvements in air quality occurred in the coastal neighborhoods of Los Angeles and 
Orange counties. These were also areas that had the best air quality levels in 1990. On the 
other hand, air quality improvements were highest in he inland areas of Los Angeles, 
Riverside and San Bernardino counties. Those were the areas with the worst air quality 
levels in 1990. 
Figure 7.2 shows the PUMA-level average housing price changes in the 
counterfactual 2000 equilibrium. We find that housing prices are lower, in the 
counterfactual equilibrium, in the areas with below average air quality improvements. 
These were also areas with the highest air quality levels in 1990 (see Figure 4.2). 
Average housing prices fell by as much as 13 percent in those areas. On the other hand  
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Figure 7.1: Percent Change in Ozone Levels (1990-2000) 
 
 




housing prices, in the counterfactual equilibrium, are higher in the areas that experienced 
above average air quality improvements. These were areas with the highest ozone levels 
in 1990. Housing prices rose by as much as 8 percent in those areas.  
The equilibrium price effects observed across neighbor oods were conceptually 
predicted by Bartik (1988). The intuition is as follows. The large air quality 
improvements are likely to have two effects on the hedonic equilibrium. First, the fact 
that a larger proportion of residential locations now have good air quality implies that the 
hedonic housing rent differentials between high and low air quality areas would be 
significantly reduced. Table 7.1 shows the proportion of locations with ozone levels 
below the federal one-hour ozone standard (0.12 ppm) in 1990 and 2000. 
 
Table 7.1: Proportion of Residential Locations below the Federal 1-Hr Ozone Standard (0.12 Ppm) 









1990 29.5 32.3 48.7 0.0 0.0 
2000 92.7 98.1 100.0 100.0 51.3 
 
The second effect is that, because the supply of air quality has gone up, rents are 
likely to fall for any given amenity level but relatively more for high air quality areas 
since the air quality price premium is now lower. This effect is characterized by a shift in 
the hedonic function. The result of these two effects is that high air quality locations that 
experience relatively little improvement are likely to experience rent declines. This is 
because the rent increase from the air quality improvement at these locations is not 
enough to offset the rent decline from the second effect. On the other hand, low air 
quality areas that experience large improvements in air quality would likely have higher 
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rents. This is due to the fact that the rent premium from the air quality improvement at 
each location is large enough to offset the shift in the hedonic function. 
7.2 Welfare Measurement in Locational Equilibrium Models 
The measurement of welfare in the Epple and Sieg (1999) equilibrium framework was 
first implemented by Sieg et al. (2005). The study also provides the first empirical 
analysis of the welfare impacts of non-marginal amenity changes in the context of the 
Epple-Sieg equilibrium approach. Because the household utility is deterministic in this 
framework, the derivation of Hicksian welfare measure  is straightforward. Given the 
estimated household preference parameters, one can define the Hicksian compensating 
variation (CV) for an amenity change as the reduction in income such that the 
household’s maximized utility after the change equals the maximized utility before the 
change.  
The earliest empirical evidence on the welfare impacts of non-marginal amenity 
changes in the context of the discrete choice locati n l equilibrium framework can be 
traced back to Anas (1982). The study does not however derive a Hicksian welfare 
measure that is consistent with the random utility model. An approximation of the 
Hicksian CV measure for an amenity change is obtained as the exp cted change in the 
household’s maximized utility. This is the approach suggested by Small and Rosen 
(1977). Timmins (2007) adopts a similar approximation of the Hicksian welfare measure 
when evaluating the welfare cost of rainfall changes in Brazil using a discrete choice 
locational equilibrium model of the labor market. Bayer et al. (2005) do not conduct a 
welfare analysis. Instead, they investigate the impact of changes in income inequality on 
equilibrium housing prices. 
 113 
 
Defining the Welfare Measure 
We characterize and estimate Hicksian welfare measur s which are derived from a 
random utility function with non-linear income effects. The household-level Hicksian 
welfare measure for an air quality change is defined as the reduction in the household’s 
income which is such that the household’s maximum utility after the change equals the 
maximum utility before the change. Hence, by definitio , the compensating variation will 
be negative for an air quality improvement and positive for a reduction in air quality.  
For the utility function (vih) defined by equation (4.1), the household compensating 















ih vMaxV = . The superscript zero indicates the 1990 market conditi ns, and the 
superscript one indicates the market conditions after the air quality changes. For ease of 
exposition, the attribute vector is broken into two c mponents. x1h represents the air 
quality level at location h, and x2h is a vector capturing all other attributes of the 
residential location. 
Direct vs. Equilibrium Welfare Measures 
For the purpose of evaluating the benefits of the canges in air quality across the Los 
Angeles area two welfare measures are of interest. The first measure asks what 
households are willing to pay for the change in air quality at their residence, holding 
 114 
housing prices and all other attributes fixed. This is the “pure” WTP measure defined in 
chapter 3. We will refer to this welfare measure as the direct WTP measure (CVd) since it 
can be recovered directly from the indirect utility function. For our random utility model, 












ihiihihhhhiih xxCVpyVxxpyV εε −−=− ,  (7.10) 
 
where the notation is similar to that used in equation (7.9). 
The direct willingness to pay measure does not, however, provide a complete picture 
of the welfare impact of the changes in air quality across the Los Angeles area. Bartik 
(1988) shows that CVd provides a lower bound to the full, i.e. equilibrium, welfare impact 
of the air quality changes. We define the equilibrium welfare measure (CVe) as the WTP 
measure which takes into account the induced changes in housing prices that occur as 












ijiijihhhhiih xxCVpyVxxpyV εε −−=− .  (7.11) 
 
The household’s residential location choice j in the ex-post equilibrium differs from the 
location h in the benchmark equilibrium. This indicates that the household might change 
its residential location choice as a result of the c ange in air quality. 
Assumptions about the Equilibrium Welfare Measure 
The characterization of the equilibrium welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA only accounts 
for air quality changes and induced price changes resulting from the re-sorting of 
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households across locations. In reality, however, one could expect other changes to take 
place. First, in addition to induced price changes, induced changes in the housing supply 
may occur as developers respond to the price changes. Moreover, exogenous changes in 
the model’s primitives may occur between 1990 and 2000. These would include changes 
in household income, population, and economic conditions. Our equilibrium model 
cannot account for either induced changes in the housing supply or other exogenous 
changes in market conditions. As a result we do not attempt to replicate the real market 
conditions that prevail after the air quality changes. Rather, we simulate a counterfactual 
market equilibrium in which induced price changes occur while all other factors are held 
to their 1990 levels. 
One might wonder about how accounting for these other factors would affect the 
equilibrium welfare measure. Using the higher household income levels in 2000 would 
likely lead to higher benefit estimates as high-income households would have a higher 
marginal willingness to pay for air quality. If the supply of housing is elastic with respect 
to price, accounting for housing supply adjustments would likely increase equilibrium 
benefits as the influx of new housing units would provide more choices to households. 
An increase in population is likely to reduce equilibr um welfare gains to the extent that 
the increased demand for housing results in higher prices. This effect is however likely to 
vanish in the long run as the supply of housing adjusts. Hence, it is likely that accounting 
for the other exogenous changes in the housing market will result in higher equilibrium 
benefit estimates. 
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7.3 Computing Compensating Variation in a Random Utility Model 
The household level CV measure defined by equation (7.9) is a random variable as it is a 
function of the unobserved taste error ε. Hence the welfare measure that is of interest to 
policy analysis is the expected value of the household level compensating variation over 
the distribution of the unobserved taste error ε. We define this expectation as: 
 
)],,,,,(|[ 1010 εxxppyCVEECV =        (7.12) 
 
The expectation ECV will characterize the household’s expected willingness to pay 
(WTP) for the air quality changes across the Los Angeles ar a.  
A general closed form expression for ECV does not exist for the indirect utility 
function in equation (4.3). This is because in certain cases the CV measure may be a 
nonlinear function of the stochastic error term ε. As a result its expectation, which 
requires integrating out the nonlinear error term, cannot be characterized explicitly. Two 
empirical approaches have been suggested for recovering ECV. Morey et al. (1993) 
suggested approximating ECV as the income reduction which equates the expected 
maximum utility after the change with the expected maximum utility before the change. 
This approach gets around the computational problem of integrating out the nonlinear 
error term by defining CV as the income compensation o a representative household. 
Hence it is known as the representative consumer app oximation of ECV. McFadden 
(1999) suggested a general simulation approach for recovering the exact ECV. We adopt 
the simulation approach of McFadden to obtain the av rage and income distributional 
welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA.  
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We compare the mean and income distributional welfare impacts from the simulation 
and representative consumer approach. McFadden (1999) argues that the representative 
consumer approximation to ECV is biased when large changes are considered. However, 
in a study of fishing mode choices by California anglers, Herriges and Kling (1999) find 
that the two approaches do not lead to substantially different welfare results. We attempt 
to provide additional empirical evidence on the relative performance of these two 
approaches in the context of measuring equilibrium welfare impacts. 
7.3.1 A Representative Consumer Approximation of ECV 
Morey et al. (1993) suggested approximating ECV by computing the income 
compensation that equates the expected maximum utility of a representative consumer 
before and after the air quality and price change. This approximation to ECV, denoted 






ihhhiihihhihiih xpyVExCVpyVE εε −=−− . (7.13) 
 
A closed for expression for the expected maximum utility E[Vih]  can be obtained when 
the unobserved household taste error ε enters the utility additively and is drawn from an 
extreme value (EV) distribution. Both of these assumptions are satisfied by the indirect 
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where c is Euler’s constant. This constant term cancels out of the computation of ECV as 
it appears on both sides of equation (7.13). The computation of CV  is achieved via a 
simple one dimensional search algorithm. Our computations use the Fzero function in 
MATLAB. The direct and equilibrium WTP measures areobtained for a random sample 
of 1,674 households from the household population in the study area. 
The advantage of the representative consumer approach is that it is simple and 
relatively easy to implement. In addition, the computational burden of the one-
dimensional search is minimal. The search will generally converge in a fraction of a 
second on most standard personal computers. The main li itation of the representative 
consumer approximation approach is that, for large quality improvements, CV  may 
provide a biased measure of the true expectation of the household’s CV measure defined 
by equation (7.9). McFadden (1999) showed evidence of this bias using an analytical 
example which compares the exact measure of ECVwith the approximation CV . 
7.3.2 A Simulation Approach to Recovering the Exact ECV 
For each household, a random sample of size T is drawn from the distribution of the 
unobserved taste error ε. For every draw t the household level CV measure defined in 
equation (7.9) is computed. The household’s ECV, denoted tCV , is obtained as the 
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 This is the simulation estimator suggested by McFadden (1999). It has been shown that 
tCV  is a consistent estimate of ECV. McFadden (1997) has shown that tCV  almost 
surely converges to ECV, and ( )ECVCVT t −  is asymptotically distributed as a normal 
with mean zero and variance 2σ . A consistent estimate of 2σ  can be obtained given r = 
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where tCV  is the household level CV measure computed for each random draw t using 
equation (7.9). 
The complete simulation procedure was outlined by McFadden (1999) for the general 
case of an unobserved taste error term with a generaliz d extreme value (GEV) 




Step 1: At iteration t (t = 1,…, T) a pseudorandom number generator is used to 
draw the vector tiε̂  from the hypothesized GEV distribution of εi. 
 
Step 2: For each draw tiε̂ , a numerical algorithm is then used to search 
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Steps 2 and 3 of the simulation algorithm are relatively easy to evaluate. The numerical 
search in Step 2 is achieved via a simple one dimensional search algorithm. The main 
computational task of the simulation algorithm regards the evaluation of Step 1. 
Generating the random sample from the GEV distribution can be a fairly complex 
exercise. McFadden (1999) outlines a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm 
for generating draws from a GEV distribution. The MC C algorithm uses an 
independence Metropolis-Hasting sampler. The algorithm, which McFadden termed a 
GEV sampler, is as follows: 
 
GEV sampler: At step t draw J+1 independent variables tjζ  (t= 1,…, J) and tη from a  
uniform (0, 1) distribution. Form J extreme value random variables 
using the transformation: ))log(log(~ tj
t
j ζε −−= . The GEV draw
tε̂ is 
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where f and g are the GEV and EV density function, respectively. 
 
In their empirical applications, McFadden (1999) and Herriges and Kling (1999) find 
that the computational burden of the GEV sampler inc eases significantly as f departs 
from the EV distribution. When the unobserved tastes are distributed as EV, i.e. the 
choice model is multinomial logit, the GEV sampler is unbiased and Step 1 can be 
evaluating using a EV pseudorandom generator from standard statistical packages. In our 
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application we used the EV pseudorandom generator from MATLAB’s Statistical 
Toolbox. 
The direct and equilibrium WTP measures are obtained for a random sample of 1,674 
households from the household population in the study area. Step 1 of the simulation 
algorithm is implemented by generating 100=T  independent vectors of 4,037 
pseudorandom EV variables. The numerical search in Step 2 is achieved via MATLAB’s 
Fzero function. The computation of the ECV simulation estimate takes an average of 4.5 
hours on a Pentium 4 2Ghz PC station. This compares to an average time of about 5 
minutes for the computation of the representative consumer ECV estimate. 
The size of T was selected on the basis of a Monte Carlo experiment suggested by 
Herriges and Kling (1999). The estimation of ECV using T iterations was repeated 100 
times. We found that after 50=T , the estimated mean compensating variations were 
very similar over the 100 trials. The standard deviation was roughly 4 percent of the 
mean value across the 100 trials for 50=T .  By 100=T  the standard deviation was 
reduced to roughly 1 percent of the mean compensating variation across the 100 trials. 
7.4 Welfare Impacts of the 1990 CAAA 
Our analysis of the benefits of the 1990 CAAA focuses on the changes in neighborhood 
ozone levels between 1990 and 2000. The neighborhoods f the Los Angeles area 
experienced significant reductions in ozone levels during the years that followed the 1990 
CAAA. Table 7.2 summarizes the changes in ozone levls for the neighborhoods in our 
sample. The neighborhood average ozone concentratio fell by nearly 21 percent between 
1990 and 1995. By the year 2000, the average reduction in ozone levels was close to 40 
percent. The changes in ozone levels also varied across the area. The neighborhoods of 
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Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties experienced th  greatest ozone reductions 
between 1990 and 2000, while Orange and Riverside counties had the smallest average 
fall in ozone levels. 
 
Table 7.2: Changes in Neighborhood Ozone Levels across the Los Angeles Area 





(Sieg et al.) 
% ∆ 
1990-2000 
Study area 0.146 0.116 0.089 -20.8 -19.3 -38.9 
        
Los Angeles County 0.143 0.110 0.086 -22.6 -20.8 -39.8 
Orange County 0.109 0.094 0.076 -13.8 -18 -29.8 
Riverside County 0.177 0.140 0.115 -20.6 -20.7 -35.2 
San Bernardino County 0.198 0.162 0.115 -18.1 -16.3 -41.9 
 
The neighborhood ozone changes for our sample differ slightly from the changes in 
ozone levels used by Sieg et al. (2002). In Orange County, for instance, our neighborhood 
ozone reductions between 1990 and 1995 were 4 percent lower than the reductions 
observed by Sieg et al. The slight divergence in ozone changes can be attributed to the 
differences in neighborhood geography. This study characterizes neighborhoods with 
PUMA boundaries while Sieg et al. use school district boundaries to characterize 
neighborhoods. 
7.4.1 Results 
The direct and equilibrium WTP measures, defined by equations (7.10) and (7.11), are 
computed for a random sample of 1,674 households from the household population in the 
study area. This sample represents one-percent of the household population in our study 
area. The random sampling allows us to derive unbiased means for the distribution of 
WTP.  
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Unlike in the simulation model, households face the full set of housing alternatives in 
the housing market. While there are strategies for obtaining consistent25 estimates of 
preference parameters and housing-type demands under choice set sampling (see Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985), we do not know of any strategies for obtaining consistent 
estimates of the Hicksian welfare measure under the sampling of choice sets. Hence we 
allow households to face the full set of alternatives in the welfare estimation. 
Mean Welfare Impacts 
Table 7.3 presents the mean welfare impacts of the CAAA from 1990 to 2000. These are 
the exact welfare measures obtained via McFadden’s simulation approach. The first row 
provides the overall results for the study area. The second group of rows provides the 
county-level results. The last two groups of rows provide results for selected 
neighborhoods. In the third set of rows, neighborhods are ranked by their average 1990 
income level and we present the mean welfare results for the 1st, 50th and 99th percentile. 
In the last set of rows we rank neighborhoods by their 1990 ozone level and present the 
mean welfare results for the 1st, 50th and 99th percentile. 
The welfare results suggest that, on average, the air qu lity improvements provided 
significant benefits to the households of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. We estimate 
that the reductions in ozone levels between 1990 and 2000 provided an average 
equilibrium welfare benefit of $1,829 to the households of the Los Angeles Area. This 
benefit represents 4 percent of the annual average household income in 1990. As 
conceptually predicted by Bartik (1988) and demonstrated by Sieg et al. (2004), direct 
welfare benefits, which do not account for induced changes in housing prices, 
                                                      
25 Here consistent estimate implies an estimate that is asymptotically equivalent to the estimate which is 
computed using the full set of housing alternatives. 
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underestimate the benefits of the air quality improvements. On average, equilibrium 
benefits were 32 percent higher than the direct benefit estimates. 
 













WTPD WTPE WTPE / D 
         
Study area (mean) 49,197 0.146 -36.1 748 0.14 1,386 1,829 1.32 
         
Counties          
Los Angeles County 47,152 0.143 -37.6 728 0.17 1,325 1,757 1.33 
Orange County 60,924 0.109 -23.8 926 -4.10 1,659 2,134 1.29 
Riverside County 47,374 0.177 -34.4 687 1.02 1,299 1,764 1.36 
San Bernardino County 48,096 0.198 -41.9 682 4.35 1,384 1,836 1.33 
         
Neighborhoods by income levels         
1st percentile (lowest) 24,657 0.103 -46.8 455 -1.14 382 704 1.84 
50th percentile 47,331 0.119 -40.4 805 -1.33 1,157 1,665 1.44 
99th percentile (highest) 92,708 0.148 -48.7 982 2.57 2,378 2,837 1.19 
         
Neighborhoods by ozone levels         
1st percentile (lowest) 65,135 0.058 30.0 1,000 -12.93 2,018 2,434 1.21 
50th percentile 54,568 0.148 -43.7 822 1.41 1,462 1,832 1.25 
99th percentile (highest) 39,979 0.212 -43.9 580 5.22 1,109 1,492 1.35 
         
* Note: WTP is computed as the expected compensating variation (ECV). All WTP estimates are computed using McFadden’s 
simulation approach. WTP estimates are in annual 1990 dollars. 
 
The estimated mean welfare gains vary across the counties in the sample. Average 
benefits are highest in Orange County and lowest in Los Angeles County. The mean 
equilibrium WTP for the ozone changes between 1990 and 2000 was $2,134 in Orange 
County. This compares with an average equilibrium benefit of $1,757 in Los Angeles 
County. The distribution of welfare gains across counties tends to reflect equilibrium 
price effects across the counties. Orange County, which experienced a fall in housing 
prices, has a significantly larger average equilibrium WTP. 
We find a significant variation in welfare gains across neighborhoods. The mean 
equilibrium benefit in the neighborhoods with the highest average income is nearly four 
times the mean equilibrium benefit in the poorest neighborhoods. This variation can be 
attributed to the fact that richer households have  significantly higher MWTP for air 
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quality compared to low-income households in our model. However, relative equilibrium 
gains are higher in the low-income neighborhoods as evidenced by the ratio of 
equilibrium to direct benefits. Indeed, equilibrium benefits are 84 percent higher than 
direct benefits in the poorest neighborhoods, as compared to only 19 percent in the 
richest neighborhoods. 
 We also find that households originally located in the most polluted neighborhoods 
have on average lower equilibrium benefits than households originally located in the least 
polluted neighborhoods. This variation can be attribu ed to the fact that the most polluted 
neighborhoods, which had above average ozone reductions, experienced an increase in 
housing prices. On the other hand, housing prices dcreased in the least polluted 
neighborhoods as they generally had below average ozone reduction (an ozone increase 
in the case of the cleanest neighborhood). 
Income Distributional Welfare Impacts of the 1990 CAAA 
Table 7.4 presents the distribution of equilibrium welfare estimates across household 
income quartiles. The lowest income quartile is comprised of households with 1990 
annual 1990 income below $20,000 dollars, while the highest income quartile includes 
households with annual income above $60,000. Income distributional benefits are 
provided for the study area as well as counties and neighborhoods. The WTP estimates 
are obtained using McFadden’s simulation approach.  
Equilibrium benefits vary significantly across household income groups. Specifically 
we find that richer households generally have significantly higher benefits compared to 
households in the lower income groups. This is truefor the overall study area as well as 
within counties and neighborhoods. The variation in welfare gains across income groups 
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is to be expected as the higher income households have a significantly higher MWTP for 
air quality in our model.  
 











20k - 37k 
Income 
37k - 60k 
Income 
> 60k 
        
Study area (mean) 49,197 -36.1 0.14 441 1,019 1,706 3,634 
        
Counties         
Los Angeles County 47,152 -37.6 0.17 433 1,009 1,682 3,638 
Orange County 60,924 -23.8 -4.10 518 1,058 1,707 3,774 
Riverside County 47,374 -34.4 1.02 384 1,053 1,796 3,133 
San Bernardino County 48,096 -41.9 4.35 433 1,017 1,812 3,510 
        
Neighborhoods by income levels        
1st percentile (lowest) 24,657 -46.8 -1.14 409 850 1,439 2,325 
50th percentile 47,331 -40.4 -1.33 392 1,075 1,695 2,566 
99th percentile (highest) 92,708 -48.7 2.57 479 909 1,590 4,505 
        
Neighborhoods by ozone levels        
1st percentile (lowest) 65,135 30.0 -12.93 577 1,090 1,759 4,015 
50th percentile 54,568 -43.7 1.41 388 964 1,790 4,341 
99th percentile (highest) 39,979 -43.9 5.22 541 845 1,527 2,761 
        
* Note: WTP is computed as the ECV. All WTP estimates are computed using McFadden’s simulation approach. WTP 
estimates are in annual 1990 dollars. 
 
We also find a somewhat significant variation in welfare gains across neighborhoods 
within each income group. For instance, high-income households who were located in 
neighborhoods with low and median air quality levels in 1990 have significantly higher 
benefits than the average high-income household. On the other hand, high-income 
households who resided in the dirtiest neighborhoods experience significantly lower 
benefits than the average high-income household in the study area. This disparity can be 
attributed to the fact that housing prices increased in the neighborhoods with the highest 





Comparing Relative Welfare Gains across Income Groups 
Figure 7.3 shows the mean WTP as a proportion of the household’s income in 1990. The 
bar graphs characterize the distribution of relative welfare gains across income groups. 
The WTP estimates are obtained using McFadden’s simulation approach. The 
distributional findings seem to differ between the direct and equilibrium welfare 
measures. While the direct welfare measure suggests that the richer households 
experienced higher relative welfare gains, the equilibrium welfare measure suggests that 
the distribution of relative benefits is fairly even across income groups. This implies that 
ignoring equilibrium price effects can significantly alter the distribution of relative 
welfare gains.  
 
Figure 7.3:













































The divergence between the distribution of relative welfare gains in the direct and 
equilibrium approach can be explained from the difference between the two welfare 
measures which is also show in Figure 7.3. This difference can be interpreted as the 
household’s relative welfare gain from adjusting to a new location after the air quality 
changes. Figure 7.3 shows that the welfare gains from the equilibrium adjustments are 
regressive in the sense that the gains represent a larger share of income for low-income 
household. On the other hand, the direct welfare gains re progressive since high-income 
households are willing to pay more for a marginal improvement in air quality. Hence the 
direct benefit measure will tend misrepresent the distribution of the equilibrium welfare 
impacts from large air quality changes. 
7.4.2 Alternative Welfare Estimations 
The welfare results presented in the previous section use McFadden’s (1998) simulation 
approach (see section 7.3). We compare these exact welfare estimates with the 
approximations obtained from the representative consumer approach suggested by Morey 
et al. (1993). McFadden (1999) argues that the representative consumer approach leads to 
biased estimates of ECV when improvements are large. Herriges and Kling (1999) revisit 
this issue in a study of fishing mode choices by California anglers. The study estimates 
the WTP of the fishermen for a policy regime that leads to a doubling of the catch rate.  
They find that the two approaches lead to quite similar estimates of the ECV. The 
exercise in this section is intended to shed further light on this issue. That is, whether 
welfare estimates from the complex simulation approach are substantially different from 
the simpler representative consumer approximations so as to justify the significantly 
higher computational cost. 
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Comparing the ECV Estimates 
Table 7.5 presents the direct and equilibrium welfar  measures for the two estimation 
procedures. As suggested by McFadden, we find that the estimate of the overall mean 
WTP from the representative consumer approximation d ffers significantly from the exact 
welfare estimate obtained from the simulation approach. The representative consumer 
approach severely overestimates the mean welfare impact of the air quality changes that 
occurred in the Los Angeles area between 1990 and 2000. The direct and equilibrium 
benefits from the representative consumer approach are almost twice the size of the exact 
welfare estimate obtained from the simulation approach. 
 











WTPE / D 
(Approximation) 
       
Study area (mean) 1,386 1,829 1.32 2,152 2,289 1.06 
       
Household Income†       
< 20,000 196 441 2.25 223 300 1.35 
20,000 - 37,000 546 1,019 1.87 853 1,000 1.17 
37,000 - 60,000 1,216 1,706 1.40 1,918 2,067 1.08 
> 60,000 3,137 3,634 1.16 4,889 5,041 1.03 
Note: 
†
1990 $. WTP is computed as the ECV. Exact welfare measure is computed via the simulation approach of McFadden (1999). 
Approximation of ECV uses the approach suggested by Morey et al. (1993) 
 
The results also suggest that the representative consumer approximation severely 
underestimates households’ welfare gains from the equilibrium adjustments that take 
place as a result of the large air quality changes. The mean equilibrium benefit estimate 
from the representative consumer approximation is only 6 percent larger that the direct 
benefit estimate, which would suggest that the equilibrium adjustments that result from 
the air quality changes do not have a significant impact on households’ benefits.  On the 
other hand, the exact welfare estimate of the mean equilibrium benefit is 32 percent 
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larger than the direct benefit measure, implying that the equilibrium adjustments do 
provide significant additional benefits to households. 
7.4.3 Comparing with previous studies 
To provide a comparison of our results with those of Sieg et al. (2004) we simulate the 
counterfactual equilibrium that would have resulted from the changes in ozone levels 
between 1990 and 1995. This is because, in their empirical analysis, Sieg et al. use the 
changes in ozone levels that occurred between 1990 and 1995. Table 7.6 reports the 
welfare results for the changes in ozone levels betwe n 1990 and 1995. We find that the 
reductions in ozone pollution between 1990 and 1995 provided an average equilibrium 
benefit of $896 to the households of the Los Angeles Area. Similar to the welfare benefits 
from 1990 to 2000, there is a significant variation n the equilibrium benefits for 1995 
across counties.  
 
Table 7.6: Direct and Equilibrium WTP for the CAAA (1990-1995) 
 
Discrete Choice equilibrium 
approach 
Epple-Sieg equilibrium  
approach (Sieg et al, 2004) 
 WTPD WTPE WTPE / D WTPD WTPE WTPE / D 
       
Study area 589 896 1.52 1,210 1,371 1.13 
       
Counties        
Los Angeles County 568 866 1.52 1,472 1,556 1.06 
Orange County 698 1,029 1.47 901 1,391 1.54 
Riverside County 526 858 1.63 834 372 0.45 
San Bernardino County 576 891 1.55 738 367 0.50 
       
 
The last three columns of Table 7.6 report the overall and county-level mean benefit 
estimates from Sieg et al. (2004). Our overall direct and equilibrium benefit estimates are 
substantially lower than the Sieg et al. estimates. The county-level benefit estimates also 
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differ significantly. The county-level direct WTP estimates are consistently lower than 
the Sieg et al. estimates. The relationship between th  equilibrium benefit estimates is, 
however, more complex. The equilibrium welfare estimates from this study are higher 
than the Sieg et al. benefit measures in Los Angeles and Orange counties. The 
relationship between the welfare measures is reversd in Riverside and San Bernardino 
counties. Sieg et al. also find that equilibrium adjustments in the 1995 counterfactual 
equilibrium resulted in average welfare losses for h useholds in Riverside and San 
Bernardino counties. Our results, on the other hand, suggest that on average the 
equilibrium adjustments resulted in welfare gains for households in all four counties. 
The disparity between our welfare estimates and those f und by Sieg et al. can be due 
to a number of factors. First, the differences could emerge as a result of differences in the 
data. The fact that the two studies use a different characterization of neighborhoods 
(PUMA vs. school district) is likely to affect the welfare results. In addition, Sieg et al.’s 
average welfare benefit for the Los Angeles area includes Ventura County while ours 
does not. We excluded Ventura County from our sample because the 1990 PUMA 
boundaries for that county were not mutually exclusive and hence did not meet our 
selection criteria (See section 5.3). 
Second, our welfare results are likely to diverge from the Sieg et al. results because of 
the differences in the specification of households’ ocation choices. The discrete choice 
characterization of households’ location choices allows us to estimate household 
preferences for that vary across income groups and educational levels. Our preference 
estimates suggest that high-income households have stronger preferences for air quality 
relative to the average population. We also find that t e average household population 
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has a lower preference for school quality compared to college educated households. This 
contrasts with the Sieg et al. framework in which households are restricted to have the 
same preference ordering of neighborhoods with respect to neighborhood amenities. This 
is due to the fact that the marginal rate of substitution between community amenities is 
independent of the household’s income and taste (se equation 3.14 in Chapter 3). In 
addition, the preference specification in this study naturally captures the geography of the 
housing market by allowing household preferences for locations to depend on the 
proximity to their employment location. We find tha households have stronger 




This dissertation has developed a discrete choice equilibrium model to evaluate the 
benefits of the air quality improvements that occurred in the Los Angeles area between 
1990 and 2000 as a result of the implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
The study has two main objectives. The first is to apply the discrete choice equilibrium 
framework (Anas, 1980, Bayer et al., 2005) to the valuation of large environmental 
changes. The second objective is to evaluate the distributional welfare impacts of the 
1990 CAAA in the Los Angeles area. 
Main Findings 
The empirical analysis suggests that the reductions in ozone concentrations across Los 
Angeles, Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino counties, provided an average 
equilibrium benefit of $1,800 to households. In contrast, average benefits are $1,400 
when equilibrium price effects are not accounted, demonstrating that ignoring 
equilibrium effects will likely underestimate the bnefits of large environmental changes. 
We find that the equilibrium welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA, in the Los Angeles 
area, varied significantly across income groups. Households in the highest income 
quartile experienced equilibrium benefits of approximately $3,600 as compared to only 
$400 for households in the lowest income quartile. W  also find that ignoring equilibrium 
adjustments in housing prices can significantly alter the distribution of relative welfare 
gains (i.e. welfare gains as a proportion of household income). Indeed, welfare impacts 
that do not account for equilibrium adjustments suggest that high-income households 
have larger relative welfare gains compared to low-income households. However, when 
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accounting for equilibrium adjustments, we find that the distribution of relative welfare 
gains from the 1990 CAAA is fairly even across income groups.  
Potential Limitations 
We now discuss some limitations of the equilibrium welfare measures developed in this 
dissertation. The equilibrium welfare estimates in this study are based on the simulation 
of a counterfactual equilibrium which only accounts for air quality changes and induced 
housing price changes that result from the resorting of households. The actual welfare 
impacts of the 1990 CAAA would also account for changes in the housing supply, 
household income, and household population. These changes will likely affect the 
welfare benefits of the 1990 CAAA.  
Using the higher household income levels in 2000 would likely lead to higher benefit 
estimates as high-income households have a higher marginal willingness to pay for air 
quality. If the supply of housing is elastic with respect to price, accounting for housing 
supply adjustments would likely increase equilibrium benefits as the influx of new 
housing units would provide more choices to households. An increase in population is 
likely to reduce equilibrium welfare gains to the extent that the increased demand for 
housing result in higher prices. This effect is however likely to vanish in the long run as 
the supply of housing adjusts.  
The estimated equilibrium welfare measures could be sensitive to the geographic 
definition of the housing market. We assume in this work that the Los Angeles area 
housing market comprises four counties: Los Angeles County, Orange County, Riverside 
County and San Bernardino County. One could argue, as in Sieg et al. (2004), that the 
Los Angeles area housing market also includes Ventura County. All else equal a larger 
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geographic area is likely to lead to higher welfare benefits as it would provide more 
choices to households. 
The equilibrium welfare measures could also be sensitive to the geographic 
characterization of neighborhoods. This study uses the 1990 Census Public Use 
Microdata Areas (PUMA) to characterize neighborhoods. On the other hand, Sieg et al. 
(2004) use the 1990 school district boundaries to define neighborhoods. One could also 
characterize neighborhoods using smaller geographic units such Census tracts, Census 
blocks groups or Census blocks. Altering the geographic definition of neighborhoods is 
less likely to significantly affect the air quality measures as they generally do not vary 
much across small areas. As a result welfare impacts of air quality changes are likely to 
be less sensitive to the characterization of neighborhoods. 
The random utility model defined by equation (4.3) assumes that the household-
specific unobserved tastes are independently distributed as Type I Extreme Value. This 
assumption gives rise to the multinomial logit (MNL) model. A major limitation of the 
MNL model is the IIA assumption, which generates individual household demands with 
limited substitution patterns. In Section 4.2 we discussed that the use of household 
interactions will produce residential location demands that possess rich substitution 
patterns. However, it is still the case that relaxing the IIA assumption would provide 
much richer substitution patterns across residential loc tions. The extent to which these 
richer substitution patterns affect the equilibrium welfare results is an empirical issue that 
will be addressed in future extensions of this research. 
The random utility specification in equation (4.3) also assumes away endogenous 
social interaction effects. Social interaction effects emerge from the fact that households 
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may care about the average socioeconomic characteristics of their neighborhoods. These 
social interaction effects are likely to be endogenously determined in the sorting 
equilibrium when households have heterogeneous preferences. This is because the 
average socioeconomic makeup of neighborhoods changes each time households resort. 
Our utility function incorporates an exogenous social interaction effect. The social 
interaction effect is a result of households’ homogeneous tastes for the proportion of 
Hispanics in the neighborhood. Incorporating endogen us social interactions in the 
household’s utility could affect the equilibrium welfare estimates. For example, low-
income renters could suffer welfare losses as increases in housing prices in their original 
neighborhoods force them to relocate to neighborhoods with less desirable attributes. An 
avenue for future research would be to explore empirically the extent to which the overall 
and distributional impacts of the 1990 CAAA are affected when endogenous social 
interactions are incorporated in the household’s random utility function. 
Future Research 
We discuss two extensions of this work to be explored in future research. One extension 
involves relaxing the assumption about the housing supply. The current framework 
assumes an exogenously determined housing supply. However, in the long run, the 
housing supply is likely to respond to large changes in air quality and housing prices. The 
question from a policy perspective is whether these changes substantially change the 
overall and distributional welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA.  
Sieg et al. (2004) try to address this question by using different predetermined supply 
elasticities in the counterfactual simulation. They find that the changes in housing supply 
elasticities do not lead to significant changes in welfare predictions. However, the Sieg et 
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al. conclusions rely on ad-hoc, instead of endogenous, changes in the housing supply. 
Walsh (2003) evaluates the equilibrium welfare impacts of open space policies, in the 
Epple-Sieg equilibrium framework, by incorporating an endogenous housing supply. To 
our knowledge, no one has yet investigated the equilibri m welfare impacts of policy 
changes using a discrete choice equilibrium model which incorporates endogenous 
housing supply adjustments. 
Another extension of this work would consider a detail d investigation of the 
implications of alternative specifications of household preferences on equilibrium welfare 
impacts. The question of policy interest here is whether the estimates of the equilibrium 
welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA differ substantially across alternative specifications 
of the household utility function. Our welfare result  suggest that the specification of 
household preferences could play a rather significat role in equilibrium welfare 
predictions. This is evidenced by the significant divergence between the county-level 
equilibrium benefit estimates from this study and the estimates from Sieg et al. (2004) 
(see Table 7.6). A clean comparison of the two approaches would, however, require 
estimating the Sieg et al. (2004) model using our data. This investigation would compare 
the benefit estimates from the Epple-Sieg and discrete choice equilibrium approaches 
using the same data.  The analysis would also compare the equilibrium welfare impacts 
from two alternative specifications of the household’s random utility, which relax the IIA 
assumption. These are the nested logit model and the random coefficient logit model. The 
nested logit allows a partial relaxation of the IIA assumption, whereas the random 
coefficient logit fully relaxes the IIA assumption. This type of investigation has been 
tried in the empirical industrial organization literature by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
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(1995, 2004), and Petrin (2002). However, these studies were only interested in the 
implications for estimates of price elasticities, not welfare predictions. 
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 Appendix A: Generating the Data 
A1. Regression output from computation of the rental housing price 
 
Table A1. Regression Used for Correcting House Values 
Note: * Significant at the 5 percent level. **  Significant at the 1 percent level. Dependent variable is log of house value.  
Regression includes a full set of PUMA dummies. 
 
 








    
Log Transaction price (10 times property tax) .335** .349** .440** 
Moved in 1985 to 1988  (compared to 1989-90) -0.013**  0.017**  -0.060**  
Moved in 1980 to 1984 0.037**  0.075**  -0.071**  
Moved in 1970 to 1979 0.192**  0.309**  0.040**  
Moved in 1960 to 1969 0.253**  0.395**  0.097**  
Moved in 1959 or earlier 0.201**  0.307**  0.088**  
    
R2 0.325 0.263 0.431 
Observations 138,181 39,550 33,891 
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Table A2. Regression Used for Correcting Monthly Rents 
 








    
Moved in 1985 to 1988  (compared to 1989-90) -0.082**  -0.062**  -0.081**  
Moved in 1980 to 1984 -0.207**  -0.193**  -0.234**  
Moved in 1970 to 1979 -0.329**  -0.298**  -0.328**  
Moved in 1960 to 1969 -0.410**  -0.439**  -0.295**  
Moved in 1959 or earlier -0.421**  -0.310**  -0.459**  
Rooms 0.027**  0.014**  0.043**  
Bedrooms 0.154**  0.144**  0.121**  
One-family house attached 
(compared One-family attached) 
-0.056**  -0.029**  -0.080**  
2 Apartments complex 
(compared One-family attached) 
-0.098**  -0.128**  -0.182**  
3-4 Apartments complex -0.128**  -0.132**  -0.168**  
5-9 Apartments complex -0.144**  -0.168**  -0.174**  
10-19 Apartments complex -0.142**  -0.166**  -0.133**  
20-49 Apartments complex -0.113**  -0.138**  -0.143**  
50 or more apartments complex -0.145**  -0.170**  -0.148**  
Built in 1985 to 1988 
(compared to 1989-90) 
-0.001**  0.011**  -0.053**  
Built in 1980 to 1984 -0.089**  -0.073**  -0.139**  
Built in 1970 to 1979 -0.078**  -0.045**  -0.158**  
Built in 1960 to 1969 -0.068**  -0.072**  -0.211**  
Built in 1950 to 1959 -0.105**  -0.103**  -0.257**  
Built in 1940 to 1949 -0.122**  -0.149**  -0.291**  
Built in 1939 or earlier -0.146**  -0.161**  -0.322**  
    
R2 0.368 0.410 0.395 
Observations 138,181 39,550 33,891 
Note: * Significant at the 5 percent level. **  Significant at the 1 percent level. Dependent variable is monthly rent.  
Regression includes a full set of PUMA dummies. 
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Table A3. Regression Used for Converting House Values to Rental Rates 
 








    
Owner-occupied 5.654**  5.830**  5.474**  
Rooms 0.049**  0.042**  0.090**  
Bedrooms 0.052**  0.080**  0.036**  
One-family house attached 
(compared One-family attached) 
-0.126**  -0.080**  -0.015**  
2 Apartments complex 
(compared One-family attached) 
-0.217**  -0.143**  -0.160**  
3-4 Apartments complex -0.210**  -0.179**  -0.130**  
5-9 Apartments complex -0.232**  -0.207**  -0.138**  
10-19 Apartments complex -0.229**  -0.204**  -0.108**  
20-49 Apartments complex -0.201**  -0.166**  -0.111**  
50 or more apartments complex -0.234**  -0.188**  -0.119**  
Built in 1985 to 1988 
(compared to 1989-90) 
-0.014**  -0.063**  -0.049**  
Built in 1980 to 1984 -0.083**  -0.158**  -0.142**  
Built in 1970 to 1979 -0.105**  -0.191**  -0.200**  
Built in 1960 to 1969 -0.182**  -0.239**  -0.303**  
Built in 1950 to 1959 -0.247**  -0.293**  -0.382**  
Built in 1940 to 1949 -0.255**  -0.316**  -0.402**  
Built in 1939 or earlier -0.257**  -0.319**  -0.409**  
    
R2 0.992 0.987 0.986 
Observations 138,181 39,550 33,891 
Note: * Significant at the 5 percent level. **  Significant at the 1 percent level. Dependent variable is log of corrected  
house value if owned, otherwise, log of corrected monthly rent. Regression includes a full set of PUMA dummies. 
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A2. STATA Codes Used to Generate the Data 
Main Code 
 
/* generates household sample from original CA pums */ 
 




log using gen_pumsdata90.log, replace 
set more off 
 
/* preliminaries: 
1. generate unit and person record from pums origin al files (pumsah90) 
2. generate puma pollution data 
3. generate puma distance data 
4. generate puma elevation data 




* housing unit record 
use pumsah90, clear 
keep rectype serialno sample state puma msapmsa hou swgt persons gqtype units1 rooms tenure acreage val ue rent1 yrmoved 
/// 
 bedrooms yrbuilt condo oneacre proptax rgrent rren tunt rvalunt rhhinc rhhfamtp r18undr r65over 
*keep if  msapmsa=="6000" | msapmsa=="4480" | msapm sa=="6780" | msapmsa=="0360" 
keep if  msapmsa=="4480" | msapmsa=="6780" | msapms a=="0360" 
gen pmsaname="." 
replace pmsaname="Orange County" if  msapmsa=="0360 " 
replace pmsaname="Los Angeles - Long Beach" if  msa pmsa=="4480" 
*replace pmsaname="Ventura" if  msapmsa=="6000" 
replace pmsaname="Riverside - San Bernardino" if  m sapmsa=="6780" 
drop if  msapmsa=="6000" /*drop ventura cnty*/ 
 * cleanup 
drop if units1=="00" | units1=="01" | units1=="10" 
drop if tenure=="0" | tenure=="4" 
sort serialno 
save pumsah90_socal, replace 
 
* person record 
clear 
set mem 500m 
use pumsap90.dta, clear 
keep serialno relat1 sex race age marital ragechld hispanic poverty pob school yearsch mobility migrst at migpuma /// 
 disabl1 disabl2 powstate powpuma travtime 
 
 * racial characteristics 
destring hispanic, replace 
gen hispanic1=(hispanic!=0 & hispanic!=199) 
gen mexic_org=(hispanic==1 | (hispanic>=210 & hispa nic<=220)) 
drop hispanic 
ren hispanic1 hispanic 
destring race, replace 
gen black=(hispanic==0 & race==2) 
gen white=(hispanic==0 & race==1) 
gen asianpi=(hispanic==0 & (race>=6 & race <=36)) 
 * keep household headers 
keep if relat1=="00" /*NOTE: this implies that only  */ 
 
* merge person and unit record 
sort serialno 
merge serialno using pumsah90_socal 
tab _merge 




save pumsah90_socal, replace 
clear 
set mem 250m 
 
* generate price variable 
do generate_price 
 
* merge price variable with master dataset 
use pumsah90_socal, clear 
merge serialno using pums90price 
tab _merge 




* drop non-contiguous pumas (see file puma_list.xls ) 
drop if puma=="04808" | puma=="06420" | puma=="0642 4" | puma=="06901" | puma=="06904" | puma=="06905" | puma=="07201" | 
puma=="07207" 
save pumsah90_socal, replace 
 







Sub-Code for Generating the Housing Price Variable 
 
/* do-file to generate adjusted home value and rent . Also converts home 




/*Part1: 1990 Pums housing sample*/ 
 
/* 
use value1990pums, clear 
gen value2=value 
tostring value, replace format(%02.0f) 
sort value 
save value1990pums, replace 
 
* add tax amounts 
use proptax1990pums, clear 
gen proptax2=proptax 
tostring proptax, replace format(%02.0f) 
sort proptax 
save proptax1990pums, replace 
*/ 
 
/* cleanup housing values in pums using tax data*/ 
 
 
use pumsah90_socal, clear 
* evaluate how many values or rents are top coded 




* add value amounts 
sort value 
merge value using value1990pums, keep(value1) 
tab _merge 
drop if _merge==2 
drop _merge 
* add tax amounts 
sort proptax 
merge proptax using proptax1990pums, keep(taxamt1) 
tab _merge 
drop if _merge==2 
drop _merge 
 
* begin cleanup 
tab msapmsa, gen(msa_dum) 
 
gen ln_val=log( value1) 
gen ln_tax=log( taxamt1) 
drop if value1!=. & ln_tax==. /* drop owner occupie d units with no reported property tax*/ 
destring value, replace 
 
 * compute predicted value 
xi: regress ln_val ln_tax i.puma i.yrmoved if  valu e>0 & value<25 & msa_dum1==1 [fw= houswgt] 
predict pred_lnval1 
xi: regress ln_val ln_tax i.puma i.yrmoved if  valu e>0 & value<25 & msa_dum2==1  [fw= houswgt] 
predict pred_lnval2 
xi: regress ln_val ln_tax i.puma i.yrmoved if  valu e>0 & value<25 & msa_dum3==1  [fw= houswgt] 
predict pred_lnval3 
 
gen  pred_lnval= pred_lnval1 if msa_dum1==1 
replace  pred_lnval= pred_lnval2 if msa_dum2==1 
replace  pred_lnval= pred_lnval3 if msa_dum3==1 
 
 * replace reported value with predicted value if p redicted value greater than reported value 
gen val_low=. 
replace val_low=1 if  pred_lnval!=. & ln_val!=. & p red_lnval> ln_val 
replace val_low=0 if  pred_lnval!=. & ln_val!=. & p red_lnval< ln_val 
tab val_low,m 
tab val_low if value==25,m 
tab val_low if value==25 & pred_lnval==.,m 
gen val_adj= value1 if val_low==0 
replace val_adj= exp(pred_lnval) if val_low==1 
 
 * regress adjust rents to market values 
gen ln_rent=log(rgrent) 
*replace ln_rent=. if tenure=="4" 
destring rooms bedrooms condo oneacre units1, repla ce 
 
 * adjust reported rents based on year moved 
xi: regress ln_rent i.yrmoved rooms bedrooms i.unit s1 i.yrbuilt i.puma if msa_dum1==1 [fw= houswgt] 
gen ln_rent_a= ln_rent + _b[_Iyrmoved_2]*_Iyrmoved_ 2 + _b[_Iyrmoved_3]*_Iyrmoved_3 + _b[_Iyrmoved_4]*_ Iyrmoved_4 + 
_b[_Iyrmoved_5]*_Iyrmoved_5 + _b[_Iyrmoved_6]*_Iyrm oved_6  if msa_dum1==1 
xi: regress ln_rent i.yrmoved rooms bedrooms i.unit s1 i.yrbuilt i.puma if msa_dum2==1 [fw= houswgt] 
replace ln_rent_a= ln_rent + _b[_Iyrmoved_2]*_Iyrmo ved_2 + _b[_Iyrmoved_3]*_Iyrmoved_3 + _b[_Iyrmoved_ 4]*_Iyrmoved_4 + 
_b[_Iyrmoved_5]*_Iyrmoved_5 + _b[_Iyrmoved_6]*_Iyrm oved_6  if msa_dum2==1 
xi: regress ln_rent i.yrmoved rooms bedrooms i.unit s1 i.yrbuilt i.puma if msa_dum3==1 [fw= houswgt] 
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replace ln_rent_a= ln_rent + _b[_Iyrmoved_2]*_Iyrmo ved_2 + _b[_Iyrmoved_3]*_Iyrmoved_3 + _b[_Iyrmoved_ 4]*_Iyrmoved_4 + 
_b[_Iyrmoved_5]*_Iyrmoved_5 + _b[_Iyrmoved_6]*_Iyrm oved_6  if msa_dum3==1 
gen rent_adj=exp(ln_rent_a) 
 
 * generate price variable using values and rents 
gen price1=. 
replace price1=val_adj if tenure=="1"|tenure=="2" 
replace price1 =rent_adj if tenure=="3" 
tab tenure if price1==.,m 
gen ln_price1=log(price1) 
drop if price1==. 
 
 * regress log prices on owner dummy to get coeffic ient for conversion of values  to gross rents 
gen owned=(tenure=="1"|tenure=="2") 
*xi: regress ln_price1 owned rooms bedrooms oneacre  i.units1 i.yrbuilt i.puma [fw= houswgt] 
xi: regress ln_price1 owned rooms bedrooms i.units1  i.yrbuilt i.puma if msa_dum1==1 [fw= houswgt]  
gen coef901=exp(_b[owned])       /* use value from previous 
regressions*/ 
xi: regress ln_price1 owned rooms bedrooms i.units1  i.yrbuilt i.puma if msa_dum2==1 [fw= houswgt] 
gen coef902=exp(_b[owned]) 




replace coef90=coef901  if owned==1 & msa_dum1==1 
replace coef90=coef902  if owned==1 & msa_dum2==1 
replace coef90=coef903  if owned==1 & msa_dum3==1 
tab coef90,m 
tab tenure if coef90 ==. 
 
 * convert values to rental rates 
gen rt_price1=price1/coef90  if owned==1 
replace rt_price1=price1  if owned==0 
replace ln_price1=log(rt_price1) 
 
*keep serialno price1 rt_price1 ln_price1 
*ren price1 price 
keep serialno rt_price1 ln_price1 coef90 topcoded 
ren rt_price1 rt_price90 
ren ln_price1 ln_price 
sort serialno  
save pums90price, replace 
 
 
Sub-Code for Generating Household and Housing-Type Data used in MATLAB Estimation 
 
/* This do-file generates (1) housing types dataset  and (2) household population dataset*/ 
 
cd "H:\dissert_files\datasets\sata_data\pums" 
set more off 
 
 
/************ generate 1990 housing types and their  attributes for matlab **************/ 
use pumsah90_socal, clear 
 
* drop hslds with monthly inc less than 500 or rent al hsg price 
gen hincm90=rhhinc/12 
drop if hincm90<500 
drop if  hincm90<=rt_price90 /*drop hslds who canno t affort their hsg unit*/ 
 
* merge 3-digit puma coordinates 
generate str puma1 = substr(puma,1,3) 
gen a="00" 
egen puma3dg = concat(puma1 a) 
drop puma1 a 
sort puma3dg 
merge puma3dg using work_puma, keep(pow_x pow_y) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
ren pow_x puma3dg_x 
ren pow_y puma3dg_y 
* merge place of work puma coordinates 
ren puma3dg puma3dg_a 
gen puma3dg=powpuma 
sort puma3dg 
merge puma3dg using work_puma, keep(pow_x pow_y) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
ren pow_x powrk_x 
ren pow_y powrk_y 
replace powrk_x=0 if powrk_x==. 




save pumsah90_socal1, replace 
 
* generate puma indices 
gen a=1 
rename a numhses 
destring msapmsa, gen(pmsa) 
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destring puma3dg_a, replace 
collapse (mean) pmsa hispanic mexic_org black white  asianpi rhhinc puma3dg_a puma3dg_x puma3dg_y (coun t) 
numhses,by(puma) 
ren puma3dg_a puma3dg 
egen int pumaind1  = seq() 
*tostring pumaind1, generate(pumaind2) format(%03.0 f) 
*gen year="1990" 
*egen pumaind = concat(year pumaind2) 
tostring pumaind1, generate(pumaind) format(%02.0f)  
ren hispanic shrhisp 
ren black shrblack 
ren white shrwhite 
ren asianpi shrasian 
ren rhhinc avginc 
sort puma 
save puma90ind, replace 
 
* merge puma indices and average demographics to ma ster dataset 
use pumsah90_socal1, clear 
sort puma 
merge puma using puma90ind , keep(pumaind pumaind1)  
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
 
* generate new variables 
tab yrbuilt 
gen blt80s90s=(yrbuilt=="1" | yrbuilt=="2" | yrbuil t=="3") 
gen blt60s70s=(yrbuilt=="4" | yrbuilt=="5") 
tab  units1 
gen singlefam=( units=="02" | units=="03") 
gen owned=(tenure=="1"|tenure=="2") 
destring bedrooms, replace 
replace bedrooms=bedrooms-1 /*number of bedrooms in  census starts at 1 instead of 0*/ 
egen hsid = concat(pumaind owned bedrooms blt80s90s  blt60s70s singlefam) 
sort hsid 
egen pricetype=mean(rt_price90), by(hsid) 
drop if  hincm90<=pricetype /*drop hslds who cannot  affort their hsg type*/ 
save pumsah90_socal1, replace 
 
* generate location types 
gen a=1 
collapse (mean) pricetype owned bedrooms blt80s90s blt60s70s singlefam /// 
 pumaind1 (count) a [fw= houswgt], by( hsid) 
gen rt_price90=pricetype 
* generate housing units by location type 
ren a agrgdem_w 
egen totmkt=sum( agrgdem_w) 
gen mktsh= agrgdem_w / totmkt 
 
* generate indices for location types 
sort hsid 
egen int altid = seq() 
sort hsid 
*save pums90_discr, replace 
 
* merge puma demographics 
save pums90alt1b, replace 
use puma90ind, clear 
sort pumaind1 
save puma90ind , replace 
use pums90alt1b, clear 
sort pumaind1 
merge pumaind1 using puma90ind , keep(pmsa shrblack  shrhisp shrasian shrwhite avginc puma puma3dg puma 3dg_x puma3dg_y) 
tab _merge 




* merge puma attributes 
sort puma 
*merge puma using puma90_attr, keep(math crime elev  ozmean ozexmean pm10 hdens_km  dist_coast coast5km ) 
merge puma using puma90_attr, keep(math crime elev hdens_km dist_coast coast5km) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
sort puma 
merge puma using pollution, keep(cntyid ozo89_91 oz o94_96 ozo99_01 oz8991mean oz9496mean oz9901mean pm 89_91 pm94_96 
pm99_01 pm8991mean pm9496mean pm9901mean) 
tab _merge 




/* merge ozone 3-yr centered averages 
destring puma, gen(puma1) 
sort puma1 
merge puma1 using ozone89t01p5, keep(ozo99_01 ozo94 _96 ozo89_91 cntyname) 
tab _merge 




* merge 3-digit puma coordinates 
generate str puma1 = substr(puma,1,3) 
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gen a="00" 
egen puma3dg = concat(puma1 a) 
drop puma1 a 
sort puma3dg 
merge puma3dg using work_puma, keep(pow_x pow_y) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
ren pow_x puma3dg_x 
ren pow_y puma3dg_y 




merge puma3dg using work_puma, keep(powrk_x powrk_y ) 
tab _merge 





drop hsid puma 
sort altid 
save pums90alt1c, replace 
 
 
/************ generate 1990 household data for matl ab **************/ 
 
* add location indices to household data  
use pumsah90_socal1, clear 
sort hsid 
merge hsid using pums90alt1b, keep( altid) 
tab _merge 
drop _merge 
ren altid altind 
ren serialno hhid 
destring msapmsa, gen(pmsahh) 
 
/* 
* merge puma coordinates for place of work 
egen puma1=concat(powstate powpuma) 
destring puma1, replace 
sort puma1 
merge puma1 using pums90dist_cor, keep( point_x poi nt_y) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
ren point_x powpuma_x 





* create cnty and pmsa dummies 
destring puma, gen(puma1) 
sort puma1 
merge puma1 using ozone89t01p5, keep(cntyname) 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
gen cntyhh=37 
replace cntyhh=59 if cntyname=="Orange" 
replace cntyhh=65 if cntyname=="Riverside" 
replace cntyhh=71 if cntyname=="San Bernardino" 
*tab cntyname, gen(cntyid) 




ren persons  hsld_size 
gen female=(sex=="1") 
gen mwkids=(rhhfamtp=="01" & (ragechld=="1" | ragec hld=="2")) 
gen mwkids6=(rhhfamtp=="01" & ragechld=="1") 
gen kids=(r18undr=="1") 
destring yearsch, replace 
gen college=(yearsch>=12) 
gen hincm_price=hincm90 - rt_price90 
*keep hincm90 houswgt year hsld_size female age mwk ids mwkids6 white black /// 
 hispanic asianpi college pumaind hsid /// 
 age65 cntyid1-cntyid4 pmsaid1-pmsaid3 hhid altind  
keep hincm90 houswgt year hsld_size female age kids  mwkids mwkids6 white black /// 
 hispanic asianpi college pumaind hsid puma3dg_a po wpuma workplace powrk_x powrk_y /// 
 age65 cntyhh pmsahh hhid altind  
destring pumaind hhid puma3dg_a powpuma , replace 




save pumshh1990c, replace 
 





Appendix B: Matlab Codes for Estimation  
B1. Main Code for Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
% PURPOSE: 2-step ML estimation of residential loca tion model for Los 
% Angeles area 
 
% Constant Tra, March 2006. 
% University of Maryland, College Park 
% ctra@arec.umd.edu 
 
clear all  
 
global zbi n k y prob12 meanvalue ii nj nprod wg it er xtol 
 
% get data 
























save mvalold_a mvalold oldt2 
 
delta=log(mvalold); 
delta = delta(prob12(:,2)); % this assigns the delt as to the n*(k+1)-by-1 individual probabilities cho ices 
meanvalue=delta; 
 
tic; like=mlogit_likedh1a(theta2); toc 
 
tic   % Initialize computing time 
while any(convcrit > 0) && (maxiter > iter) 
    options=optimset('Display','iter','Diagnostics' ,'off','LargeScale',... 
    'off','GradObj','on','MaxIter', 5000); 
    disp(' ') 
    disp('***************************************** **********************************') 
    disp(['            OUTER ITERATION #   ' num2st r(iter)]) 
    oldtheta2=theta2; 
    olddelta=delta; 
    oldlike=mlogit_likedh1a(theta2); 
    oldfuneval=totfuneval; 
    olditer=tot_iter; 
 
    disp(' ') 
        disp('Starting optimization ...') 
        disp(' ') 
        [theta2, like, exitflag, output] = fminunc( 'mlogit_likedh1a',theta2,options); 
        coefs(:,iter)=theta2; 
        disp(' ') 
        disp(['....Optimization Completed. Exitflag = ' num2str(exitflag) ' Obj. Fun.= ' num2str(like) '  1st oder 
condition=: ' num2str(output.firstorderopt)]) 
        disp(' ') 
        delta=meanval_a(theta2); 
        meanvalue=delta; 
    if max(isnan(delta)) == 1 
        disp('error: mean value not a number') 
        break 
    else 
        dtheta2= theta2 - oldtheta2; 
        dxcrit=max(abs(dtheta2) - xtol); 
        ddelta= delta - olddelta; 
        ddcrit=max(abs(ddelta) - dtol); 
        df=(oldlike - like)/oldlike; 
        convcrit=[(ddcrit);(dxcrit);(abs(df)-ftol)] ; 
        disp(' ') 
 
        disp([ 'Relative Chg. in Obj. Func.= ' num2 str(df) '.  Infinity Norm of dX= ' num2str(max(abs( dtheta2)))]) 
        disp(' ') 
        disp(['.... End of Outer Iteration # ' num2 str(iter)]) 
        tot_iter=output.iterations + olditer; 
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        totfuneval=output.funcCount + oldfuneval; 
        iter=iter+1; 
    end 
end 
 











% Write a message about why it stopped 
  if all(convcrit <= 0) 
    critmsg ='Convergence Tolerance Achieved'; 
  else 
    critmsg =  'Maximum Iterations Reached'; 
  end 
 
 
% COMPUTE COVARIANCE MATRICES FOR HOUSEHOLD INTERACTION PARAMETERS 






delta = delta1(prob12(:,2)); 
mval=exp(delta); 
 
% compute cov of theta2 




    xi=zbi(m*(j-1)+1:m*j,:); 
    yi=y(m*(j-1)+1:m*j); 
    prob3i=prob3(m*(j-1)+1:m*j); 
    gradi=xi'*(yi - prob3i); 
    grad=grad + gradi; 
    covbeta=covbeta + gradi*gradi'; 
%     covdelta=covdelta + (yi - prob3i)'*(yi - prob 3i); 
end 
% save covbeta covbeta 
setheta=sqrt(diag(inv(covbeta))); 
tstats=theta2./setheta; 
% clear covdelta 
 
 




% basic specification testing; 
theta0=zeros(size(theta2)); 
lik=-like; 
lr1 = -mlogit_likedh1a(theta0); % restricted log-li kelihood: intercepts only 
meanvalue=zeros(size(delta)); 
lr = -mlogit_likedh1a(theta0); % restricted log-lik elihood: all estimates 
lr2 =  -mlogit_likedh1a(theta2); % restricted log-l ikelihood: constants only 
lratio = -2*(lr - lik); 
lratio1 = -2*(lr1 - lik); 
lratio2 = -2*(lr2 - lik); 
% lratio_p=; % likelihood ratio p-value 
rsqr = 1 - (lik / lr); % McFadden pseudo-R^2 
 
disp('MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE S: 1990 OZONE AVG. Model') 
fprintf('Nobs, Nprods, Nvars                    : % 6d,%6d,%6d \n',n,nprod,size(theta2,1)); 
  disp(['Log-Likelihood                         :  ' num2str(lik)]) 
  disp(['# of func. iterations                  :  ' num2str(tot_iter)]) 
  disp(['# of obj. func. evaluations            :  ' num2str(totfuneval)]) 
  disp(['run time (minutes)                     :  ' num2str(comp_t)]) 
  disp(['Likelihood ratio  statistic (all=0)    :  ' num2str(lratio)]) 
fprintf('LR p-value (all=0)               : %9.4f \ n',1-chi2cdf(lratio,size(theta2,1)+ nprod - 1)); 
fprintf('LR p-value (deltas=0)            : %9.4f \ n',1-chi2cdf(lratio2,nprod - 1)); 
fprintf('LR p-value (slopes=0)            : %9.4f \ n',1-chi2cdf(lratio1,size(theta2,1))); 
  disp(['McFadden pseudo-R^2              :  ' num2 str(rsqr)]) 
disp(' ') 
 





% SECOND STAGE OLS ESTIMATION % 
%-----------------------------% 
 
vnames_a=strvcat('delta','const','bedrooms','built8 0a','built60s70s', 'Singlefam',... 
    'math','logcrime','logelev','coast5km','logdens k', ... 
    'shrhisp','owned', 'ozone'); 
vnames_b=strvcat('delta','const','bedrooms','built8 0a','built60s70s', 'Singlefam',... 
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    'math','logcrime','logelev','coast5km','logdens k', ... 
    'owned', 'ozone'); 
 
disp(' ') 
disp('SECOND STAGE ESTIMATES (OLS)') 
disp(' ') 
 
delta1a=delta1 - min(delta1)+1; 
delta1a=log(delta1a); 
 
z1 = [ones(size(zmat,1),1) zmat(:,2:end)]; 





disp('SECOND STAGE ESTIMATES (OLS w/o prop. hispani cs)') 
z1(:,end-2)=[]; 




B2. Code for Computation of Log-Likelihood Function 
function [like,grad] = mlogit_likedh1a(beta) 
% PURPOSE: Computes value of log likelihood functio n for multinomial logit 
% estimation of Los Angeles area residential locati on model. 
 
% Constant Tra, March 2006. 
% University of Maryland, College Park 
% ctra@arec.umd.edu 
 
global zbi n k y meanvalue prob12 
 
    % compute choice vector of choice probabilities  for household 
    ezb=exp(meanvalue + zbi*beta); % n*(k+1)-by-1 
    ezb1=reshape(ezb,k+1,n); % (k+1) by n 
    sumezb1=sum(ezb1)';  % n by 1 
 
    probi=ezb./(sumezb1(prob12(:,1))); 
 
    % compute likelihood of household and update po pulation likelihood 
    if all(probi)<1 
        like=-1e10; 
    else 
        like=y'*log(probi); 
    end 
 
    like=-like; 
     
    if nargout>1    % compute gradient 
        grad=zbi'*(y - probi); 
        grad=-grad; 
    end 
 
B3. Code for Computation of Alternative Constants via Contraction Mapping 
function delta = meanval_a(theta2) 
% This function computes the mean utility level giv en estimates of the 
% household interaction parameters 
 
% Constant Tra, March 2006. 
% University of Maryland, College Park 
% ctra@arec.umd.edu 
 
% Based on code by: 
% Aviv Nevo, May 1998.Source: "A Research Assistant 's Guide to Discrete  
% Choice Models of Demand," NBER technical paper #2 21, and "Measuring  
% Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, " NBER WP #6387.  
 




if max(abs(theta2-oldt2)) < xtol; 
 tol = 1e-9; 
 flag = 0; 
else 
   tol = 1e-1; 
 flag = 1; 
end 
 
norm = 1; 
avgnorm = 1; 
i = 1; 
 
while norm > max(tol*10^(-flag*floor(iter/2)),1e-9)  && avgnorm > max(1e-1*tol*10^(-flag*floor(iter/2)) ,1e-11) 
 
    alpha= sumiprobi_a(theta2,mvalold); % this returns the vector housing-type demands (see B4) 
 mval= mvalold.*nj./alpha; 
 
    t = abs(log(mvalold) - log(mval)); 
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      norm = max(t); 
      avgnorm = mean(t); 
      disp(['iteration #  ' num2str(i) ' mval(4): '  num2str(mval(4)) ' aplha(4): ' num2str(alpha(2)) '  max chg mval: ' 
num2str(min(norm,avgnorm))]) 
     mvalold = mval; 
      i = i + 1; 
end 
disp(['     # of iterations for delta convergence:  ' num2str(i)]) 
 
oldt2=theta2;    
save mvalold_a mvalold oldt2 
 
delta11=log(mvalold); 
delta11=delta11-delta11(1); % normalize delta: firs t element is set to zero 
 
delta = delta11(prob12(:,2)); % this assigns the de ltas to the n*(k+1)-by-1 individual probabilities c hoices 
save delta delta11 alpha 
 
B4. Code for Computation of the sample Housing-Type Demands 
function [f,prob3] = sumiprobi_a(beta,mvalold) 
% PURPOSE: Computes sample housing-type demands use d in computation of 
% alternative constants 
 
% Constant Tra, March 2006. 
% University of Maryland, College Park 
% ctra@arec.umd.edu 
 
global zbi n k prob12 
 
delta11=log(mvalold); 
delta = delta11(prob12(:,2)); % this assigns the de ltas to the n*(k+1)-by-1 individual probabilities c hoices 
 
    % compute choice vector of choice probabilities  for household 
    ezb=exp(delta + zbi*beta); % n*(k+1)-by-1 
    ezb1=reshape(ezb,k+1,n); % (k+1) by n 
    sumezb1=sum(ezb1)';  % n by 1 
 
    prob3=ezb./(sumezb1(prob12(:,1))); % vector of choice probabilities 
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